

АКТУАЛНИ ПРОБЛЕМИ В СЪВРЕМЕННАТА КИТАИСТИКА И ИЗТОКОЗНАНИЕ

Доклади от международната конференция, посветена на 25-годишнината
от откриването на специалност „Китаистика“
В СУ „Св. Климент Охридски“



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Papers from the International Conference, Dedicated to the 25th Anniversary of the
Establishment of the Chinese Studies Program at
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Том 2

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Sun Wukong: Origins of the character

Alena Potekhina

Abstract

Sun Wukong is not a simple character of the famous novel "Journey to the West". Sun Wukong has deep worshiping tradition throughout the area of Chinese civilization, especially in the South of China, in Taiwan, Singapore and etc. This article observes two possible lines of origins of Sun Wukong character: Indian and Chinese roots. Indian line is represented in the first part of the article. It emphasizes the strong connection between Sun Wukong and Hanuman. In the second part of the article there are references to ancient Chinese books and folktales, mentioning the white monkey figure. The third part of the article analyses the phenomenon of trickster in correlation with the character of Sun Wukong. There are several examples of comparison between Sun Wukong and European tricksters.

Keywords: Sun Wukong, Hanuman, animal helper, "white monkey" motif, indigenous route, archetype, trickster

The character of Sun Wukong is still very popular among the population of Southeast Asia. There is a temple in Hong Kong devoted to the Monkey King (大聖廟). On the altar of the temple we can see Sun Wukong himself. Singaporeans, Indonesians, Malaysians, and Thais celebrate the birthday of the Monkey God on the 15th or 16th day of the first lunar month. The Monkey King Festival is also celebrated in China on the 16th day of the eighth lunar month of the Chinese calendar. Moreover, there are a lot of media adaptations of "Journey to the West", which are called the Monkey King or Monkey.

What makes Sun Wukong so popular even nowadays? The analysis of the origins of the character can be an approach to the answer to this question.

There are two main lines of describing the origins of Sun Wukong character:

1. Sun Wukong roots are considered to be Indian, deriving from the Hindu deity Hanuman from the Ramayana.
2. "Ancestors" of Sun Wukong can be found in Chinese folklore tales and folklore culture, which means that the character itself has ancient Chinese roots and probably was represented in the Chinese culture much earlier than Buddhism became the part of syncretic Chinese religion.

Firstly, we would like to briefly describe those similarities between Sun Wukong and Hanuman, which scholars often emphasize. Let us refer to the extensive researches

of Hera S. Walker, the scholar from Ursinus College (Philadelphia) and Ramnath Subbaraman, the scientist from University of Chicago:

- Sun Wukong and Hanuman are both the “monkey” heroes.
- Hanuman and Sun Wukong are very skillful in “shapeshifting”. For example, throughout “Journey to the West” Sun Wukong shows his ability to transform in animals and people or to change the size of his body.
- Hera S. Walker noticed that both Sun Wukong and Hanuman originate from the wind. In the novel “Journey to the West” it is said that firstly there was a stone on the top of the mountain. This stone split open and gave birth to a stone egg, which was transformed into the monkey, exposed to the wind.
- Both monkeys can travel long distances through the air.
- Both monkeys destroy a sacred grove of trees (Walker 1998: 4-12).
- After their birth and in childhood Sun Wukong and Hanuman disturbed “the Great Benevolent Sage of Heaven, the Celestial Jade Emperor of the Most Venerable Deva and Indra”, who is ruler of Heaven in Hindu mythology. However after punishments and reeducation they both “receive blessing or boon from this figure out of admiration and respect for the disturbance”.
- Both monkeys are immortal.
- Moreover, Sun Wukong and Hanuman are central figures in a monkey kingdom. Their kingdoms are also similar in some ways, both are “in caves located in mountainous areas near streams and waterfalls” (Subbaraman 2002: 4-9).
- Both belong to the category of animal helpers (Walker 1998: 4).

In this sense it is interesting to observe what Sun Wukong is believed to help for. As we mentioned above, talking about Sun Wukong, in the area of distribution of Chinese civilization there are temples devoted to him. Several temples we can find in Taiwan. For instance, in Yilan County there is a temple called “宜蘭紫雲寺” (“Temple of purple cloud”). This temple is also called “猴齊天廟” (Monkey, Equal to Heaven). Taiwanese often call Sun Wukong either 猴齊天 (Monkey, Equal to Heaven) or 大聖爺 (Sage Master). In the temple on the left and right sides of the statue of Monkey, Equal to Heaven we can also see statues of the Patron of warriors (武大聖) and the Patron of writing or literature (文大聖). Besides, there are statues of main characters of “Journey to the West”: Zhu Bajie, Sha Wujing and Xuanzang.

Another temple in Taiwan called “南市萬福庵” (Monastery of good luck in Tainan City) is intended for children suffering from intractable diseases. There are also statues of characters from the novel “Journey to the West”. There is banyan tree inside the temple, which is considered to be sacred one. It is said that its trunk was gradually changing and its form became very similar to the form of monkey’s body. Undoubtedly, this change is very unusual and makes prayers wonder.

According to all these comments, we can say that Sun Wukong is believed to be the patron of literature or writing, warriors and also the healer.

We can say that Sun Wukong is a product of both, indigenous monkey figures which we can find in various Chinese tales, and Indian Hanuman. However, in this article we more tend to explain the Chinese routes of Sun Wukong character.

When we are talking about the Chinese origin of Sun Wukong character, we firstly can mention the writer Lu Xun, who thought that Sun Wukong derives from the water monster Wu Zhiqi, usually depicted as a monkey. This figure is mentioned in the Tang dynasty “Book of Ancient Saint Mountains and Great Rivers” (古岳渎经) (Zhang & Zhou 2002: 12). Hera S. Walker noted that “white monkey” motif was manifested in Sichuan. In the heart of the Sichuan basin, pictorial representations of early ape tales are carved into stone sarcophagi and cave tombs, dating from the Han Dynasty. These carvings represent a local version of the “White Ape” legend, which later became the subject of the famous Tang short story “The White Monkey”. Hera S. Walker said that there are a lot of “‘demonic’ creatures in Sichuan funerary carvings in which either humans or dogs are attacking monkeys or apes, which can be related to the motif of ‘soul protection’” (Walker 1998: 55-59).

Hera S. Walker found even earlier references of “white monkey” motif. In the Chu kingdom (700-223 BC), which includes the central Yangtze River Basin, the people revered gibbon monkeys, especially white ones. Chu kingdom was an ancient center of mystical beliefs out of which Taoism evolved. “Chu folk culture considered the animal world on a par with human society and believed that some animals are rich in *qi*, or the mystical power of the cosmos. Taoism raised the status and power of the gibbon, which was regarded as one of the animals with the expert knowledge in inhaling *qi*. Among the many magical abilities credited to these monkeys is the ability to assume human shape and prolong their life several hundred years” (Walker 1998: 53). Actually, in the “Journey to the West” the narrative clearly states that Wukong is “a seeker of Tao”. Moreover, the

holidays devoted to the Monkey King in Singapore, China and other parts of Southeast Asia are deemed to be Taoist in nature.

Chinese scholars Zhang Qiang and Zhou Yeju in their article mention several researchers who are following the idea of Lu Xun and believe that Sun Wukong has indigenous roots. For example, they mention the scientist Gong Weiyong (龚维英) and his research about Sun Wukong and Qi of Xia (夏启) who was the son of Yu the Great. Gong Weiyong believe that the image of Sun Wukong is connected with Xia Qi and even derives from the character of Xia Qi. Myths about Xia Qi are presented in the “Classic of Mountains and Seas” (山海经), which was known from the 4th century BC and got its present form in the early Han dynasty.

As Zhang Qiang and Zhou Yeju said, in 1980s Chinese scholars on the wave of the development of semiotics, and especially following the research about mythological archetype, also began to use terms “archetype” and “symbol” in correlation with the origins of Sun Wukong character (Zhang & Zhou 2002: 13).

In this regard, it would be appropriate to talk about the phenomenon of “trickster”, extensively researched by European scientists. This word comes from the root “trick” which can be understood as a fraud, a joke, a prank; a foolish act; focus, ability, skill (Gavrilov 2006a: 359). According to Paul Radin, the mythological stories about trickster “belong to the oldest expressions of mankind”. “Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes others and who is always duped himself”. Actions of trickster are unconscious, don’t have any causal connection, but impulsive and he cannot control them. “He knows neither good nor evil yet he is responsible for both. He possesses no values, moral or social, is at the mercy of his passions and appetites” (Radin 1956: 9). According to Carl Jung, the trickster is an archetype, derived from the collective unconscious.

Dual oppositions in mythology are represented in the characters of cultural hero and trickster. Trickster is *demoniacal* and comical double of the cultural hero. The trickster acts as a provocateur of the cultural hero. The sense of trickster’s provocations is to check out the viability of the world and relevance of the existing world order, creating its multivariate principle. The trickster through his unconscious and unpredictable actions reverses ideal world to real. The character of trickster depicts the struggle of man with himself and the world around him. The images of the cultural hero and the trickster indicate that the original type of human interaction with the world evolved spontaneously,

developed constantly, but not rationally. It was changing due to new discoveries and new knowledge (Gavrilov 2006: 9-33).

As a synonym of “trickster” in Chinese can be seen the word “骗子”, which actually can not reflect the whole meaning of this phenomenon. Acts of the trickster are not only reduced to tricky or evil ones. The most important function of the trickster is to change this world. We also cannot fully identify Sun Wukong with a European explanation of trickster, because this term was given on the basis of European mythology which is different from Asian one. However, at least we can find some features of trickster in the character of Monkey King. In order to make it clear, we can observe several examples of European tricksters, such as Greek Odysseus and Egyptian Seth.

Odysseus was renowned for his intellectual brilliance and versatility, and was known by the epithet Odysseus the Cunning. Odysseus also had to go to the underworld of Hades in order to ask prophet of Thebes Tiresias how to come back to Ithaca.

According to Egyptian myths, Seth was originally revered as the "protector of Ra", the patron of the royal power, his name was included in the titles and names of several pharaohs. Afterwards (Third Intermediate Period of Egypt and Late Periods, in other words, starting from 1069 BC to 332 BC) he was demonized, he became known as God of disorder and violence, resorts to deception to achieve bad ends. However Seth was still regarded as a deity of valor and courage.

Actually, similar characters we can find in mythologies of other cultures, for example, in the culture of Khanty living in Khanty–Mansi Autonomous Okrug, a region historically known as “Yugra” in Russia, together with the people Mansi. In one Khanty myth called “The sacred legend of the Coveted Hero – a Merchant of the Upper world and the Underworld” (Myths, legends, tales of Khanty and Mansi 1990: 105 – 125), the main character as well as Odysseus is going to the underworld in order to understand why his young daughter died.

We can find a lot of similarities between Sun Wukong and these three characters. Sun Wukong always does not want to obey Gods’ rules and regulations, feeling himself cleverer and stronger than Gods. He is also standing on the border of three worlds – Upper, Middle and the Underworld, and can be considered as a connection between these worlds. The weapon of Sun Wukong is very interesting in that sense. Ruyi Jingu Bang (如意金箍棒) was used by the Dragon King of the East Sea in order to measure the depths of the world flood during times immemorial. This weapon weighs 13,500 jin (8.1 tons) and is

banded with a gold ring on each end. It is also noted in the novel "Journey to the West" that Jingu Bang holds the sea. Such a kind of stick is also mentioned in the Khanty myth about the merchant, who got it during the journey to the underworld in order to fight with demons. This weapon can be recognized as a symbol of world axis, which connects the world of dead creatures and demons, alive creatures and Gods.

As we said, Sun Wukong always tries to break rules made by Gods. The world order or natural rhythm is maintained by rituals and ceremonies, which are also disrupted by Sun Wukong. Monkey King shows his human fallibility – he is greedy, selfish, and prone to sudden changes of mood and outbursts of exceptional violence. He defies divine authority, laughs at attempts to be controlled, and leaves chaos in his wake. He is the misbehaving child who only needs a firm hand and a sense of purpose to come good. These characteristics invoke deep interest among the people because they can find something similar to themselves in Sun Wukong character. Maybe because of this reason Sun Wukong is very attractive personage even nowadays.

Sun Wukong or Monkey King is a product of both Chinese and Indian, particularly, Buddhist culture. By the time Buddhism found its durable basis in Chinese culture, legends and tales about White Monkey were circulated orally throughout China, and provided foundation on which fragments of the Rama saga could be added. Obviously Wu Cheng'en had a large oral tradition to draw upon for his novel.

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The Akedun Album (阿克敦 《奉使圖》): Selfhood Refashioning in Inter-media Art

Chan Man Sing Vicky, Law Yuen-mei

Abstract

Akedun 阿克敦 (1685-1756), a Manchu bannerman who worked his way through the imperial examinations to become a Hanlin academician, was sent on four diplomatic missions to Choson Korea between 1717 and 1725. Each of these trips occasioned dozens of poems by Akedun and his fellow envoys, both as diplomatic goodwill gestures toward their Choson hosts and as travelogue. In 1725, after his return to Beijing from his last trip, he commissioned a picture album to be made, as visual historiography of his Korean missions, with his poems inscribed on the top. The album passed through multiple generations of the Akedun family and is now kept in the Ethnic Library of China in Beijing.

The album has been much studied since 1990 (Lihong Liu 2016; Jeong Eunjoo 2005; Huang Youfu 1999, 2000). The scholarly focus so far is largely on the historical circumstances of its production and its ethnographic significance. In this paper, the author proposes a new angle of investigation: the visual-logogrammic art as an aesthetic embodiment of ‘Meta-Reality’. It is in such an inter-media, semi-fictional space, that the Qing selfhood, on both the personal and the national level, was refashioned in “idealized cognitive models”. The paper will also examine some of Chinese art conventions that make such historiographical fiction possible.

Keywords: Akedun, Fengshi tu, Choson dynasty, meta-reality

I. Introduction

This is a short version of a longer paper on Akedun’s 阿克敦 (1661-1756) picture album, *Fengshi tu* 奉使圖, which records his 4 diplomatic missions to Choson Korea between 1717 and 1725. The album consists of 20 paintings, each with at least one poem inscribed on top, describing scenes from his Korean journeys. Akedun himself authored the poems, while the paintings were believed to be the work of a famous Qing court painter of the time, Zheng Yu 鄭璵.

Akedun’s album is, superficially, an exercise of visual historiography, which was not unusual in his times. Both Emperors Kangxi and Qianlong were known to have commissioned paintings to record their visits and conquests of far-off regions of the vast Qing empire. Such paintings were apparently propagandist and motivated by imperialistic ambitions. They often reflect a “meta-reality” and are understandably less scrupulous about ‘facts’. By “meta-reality”, we mean “beyond-reality”, as Bhaskar

explains it (Morgan 2003: 122). It is “more than simply unfulfilled potentials held in check by existence in demi-reality (i.e. the real world) “. It is in fact the “basic necessary conditions (stunned though it may be in real life) in the very forms of being experienced in demi-reality.” (Moran 2003: 122-3, Bhaskar 2002: 175). In this sense, meta-reality is a structure upon which the human mundanity is parasitic. By postulating Akedun’s album as “meta-realistic”, we shall argue that it is a self-fashioning act that conflates what is real and what is merely potential. As historiography, it belongs to a Confucian tradition that prizes history’s didactic function above mere fact recording. As art, it is akin, in spirit at least, to the impossible “Banana Tree in Snow” (雪中芭蕉).

II. Akedun’s Korean missions and *Fengshi tu*

Akedun came from a Plain-Blue Banner family, and went through the Imperial Examination system (keju 科舉) to earn his first government appointment as a Hanlin apprentice editor (編修) in 1709. As a Manchu well versed in the poetic art, he was sent by Emperor Kangxi on his first Korean mission in 1717, to deliver a very rare and expensive medicine, *kongqing* (空青), to the Choson King Sukchong 肅宗 for his ophthalmic illness. His second mission happened in the same year, this time to relate the news of the passing of the Qing Empress Dowager. The third mission took place in 1722, when Akedun was already the Vice-minister of War. He led a 75-men strong entourage to Choson to confirm Yi Geum (1694-1776), Sukchong’s brother, as the heir-apparent. Two years later, in 1724, (the second year of the Yongzheng 雍正 reign), he was sent again to Choson, this time as an associate ambassador, (the prime ambassador being Gioro Sulu) to convey Qing condolences on the death of King Kyongjong (r. 1722-24) and to confirm the succession to the throne of Yi Geum Yongjo (英祖, r. 1724-76).

During his first three missions between 1717 and 1722, Akedun wrote a few dozen poems as a kind of travelogue, which he compiled into a small collection called *Dongyouji* 東遊集 (Collected Poems about My Eastbound Travels). Thirty such poems went into the picture album and became its narrative backbone. The album, completed in 1725 after Akedun’s return from his fourth mission, begins with Akedun’s own portrait in courtly dress with a pheasant emblem denoting his second-rank status (Fig. 1), an unusual achievement for young courtier barely turned forty. The pictorial narrative then follows basically his Choson itinerary, first the border town Fengcheng at night time, then

Hwangju 黃州, Yongcheong 龍泉, Pyongyang 平壤, and Hanyang 漢陽 (the Capital),¹ illustrating, along the way, famous scenic spots like Ryongwang Pavilion 練光亭 and ethnographic curiosities like the Taiji flag 太極旗, folk dances and acrobatics, and rural life. The narrative culminates in the royal reception by the Choson king himself in Hanyang (present-day Seoul), taking up 4 leaves altogether. The last two leaves are given to scenes from the return journey: the Uiju 義州 scenery, and Crossing River Yalu at the Qing-Choson border.

III. Reading *Fengshi tu*

Contemporary readers of the Album must have found its contents both exotic and familiar. They would notice, for instance, the unusual Taeguk 太極 pattern on the Choson flag (Leaf 9. Fig. 2), featuring only two of the Eight Trigrams, the Kan 坎 and Li 離, within a rectangular design (Kim 2000: 15-32). The King's headgear, the Ikson Kwan 翼善冠 (Fig. 3), must have struck them as odd, since headgears of similar designs were worn by Chinese court eunuchs, and never by the Emperor (See Hyo 2000: 79-107). The Sandai set up (Artificial Mountains on wheels. 山臺雜像儼禮. Leaf 7. Fig. 4) must have been an amusing curiosity. It's an Artificial Mountain with wheels at its bottom, and serves as a movable stage where dance, songs, acrobatic feats were performed (See Sa 2000: 109-141). But the Qing audience would also find much in the pictures overtly familiar. The mountains and rivers, expressed in traditional Chinese brushwork, were hardly any different from what would appear in a Chinese landscape painting. The plough driven agriculture in Leaf 6 (Fig. 5) was commonplace in south China. So were the palace architecture and furniture designs. The Taofang style (套方) of window design (Leaf 17. Fig. 6), for instance, is typically Chinese. It was, however, never known to have been featured in Choson palaces (See Lee Young 2000: 59-78). The patterned *rouxi* (褥席, mattress) and the semi-curved screen in Leaf 4 (Fig. 7) were common Qing furniture pieces. Again, they were hardly seen at all in Choson (Lee Young 2000: 62). Most Qing readers would not be observant enough, of course, to tell what was authentically Choson and what were possibly Chinese borrowings to fill out the painting. They would have the impression, rather, that Choson on the whole resembled Qing China sufficiently and that it must be indeed one of its most loyal cultural tributaries.

¹ The pictorial arrangement does not, however, follow strictly the itinerary. See Jeong 2005: 226-7 for details.

Akedun's poetry on top of each leaf would confirm that impression. He observed, for instance, in Poem 6 (Leaf 4), that Confucius and Guan Yu (the Chinese War God) were here more worshipped than the Buddhist and Daoist gods. (“東方二氏原非重, 文是尼山武壽亭”). In Poem 26 (Leaf 17), he reminded the readers that the Choson kings were enfeoffed by Chinese Emperors, and hence owed allegiance to China. (“東瀛賜土位諸侯”). In Poem 8 (Leaf 5) he mentioned the Choson King's well-wishing to the Qing Emperor that he be blessed with a plenitude of benevolence and longevity. (“祝言天子多仁壽, 今日承恩到海濱”). He apparently felt great satisfaction with the punctilious ceremony at the ambassadorial reception and the utmost respect he could command from the Choson king and his court. (Poem 22, Leaf 14: “駕班排立虔瞻拜”; Poem 24, Leaf 15: “避人清道迎天使, 引入藩宮禮更尊”.)

The same suzerain-vassal relationship is also on full display in the paintings. The Qing envoy, presumably Akedun himself, appears larger in size, and pictorially always in a higher position vis-à-vis the Choson king (Leaves 14, 15, 16, 18. Fig. 8). The painter also chose to depict the moments when the king knelt or made deep bows in front of the Envoy, who remained standing or sitting (Leaves 14 and 15). When exchanging greetings (*baili* 拜禮) in a reception ceremony (Leaf 16. Fig.9), the Envoy was seen to raise his clapped hands to upper chest level, while the King's hands were up to as high as his brow. The colour symbolism also serves to underline the Korean subservience. In Leaf 18 where the King bids welcome to the Qing Envoy at Mohwagwan (慕華館), his ceremonial “umbrella” (傘繖) and fans (扇) are in vermillion red (朱), an inferior colour in Chinese chromatic hierarchy to the Qing yellow (正黃) (Fig. 10) (Su 2011). Curiously, the Korean Yellow Tent (黃幄), which symbolized kingship, and was a constant fixture of such welcoming occasions, (see Kyu 2017: Ch'iksa tungnok 勅使騰錄) is absent in the paintings.

Readers with knowledge of Chinese pictorial conventions would also notice that, vis-à-vis the King, the Qing envoy was always on the left of the picture (Fig. 11). It is a position conventionally designated for the hierarchically more elevated, while the lesser in status will be right-placed (Yu 2016: 132-139). The diplomatic protocol required, in fact, in a palatial reception, the King be seated on the west side of the hall (i.e. the right side of the south-facing hall), and the Envoy on the east left side (See, for example, Kyu 2017: *Seungjeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記 -景宗二年五月二十二日). This is reflected in Leaves 16 and 18 which depict ceremonial and feasting scenes. In Leaf 14, where the King

went out of the city to greet the Qing envoy on the road, we find the same “King-right and Envoy-left” position, which appears to be a painterly design with hierarchical intentions (Fig. 12). The same intention probably informs the design of Leaf 17 (Fig. 6), where a King’s courtier bearing a paper scroll written with the King’s name, knelt on the right side of the picture before a Qing official standing on the left. The significance of left-right positioning would not be lost on the Qing readers.

Another curious feature worth noting is the ornamental design on the tent canopy in Leaf 18 – a ruyi (如意) pattern with a Chinese cash coin figure at the center (Fig. 13). This is commonly known as the “Coin-ruyi combined pattern” (金錢如意紋), found most usually in Chinese traditional folk furniture design, as well as in lacquer art and decorative woodcut (Fig. 14). Choson royalties had never been known to have adopted it for tent or building designs. It doesn’t appear in Choson paintings, either, which show consistently royal tents as plain in colour (usually white). Hence it is most probably another of the painter’s inventions in the Akedun album. Its folksiness would, on one hand, forge the impression of cultural affinity between the two nations, and on the other, further undermine the Choson king’s royal stature in the eyes of the Qing viewers.

In sum, the overall impression one would have from reading the Akedun album is the Qing supremacy as a political, military and cultural power over its tributary satellites like Choson. The Korean’s easy subservience is demonstrated repeatedly in the poems and pictures. There were also sufficient cultural affinities between Qing and Choson, to prove that Korea was indeed a “tributary” of the great Chinese civilization. Occasional representations of Choson curiosities reflect the same Sinocentric interest. There lies in such efforts the colonizing impulse that took pride in bringing the far-off exotics into its superintendence. As remarked by Laura Hostetler on a similar Qing effort in 1750 of compiling the “Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributaries”, the ethnographic constructions of non-Chinese peoples were a conscious display of “power dynamics between the ruling and the ruled, creating a basis for their governance” (Hostetler 2001: 45; Liu 2016: 128).

The album is, in short, an exercise in self-fashioning on both a personal and a national level. For Akedun, the album projects, on a personal level, a self-image of a successful diplomat, who was also a cultured Confucian and an art connoisseur with recognized poetic skills. For the Manchu-Chinese empire, the album is a testimony of its far-reaching prowess as a political, military and cultural hub, a symbolic embodiment of its grand vision of “tianxia 天下”.

IV. The Korean records of the Akedun missions

Anti-Manchu sentiment in the Choson court up to the Yongjo 英祖 times (second half of the 18th century) is a well-known fact to historians. The Choson dynasty remained loyal to Ming long after its downfall in 1644 and saw itself as “the last bastion of the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy”, when the Manchu barbarians appeared increasingly secure in power as time wore on (Holcombe 2010: 177). Hence, despite the superficial civility, the Koreans were generally wary and hostile to the Akedun missions. Official records, like *Seungjeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記 and *Ch'iksa tungnok* 勅使騰錄, provide ample such evidence. In these records Akedun appeared to be insatiably covetous. His demand for silver and luxury gifts was a constant subject in the king's private audience with his ministers, and his avarice appeared to aggravate with each mission. During his third mission, he was described as “difficult to deal with, who tries to give an impression of honesty and incorruptibility, but his greed, in fact, knows no bounds – he would help himself to whatever he could lay his hands on. ... This barbarian's “gorge-like” appetite could never be filled!” (承政院日記: 景宗二年六月初三日). His poetry, too, attracted the same ethnic slur, and was ridiculed: “awful lines from a barbarian” (“阿胡恶句” 李宜顯陶谷集, 卷之三).

The Korean kings, on the other hand, often sought excuses to avoid welcoming and seeing off the Qing envoys in person, often to the consternation and protest of Akedun himself. Very often, it was either the heir apparent (王世子) or the Royal Brother (王世弟) who performed the duties on his behalf, (e.g. *Seungjeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記: 肅宗四十四年正月初七日). During the four Akedun missions, never once was the king present to receive the Envoys at Yeonggeunmun 迎恩門 (The Welcoming gate), as the protocol required.² Only once, during the last of the Akedun missions in 1724, did the King officiate at the sending-off ceremony. The Akedun album is hence a far cry from the complex reality of the Qing-Choson relationship.

V. Concluding Remarks: Art and Meta-Reality

The Akedun album has been praised for its “immense value as a historical document” (重要史料价值) in Qing-Choson studies (Huang 1999: 1). We know from the

² The welcoming scene in Leaf 14 is hence fictitious.

above, however, that it reflects at best only the half-truth, or in Bhaskar's terminology, a demi-reality. It is more a fusion of what happened and what should have happened under the Chinese "tianxia" ("all under heaven") ideology. The visual-logogrammic art represents only the demi-reality, which is enveloped in a meta-realistic *imaginaire* of the Sinocentric world order. This Sinocentrism, expressed as the "tributary system" in international diplomacy, is the meta-reality which breathes life into the art and poetry of Akedun and his associates.

Modern viewers of the album, raised on historical realism, might accuse Akedun of propaganda intent. But, as we know, the Chinese art tradition always subjugates "form-likeness" (xingsi 形似) to the expression of the spiritual and magical, shen (神) (See, for instance, Fong, 2003: 262). To paraphrase the great Su Shi (蘇軾), "form likeness" is simply childish ("論画以形似, 見與兒童鄰"). Su also says that "the artisans of this world may be able to capture the forms perfectly, but when it comes to the principles, only a superior man of outstanding talent can discern them" (Golas 2015: 91. 《淨因院画記》“世之工人, 或能曲尽其形, 而至於至理, 非高人逸才不能辨。”). Ideally, in Chinese art, the artist and his readers can consociate on such principles, the most fundamental of which is the Confucian belief in universal harmony and goodness: that "this world of which humans are an integral part manifests an orderliness and harmony that is real, meaningful, good and comprehensible by humans" (Golas 2015: 91). Such a world view seems to be what the Akedun album aspires to express. Readers of the album will see ultimately a conflation of two interdependent realities, the demi-reality and the meta-reality, created in the inter-medium space of poetry and visual art. The reader's eyes will move between the two art forms, seeking clarification of one from the other, and will reach ultimately an aesthetic appreciation of the Confucian world order. As explained by the Song poet, Liu Chang 劉敞:

As in reading a painting,
 One reaches a full understanding of what one aspires.
 忽如按圖画,
 所嚮得了了。

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From absolutism to constitutionalism: Late Qing China and the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century

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Abstract: *In the first decade of the 20th century, the Qing Empire was not the only country to experience a “constitutional movement”. The present article argues that Chinese intellectuals and officials concerned with the transition to constitutionalism were keenly aware of the events happening at roughly the same time in the Russian Empire. The Russian constitution was variously translated into Chinese and used in debates about the Chinese constitution, and news coming in from Russia had a manifold impact on Chinese approaches to constitutionalism.*

Keywords: Constitutionalism, Sino-Russian relations, Conceptual Globalisation, Dai Hongci, Absolutism, Translations

Scholarship describes late Qing China’s constitutionalism as a product of learning from the West and from Japan, stressing the close look that Chinese intellectuals and officials took at the Japanese example. But does this model suffice to explain all aspects of the emergence of modern Chinese constitutional thought? If one looks at the global history of constitutionalism, one finds that China’s experience of transformation into constitutionalism was not singular in the beginning of the 20th century. This paper intends to show that, during the whole period of “constitutional preparation”, the Qing government, as well as Chinese media and intellectuals, looked not only to Japan or Western Europe, but remained well aware of the other large Eurasian polities that were concurrently transitioning to constitutionalism. Specifically, I argue that the Russian constitutional experience did not fail to have a manifold impact on Chinese perceptions on how to cope with China’s own challenge.

More often than not, the Russo-Japanese War, which began on 8th February 1904, is described as the turning point which propelled constitutionalism to the very top of the political agenda. At least to the reform-oriented circles, the outcome of the war was less a surprise than is often depicted, for around the turn of the 20th century, Turkey, Russia and China were the standard examples of absolute monarchies. And the outcome of the war seemed like a confirmation of what Chinese intellectuals had been saying for quite a few years: autocracy was inferior to constitutionalism, and autocratic countries would have

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to adopt constitutionalism sooner or later. But indeed, the war was won by Japan, a country much smaller in area, population and number of soldiers, and Chinese writings brimmed with assertions like:

“This was not a war between Japan and Russia, but a war between the two systems of constitutionalism and absolutism.” (*Lixian jiwen* 1906: 12).

Internally, Czar Nicholas II was still under heavy pressure by social and political unrest. On 30th October 1905, he agreed to concessions by issuing the so-called October Manifesto. The manifesto provided for some basic civil liberties as well as for the creation of an advisory and legislative body elected by universal male suffrage, the State Duma. After a few months, on 6th May 1906, the Czar promulgated a formal constitutional charter, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire. And Chinese published opinion did not dwell on the mere news that Russia lost the war, but also took the internal developments of that country into account:

“The Russian people have united in the whole country and handed in petitions to the sovereign, and they have dispersedly struck. ... Now, Czar Nicholas II has acceded to the demands of his people to convene a parliament and hold elections for members of parliament. From now on, the Russian people, which have lived under absolutist rule, have all obtained the right to enjoy constitutionalism. However, our country’s people are still keeping silent, sitting tacitly there waiting for the government to establish a constitution.” (*Juemin* 1906: 244-245).

The idea of constitutionalism was gaining prominence in government circles, too. In December 1905, two groups of high-ranking officials departed for a tour of Japan, Europe and the United States with the aim of studying foreign political systems. The study groups placed an emphasis on Japan, Great Britain, Germany, the United States and France, staying in these places comparatively long. Yet, one should not neglect the instructiveness of the stay in Russia for the mission, as it was the only country toured that had not had an established constitutional government, but was just in the process of establishing one.

The lesson that the constitutional commissioners learned from their stay in Russia can be read from Dai Hongci’s (戴鴻慈) travel diary. From his stay in Russia, Dai argued that a constitutional system could not easily be introduced in China, even less so than in Russia. He concluded that in order to ensure the adoption of a constitution in China,

“preparation” was needed, and one pressing matter would be to improve education in general and legal training in particular, sending batches of students abroad (Cai et al. 1985: 485-487). After all, Dai stressed,

“But if you establish a constitution with empty words, wherein the citizens do not have general knowledge nor legal thinking, then there is no one to deliberate on the laws nor to observe them. The evils of such an approach are about the same as not having a constitution at all.” (Cai et al. 1985 : 485-486).

The exploits of the study commission resulted in the Qing government’s announcement, on 1st September 1906, that it would henceforth “prepare for constitutionalism”. After “several years” of preparation, a date for the implementation of a constitution would be decided. Although the government was already at that time heavily criticised by parts of the public for playing for time and being unwilling to introduce real constitutionalism, Russia’s problems with promulgating a constitution too rapidly were perceived not only by government circles. The difficulties of the new constitutional mode of government were perceived even by the otherwise reform-oriented, pro-constitutionalist press of China. In March 1906, the *Eastern Miscellany* argued that Russia was not introducing constitutionalism carefully and therefore could not hope for its benefits. Instead, the paper argued, “constitutionalism needed preparation first”, anticipating the government’s stance:

“In recent years, the Russian popular revolt has been going on year and day. ... We think that there is probably one big cause for it. ... It is to be felt in the mark left by the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war. This is definitely an outer stimulus and does not come from the swelling of the people’s force. It certainly evokes the empty word of constitutional government and does not see through the spirit of constitutional government. Their objective is purely an objective one and not a subjective one. To hope for constitutionalism from such a standpoint, isn’t this already a fundamental large mistake?” (*Sheshuo* 1906: 45).

On the other side of the political spectrum, it is true, news coming from Russia also served as a warning against the introduction of a constitutional monarchy, and as an argument for doing away with the monarchic regime altogether. The Tokyo-based *Minpao* Magazine (民報), for example, published a shocking photo showing atrocities committed by Russian soldiers, asking its readers: “This is the woeful scene of slain corpses laid out to the public after Russia established a constitution. You who are hoping for a

constitutional government, why do you not take this as a warning?" (*Lixianguo pushi tu* 1908).

Such revolutionary activities notwithstanding, the government proceeded with "constitutional preparation". On 22th July 1908, it ordered that an outline of a monarchical constitution based on the best regulations found in different countries be drafted. The concerned bodies should also draft an electoral law, a law for a parliament and a list of things to be provided for in the years before its convention. This edict was indeed complied with very quickly, and the documents were produced within little over a month, on 27th August 1908. The plan approved on that day foresaw the promulgation of a constitution and the convening of a parliament in 9 years, i.e., in 1916. The drafting of the final text of the constitution was commissioned to five men at the end of 1910 and beginning of 1911.

Besides the official *Outline of a Constitution*, our knowledge of the concrete constitutional texts that were being drafted at the end of the Qing dynasty is rather limited, due to but fragmentary sources. The extant texts point to a very close resemblance of the forming Chinese constitution to the Japanese constitution of 1889/90. Yet, a close look at the sources reveals that although legal scholars, and especially the drafters of the Chinese constitution, chose to adopt many, but not all, Japanese norms, they did not blindly do so, and were well aware of the constitutional efforts going on at the time. Not least, they were aware of the Russian constitution, promulgated in 1906, and of the Turkish constitution, reinstated on 24th July 1908.

Texts of foreign constitutional charters were translated into Chinese in large numbers in the first years of the 20th century, and some of them distributed within the Constitutional Office. Thus, the Russian constitution was published in quite a few different forms and media:

- a) *The Essentials of Government in Various Countries* (*Lieguo Zhengyao* 列國政要), the 132-volume result of Duanfang's and Dai Hongci's constitutional mission abroad, contained 3 volumes (No. 7-9) about the Russian constitution. These were, however, not a translation of the constitutional charter as such, but of the legal provisions concerning the State Council, the Duma and the elections (Duanfang & Dai (1907).

- b) In the special volume on constitutional government published by the *Oriental Miscellany* (*Dongfang Zazhi* 東方雜誌) in 1906 (*Junzhu lixianguo xianfa zhaiyao* 1906);
- c) In the Tokyo-based *Magazine of Law and Politics* (*Fazheng Zazhi* 法政雜誌) of June 1906 (Zhu 1906);
- d) In the first edition of the journal *Miscellaneous Knowledge about Constitutional Government* (*Xianzheng Zashi* 憲政雜識), of December 1906 (Bao 1906);
- e) In the compendium *Constitutions of 17 countries* (*Shiqi guo xianfa* 十七國憲法), published in book form in 1906 (Qi & Gu 1906);
- f) In the Bulletin of the *Society for Preparation of Constitutionalism* (*Yubei Lixian Gonghui Bao* 預備立憲公會報); this was not a literal translation, but a prose reproduction, followed by a short commentary saying that in spite of its shortcomings, it was a remarkable feat for a country that had been an autocracy for millennia. This showed the great trend of the world (He 1908).

From the surviving materials concerning the drafting of a new constitution, it is clear that although there was a clear preference for the Japanese model, there was a keen consciousness about the constitutions of the world as well as debates on them. Perhaps the point of utmost importance to the Qing government was the part about the sovereign's position. On this part, the constitution of Russia with her strong Czar was of special interest. For example, an internal memorandum penned by the Prince Pu Jun (溥儁, 1885-1942), contained in the archives of the Constitutional Compilation Office, criticises the corresponding parts of the 1908 Outline of a Constitution on the basis of the Japanese and the Russian constitutions (*Jinjiang...* n.d.). The memorandum judged the Chinese document to be imprecise by citing the Japanese and Russian texts as models of good law-making. Interestingly, this document did not adopt the common perception that Russia's constitution was a fake, but, without looking at the constitutional and legal reality, contrasted the texts of both the Japanese and Russian charters with the Chinese in technical terms.

That the drafting process was much more than a mere passive (albeit selective) copying of the Japanese model, but was indeed embedded in a wider – global – context of constitution-making can also be seen on the example of the complete draft privately

written by the Japanese scholar Kitaoni Saburô (1909). Kitaoni's draft does make an earnest effort at not copying blindly the Japanese model, but follows the thought of "picking the best regulations from the various countries". The commentary of every paragraph discusses the legal situation in various countries, and gives parallel norms in other constitutions. Although Japan is Kitaoni's most popular point of reference, he refers extensively to constitutions of a large number of countries, including such ones as Belgium and Luxemburg. Just about half of the proposed articles (37 of 76 articles) refer expressly to parallel norms in the Russian Constitution of 1906.

The sparse secondary literature on this draft (as well as on the other concrete constitution-making efforts of late Qing times) has compared it to the Meiji and at most to the Prussian constitution. But it has overseen that it was, at least from a textual point of view, also quite similar to the Russian constitution, of which the drafter was aware fully well. This was not a mere coincidence, but the expression of the global process in which it was embedded.

Coming from the constitutions of the USA and Western Europe, even from Japan, one could see China as a latecomer to the modern concept of constitutionalism. But this view only captures a cut-out of a larger picture. China was not alone: some of the largest Empires of the time, in terms of both area and population, were undergoing similar, albeit not identical processes.

From the outset, Chinese intellectuals and the government debating about constitutionalism were interested in what was happening in constitutional terms in other constitutional countries supposedly so similar to their own, most notably, in Russia. The Qing government as well as those involved in the drafting process, when they decided to implement constitutionalism from 1905/06, took close interest in Russian constitutionalism. Just as the defeat in the war had confirmed the need for a constitution, the intense difficulties encountered by Russia in spite of her speedy adoption of a constitution indicated to the government that constitutionalism had to be "prepared" beforehand. Such arguments were even seen outside of the government, next to warnings against the intentions of monarchic governments such as China and Russia.

Even though China's relations were certainly by far the closest with Japan and the results of the constitution-making efforts resembled (but were not identical to) Japanese models, the Chinese did not think of their constitutional movement as taking place in an environment in which they were alone in copying already finished models. Chinese intellectuals were keenly aware that they were late, but by no means the latest, in

introducing a modern constitution, and were therefore very much interested in the concurrent Russian constitutionalism.

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Отношенията Китай-Централна Азия в енергийния сектор: в търсене на нов модел на сътрудничество

Елизабет Йонева

Abstract

In the last decade, the subject of China-Central Asia relations provokes special attention on a global level in view of the new dimensions of Beijing's involvement in the world. China is facing the challenge to adapt to new geopolitical realities and the measures undertaken and planned to improve the national situation transform the country's diplomacy. They also cause large spillover effects on international relations. In the light of these new developments, the paper explores the principal dimensions of China's contacts and cooperation with Central Asia and their repercussions for the foreign policy of the country and especially the resulting geopolitical implications. It showcases the main vectors in the Chinese involvement in Central Asia with emphasis on recent transformations, driven in part by the wider resurgence of PRC in world and regional affairs. The author discusses different aspects of the Chinese political and economic strategy in the region, especially in the energy sector and the extractive industries from the perspective of the evolutions in the last years. Special attention is paid to the significant focus on diversification efforts in regard to China's status as large consumer of different resources. The research work outlines the conceptual frame of the China-Central Asia partnership, looking through the prism of the geopolitical paradigm.

Keywords: China-Central Asia relations; energy sector; extractive industries; international relations

През последното десетилетие темата за активната динамика в засилването на ролята на Китай в глобален план провокира все по-мощно внимание, което е особено видимо и в контекста на изследванията по международни отношения. В стремежа си да се развива в стопански план и да се справи с предизвикателствата, наложени от необходимостта за адаптиране към променящите се геополитически и геоикономически реалности, Пекин планира и реализира мерки за оптимизиране на положението на страната, които неизбежно трансформират и нейната външна политика. Те също така генерират на свой ред преливащи ефекти към плоскостта на международните отношения. Нарастващата намеса и ангажиране на КНР със зони като Централна Азия, Африка и Близкия Изток, както и Латинска Америка, не само демонстрират специфичните интереси на страната към тях, особено по линия на енергийните императиви, но и внасят изменения в установения в техните рамки баланс на силите.

С оглед на тези актуални тенденции настоящото изследване е ориентирано към разглеждане на основните измерения на китайските контакти и разгръщането на сътрудничество с Централна Азия, както и отражението им върху външната политика на партньорите и резултиращите геополитически въздействия. Дискутирането на различни аспекти на китайската политическа и икономическа стратегия по отношение на региона се осъществява посредством фокусиране върху енергийния сектор през перспективата на еволюцията в последните години. Поради ограниченията в обема на публикацията вниманието е концентрирано само върху Казахстан и Туркменистан като най-значимите енергийни сили в Централна Азия.

Потенциалът за засилване на енергийните връзки между КНР и централноазиатските държави е особено релевантен в контекста на диверсификационните усилия на Пекин, провокирани от компликациите, породени от статута на страната като мащабен консуматор на въгледородни ресурси. В тази връзка Централна Азия се явява значим компонент от китайската енергийна политика поради възможностите, които тя предлага за прокарване на сухопътни маршрути за доставки. С оглед на спецификата на енергийната проблематика, анализът е ориентиран към разглеждане на партньорството Китай-Централна Азия през призмата на геополитическата парадигма. Неслучайно енергийните ресурси биват възприемани като символа на геополитиката през XXI век, тъй като те се явяват значим инструмент за глобално съревнование и упражняване на въздействие, като често биват сравнявани по важност с ядрените оръжия и мащабните армии в периода на Студената война.

Безспорно политическият възход на Китай е неразривно свързан с впечатляващото стопанско развитие и световната експортна експанзия на страната. През 2010 г. тя се превърна във втората икономика в света, измествайки Япония от тази позиция, след като през 2007 г. отне третото място от Германия. Това даде основание за прогнози, че в рамките на 10 години „Поднебесната империя“ ще изпревари и САЩ, превръщайки се в икономически лидер в глобален план (Flanders 2011). Стратегията за национално развитие поставя приоритет върху осигуряването на суровини и създаването на нови пазари в подкрепа на захранвания от износа икономически растеж, като тези цели мотивират и китайския поход в търсене на природни ресурси и енергийна сигурност.

Понастоящем страната се явява най-мощният потребител на енергия в света, като невъзможността нарастващото търсене на горива да бъде покрито от добива на национално ниво логично води като следствие до увеличаване на импортната зависимост. Широката употреба на въглищните резерви, които доминират в енергийния профил на страната, но оказват драстичен негативен ефект в екологичен план, стимулира усилията за замяната им с природен газ. Според прогнозите на китайската компания PetroChina потреблението на природен газ в страната ще достигне 300 млрд. куб.м през 2020 г. Очевидно „синьото гориво“ ще е приоритетно за енергийната политика на Пекин, но с оглед на ограничените собствени залежи, тук зависимостта от внос ще генерира нови предизвикателства.

По отношение на петрола ситуацията също не е обнадеждаваща. През 2003 г. Китай задмина Япония като втория световен вносител на нефт след САЩ, а очакванията са до 2030 г. вече да е лидер в това отношение. Според прогнози през 2020 г. Китай ще трябва да внася 77% от необходимия му петрол (Lanteigne 2010: 103). Несъмнено азиатският гигант все повече се изправя пред същите проблеми в енергиен план, които вече отдавна тревожат САЩ и ЕС, но компликациите пред него са свързани с това, че той трябва да разрешава тези трудности в далеч по-конкурентна среда.

Предизвикателствата пред Китай по отношение на енергийната сигурност доведоха до сериозни трансформации във външната политика на страната. Те са особено очевидни по отношение на дипломатическите му контакти с неговите съседи от Централна Азия, с африканските страни и т.н. В китайския внос на петрол доминира Близкият Изток, но доставките от там изискват транспортиране по морски път. Това генерира известни трудности, тъй като страната не разполага с необходимия капацитет да обезпечи сигурността на азиатско-тихоокеанските морски пътища и по тази причина се ориентира по-скоро към прокарване на енергийни коридори, заобикалящи проливите. Този приоритет е свързан с т.нар „дилема за пролива Малака“ (Ji 2007), който е от стратегическо значение за Китай заради преминаването през него на преобладаващата част от енергийните доставки. Подобни проблеми стоят и по отношение на другия маршрут за транспортиране на суровини в Индийския океан, който също е уязвим за блокада. Китайският флот не е в състояние да осигури закрила за своите морски ресурсопотоци и по тази причина националните стратегически ходове са насочени

към прокарване на стабилни сухопътни трасета за доставки. Именно те предопределят и значимостта на развиването на отношенията с Централна Азия.

Същевременно еволюцията в китайската енергийна политика задава и общите принципи за търговските дейности по „излизане навън“ (zouchuqu). Подходът, базиран върху това да не се поставят условия и да се отдава преимуществено значение на „икономическите права“ се доказва не само като практически полезен, но и демонстрира решимостта на страната да се противопоставя на доминиращите концепции в международната политика. Разгръщането на собствена визия по въпросите на енергетиката има не просто икономически ефект, но и превръща Китай в алтернативен център спрямо Запада за редица развиващи се страни, което допринася за цялостното нарастване на ролята на страната в световните и регионалните отношения.

Стратегията на Пекин да се ориентира към придобиване на дялове в проекти и компании с енергийна насоченост в глобален план, инвестиране в инфраструктура, продажба на оръжие, отпускане на финансови средства в замяна на дългосрочни договори за енергийни доставки (на принципа „заеми срещу петрол“, сравним с прилаганата по-рано от други държави версия „храни срещу петрол“), се оказва по-притегателна за редица страни на фона на прилаганите подходи от САЩ и ЕС. Същевременно изведените от Китай ръководни принципи в това отношение за ненамеса във вътрешни въпроси (т.нар. „политика на чистите ръце“), зачитане на суверенитета и избора на политическа система и път на развитие на съответните страни е в хармония с основния приоритет за постигане на взаимноизгодна стопанска печалба (съгласно постулата „да забогатеем заедно“). КНР не споделя идеите за примат на гражданските и политическите права, и прилага като алтернатива максимата „първо растеж, после права“.

Китайската позиция, че страната ще купува енергийни ресурси от всички места, от които може да ги получи и няма да се опитва да налага на други държави изисквания или някакви принципи или ценности, намери своя емблематичен израз в изявлението на заместник-външния министър Джоу Уънджун: „Бизнесът си е бизнес. Ние се опитваме да разделим политиката от бизнеса“ (Kurlantzick 2007: 222). Западните критики към „безскрупулното“ поведение на Пекин далеч обаче не бива да се приемат безрезервно особено в изследователски план, тъй като те налагат редица изкривени възприятия, които пречат на обективното проучване на

китайските действия в ключови региони в световен мащаб, включително и в рамките на енергийния сектор, които провокират промяна на статуквото.

Темата за отношенията Китай-Централна Азия привлича все по-сериозно внимание на глобално ниво именно в контекста на актуалните измерения на намесата на Пекин в световен мащаб. Разгръщането на енергийно сътрудничество с Близкия Изток и Африка далеч не е достатъчно за азиатския гигант, тъй като в опитите си да преодолее своята географска уязвимост той следва да насочи поглед и в западна посока. За Китай Централна Азия се явява второстепенен източник на енергийни ресурси, който обаче има своите предимства, тъй като доставките не преминават през международни води. По тази причина държавите от региона се разглеждат като значим компонент от политиката за енергийна диверсификация. Особено Казахстан и Туркменистан са изключително важни за Китай като ключови снабдители с петрол и природен газ. Страната вече е обвързана с региона чрез инфраструктурни съоръжения като газопровода Централна Азия-Китай и петролопровода с Казахстан. Свързването с Централна Азия чрез прокарване на енергийни коридори бива разглеждано от Китай като средство за насърчаване на съживяването на историческия „Път на коприната“ като значим евроазиатски търговски маршрут (Набова 2015: 66-74).

Стимулиращ фактор за развитието на тези отношения е тяхната стратегическа взаимоизгодност, тъй като от своя страна централноазиатските държави получават възможност за развитие на контакт с алтернативен външен фактор на фона на доминиращата роля на Русия в тази зона. По тази причина очакванията са, че Китай ще активизира усилията си за изграждането на своята нова роля като предпочитан енергиен партньор за тези страни. Същевременно концепцията за прокарване на „сухопътни маршрути“ за внос на необходимите суровини не предполага обаче реализиране на доставки само от тях, но и от Русия, като големият пробив в това отношение бе изграждането на петролопровода Източен Сибир-Тихи океан. От своя страна Москва запазва силен интерес към държавите от Централна Азия като транзитен играч за техните енергийни ресурси. Наред с това въпреки отварянето на новото източно направление в руската енергийна политика, важноста на доставките за Европа са далеч по-стратегически за Русия и по тази причина за нея развиването на сътрудничество в сектора между централноазиатските страни и Китай се явява по-приемлив вариант от отварянето

им в западна посока по линия на транскаспийски маршрути и изграждането на Южния газов коридор на ЕС.

Страните от Централна Азия се явяват несъмнено важна алтернатива за Китай, но те все пак не могат да бъдат пълноценни заместители на Близкия Изток, тъй като разполагат с далеч по-ограничени запаси в сравнение с него. Те обаче имат своето значение за Пекин именно от гледна точка на потенциала им за реализиране на диверсификация. Същевременно в рамките на самите централноазиатски държави, които след разпадането на СССР веднага поставят акцент върху енергийните суровини в своята външна политика (виждайки в тяхно лице инструмент за утвърждаването на независимостта им и укрепването на отношенията със западните държави), все по-сериозно започва да се утвърждава идеята, че регионът не трябва да се обвързва единствено с Европа, а да потърси и други експортни маршрути за своите ресурси. С оглед на наличните компликации по отношение на прокарването на транскаспийски инфраструктурни съоръжения, на страните от Централна Азия им остава единствено руското направление за пласиране на техния износ, което ги кара да обърнат поглед на Изток и да търсят партньорство с Китай. Понастоящем в сферата на външните си отношения те се опитват да провеждат мултивекторна политика, насочена към балансиране между значимите фактори в региона.

Казахстан често бива определян като икономически лидер в Централна Азия. От началото на първото десетилетие на XXI в. с повишаването на цените на енергийните ресурси на световните пазари страната преживява стопански бум. Същевременно още от началото на каспийската петролна и газова треска през 90-те години на XX в., Астана се опитва да води балансирана външна политика, като се старае да поддържа добри отношения с големите сили в региона и сключва енергийни сделки с Русия, Китай и Европа. Подобряването на икономическите условия в страната довежда обаче до това, че Казахстан престава да се разглежда като слаба държава под влиянието на значимите фактори, а още по-малко като страна, стремяща се да намери консенсус между конкуриращите се интереси. Той се възприема като все по-самоуверена сила със свои права, опитваща се да се превърне в регионален лидер.

Понастоящем казахстанската външна политика често бива давана като пример за мултивекторен подход. По-голямата част от износа на енергийни суровини за западните пазари преминава през Русия, но същевременно Астана

съумя да лансира транзитни опции в западна, южна и източна посока, които да я заобикалят. Повечето от новите мащабни инфраструктурни проекти са ориентирани обаче именно към Китай.

С оглед на дългата граница между двете страни, те се явяват естествено обвързани и могат да контактуват без посредници. Понастоящем Пекин е ангажиран с мащабни енергийни проекти в своя съсед. Трите най-големи казахстански петролни полета обаче са разположени далеч от общата граница, което създава допълнителни предизвикателства при реализиране на доставките. Първата голяма двустранна сделка е осъществена през 1997 г., когато Китайската национална петролна корпорация (Chinese National Petroleum Corporation - CNPC) наред със сключените договори по отношение на разработването на петролни полета, закупува 60,3% от Aktobemunaigaz – по онова време четвърта петролна компания в Казахстан. През 2005 г. CNPC пък придобива компанията PetroKazakhstan за 4,2 млрд. долара. Китай плаща над пазарната стойност, а впоследствие е принуден от казахстанското правителство да отстъпи 1/3 от активите на националния енергиен гигант KazMunaiGaz. PetroKazakhstan обаче се явява важна инвестиция с оглед на притежаваните от компанията права над полето Кумкол. Закупуването на активи в Aktobemunaigaz и PetroKazakhstan са две от трите най-големи външни енергийни инвестиции, правени до онзи момент от Китай.

Китайският държавен инвестиционен фонд – CITIC също се ориентира към сключване на споразумения с Астана. През 2006 г. той подписва договор на стойност 1,9 млрд. долара по отношение на експлоатацията на петролното поле Каражанбас. От друга страна не всички опити за енергийни договорености между двете страни завършват успешно. Така например две китайски компании – CNOOC и Sinorec се опитват да закупят през 2003 г. малък дял от North Caspian Sea Project /Кашаган/, но са блокирани от 6 от западните участници в него.

Мащабното навлизане на китайски компании в Казахстан събужда страхове сред техните западни конкуренти, че постепенно ще бъдат изтласкани от страната. Във връзка с това интересът на изследователите се насочи към проучване на спецификата на китайското участие в казахстанския енергиен сектор. Компаниите CNPC и CITIC вече се нареждат веднага след националния шампион Kazmunaigaz по дневно производство в страната. Същевременно обаче те държат далеч по-малки проценти от резервите. При някои от най-големите находища не е достигнат пълн

добивен капацитет, а повечето от тях не са контролирани от китайците. Това се дължи на очерталата се тенденция при китайските компании те да закупуват активи, които вече са свързани с производство, а не такива, изискващи тепърва разработване. Очевидно Астана фаворизира западни и руски фирми по отношение на проекти от последния вид, тъй като те се явяват по-сложни от техническа гледна точка. Така се оказва, че сред четирите големи проекта на развитие в сектора (Кашаган, Карачаганак, Тенгиз и Курмангази) нито един не е свързан с китайски фирми.

Изследванията, насочени към извеждането в сравнителен план на предимствата на китайските и западните компании по отношение на завземането на пространство в казахстанския енергиен сектор, а и в по-широк план, очертават следната картина (Kennedy 2010: 116-135): Китайските фирми имат преимущества в посока на: тесни връзки на компаниите с тяхното правителство, възможност за опериране в страни под западни санкции, достъп до финансиране от държавни банки, репутация на незаинтересованост от вътрешните работи/режими на страните-домакини (оттам по-слаб натиск за политически реформи), готовност да платят повече за ресурси/активи, предлагане на странични сделки за оказване на помощ и доставки на оръжие, слаба обвързаност с антикорупционни закони, по-слаба прозрачност по отношение на плащанията си и др.

Същевременно с изключение на полето Курмангази, което се разработва съвместно с руските компании Rosneft и Zarubezhneft, големите проекти са доминирани от западни фирми и казахстанската Kazmunaigaz. Несъмнено това показва, че няма фаворизиране на китайските компании от страна на казахстанските власти. Астана по-скоро използва предимствата на всички желаещи да участват в развитието на нейния енергиен сектор, като твърдостта на политиката спрямо всички тях се засилва с натрупването на опит и капитали от страна на националните компании.

Макар и да не ги фаворизира, Казахстан определено насърчава китайските инвестиции в страната като контрабаланс на руското влияние, тъй като опциите за износ към Европа все още не са достатъчно развити. Астана се опитва да намали контрола на Кремъл над петролния ѝ износ, като изгражда нови тръбопроводи и транспортни маршрути за експорт към Китай. През 1997 г. е подписан пакт за изграждане на Казахстано-китайски петролопровод със съвместното участие на CNPC и KazMunaiGas. Той стана първото директно инфраструктурно съоръжение за

Пекин за доставки на нефт от Централна Азия. Петролопроводът започва от град Атирау на казахстанския каспийски бряг и завършва в китайския автономен уйгурски регион Синдзян, като общата му дължина е около 3 000 км. Плановете са със стартирането на експлоатацията на Кашаган оттам да се подават суровини за хранене на съоръжението (първоначалните доставки на суровини са от полето Кумкол). Основното предимство на петролопровода е, че предлага директен маршрут за доставки, без нужда да се заплащат транзитни такси.

Наред с доставките на петрол, Казахстан полага усилия да се превърне и в износител на газ за Китай. През септември 2011 г. стартира полагането на газопровода Бейнеу-Бозой-Шимкент, който осъществява връзка между западните полета на страната с нейните южни региони, като в Шимкент се свързва с газопровода Централна Азия-Китай, който започва от Туркменистан и преминава през казахстанска територия (Шукеев 2011).

Другата важна значима енергийна сила в Централна Азия - Туркменистан бива разглеждан като страна, облагодетелствана както от геостратегическото си разположение на Пътя на коприната, така и от сериозните си резерви на природен газ. Съгласно разработената от Ашхабад стратегия за развитие, до 2020 г. трябва да се добиват 175 млрд. куб.м газ и да се изнасят 140 млрд. Голяма част от газовите резерви се намират в полето Довлетабад-Донмез, което осигурява суровини за газопровода Централна Азия-Китай. Посредством реализирането му Ашхабад съумя да диверсифицира своя енергиен износ, като наред с ангажиментите си към Русия и Иран се насочи и към изпращане на доставки в източна посока (Chow & Hendrix 2010). Съоръжението тръгва от Източен Туркменистан и преминава през територията на Узбекистан и Казахстан, които се ползват от транзитни такси. Инфраструктурното съоръжение на стойност 7,3 млрд. долара и с дължина 7 000 км бе открито през декември 2009 г.

Наред с договореностите за изграждане на газопровода, Китай и Туркменистан подписаха споразумения и за съвместно разработване на полетата, които хранят тръбата. През юни 2009 г. Китайската банка за развитие предостави заем от 4 млрд. долара на компанията Туркменгаз за развитие на газовия сектор (и особено на полето Южен Йолотан). Същевременно между двете страни бе подписано и споразумение за допълнителни доставки на 10 млрд. куб.м газ. Плановете на Ашхабад са насочени към увеличаване на доставките на газ за Китай, в това число и от новите находища Южен Йолотан, Осман и Яшлар (Жильцов

2011). Несъмнено за Туркменистан китайското направление също се очертава като изключително перспективно (Annaev 2011).

Направеният преглед на някои от значимите измерения на енергийните профили на Казахстан и Туркменистан насочва към заключението, че в стремежа си да провеждат мултивекторни външни политики, те проповядват диверсификационни концепции. Ако при Казахстан нуждата от сътрудничество с Русия има за катализатори географски (дълга граница с нея) и демографски (сериозно руско малцинство) фактори, то за Туркменистан стимул тук се явява по-голямата му международна изолация. Същевременно Ашхабад е по-затруднен да балансира руското влияние със засилване на отношенията си с Пекин, тъй като трябва да транзитира суровините си през две други държави (Узбекистан и Казахстан), докато за Астана това се явява по-лесна задача с оглед на прякото съседство с Китай. Тъй като усилията на западните енергийни компании през последното десетилетие бяха ориентирани към опити за постигане на пробив в масивното влияние на Кремъл в региона, конкуренцията между Европа и Русия предостави допълнителни възможности на Китай да се намесва като все по-сериозен фактор в централноазиатските дела. Така за този период най-сериозните трансформации в енергийния сектор на разгледаните страни са реализирани с китайско участие. В рамките на усилията си за осигуряване на външни доставки на енергийни ресурси Китай започна да развива по-интегрирана и широкообхватна политика в Централна Азия. Значението на тези страни за Пекин в дадената сфера е видно с оглед на поредицата от двустранни и многостранни инициативи, които китайската енергийна дипломация лансира в региона.

Въпреки че за централноазиатските страни Китай и Русия се явяват по-удобните опции за разгръщане на кооперативни отношения, то в ролята си на големи техни съседи те носят и заплахата за придобиване на прекомерно влияние. По тази причина тези страни са изправени пред намирането на компромиси между сътрудничество с двете значими регионални сили и поддържане на дистанция спрямо тях. Същевременно при реализирането на външнополитическия баланс се очертава, че Китай и Русия могат да служат не само като противовес на Запада, но и двете страни могат да бъдат използвани една срещу друга (Overland & Torjesen 2010).

Така съвременните геополитическите изследвания по отношение на централноазиатската зона я разглеждат през призмата на борбата за политическо

влияние в нея между Китай, Русия и САЩ/ЕС. Сравнявайки настоящата ситуация с англо-руското съперничество през XIX в. в същия регион, наричано „Голямата игра“, днес изследователите говорят за „Новата голяма игра“, като този път в нея участват повече актьори. В нея обаче централноазитските държави не се явяват в ролята на жертви, тъй като с радост са приели нейните правила и съумяват да извличат за себе си редица стратегически и икономически дивиденди.

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**Пътят на коприната и Пътят на кехлибара
като оси на взаимодействие между Азия и Европа**
Катина Йонева

Abstract

In the light of the current trends in the development of the international economic and political relations, the subject of reviving the Silk Road has gained particular importance in recent years in research and practice. By contrast, considerably less attention is paid to the study of another strategic trade artery – the Amber Road. In this regard, the paper presents a comprehensive comparative analysis of these axes for international exchanges. The main purpose is to provide clarity on the general dimensions of interaction, not only looking through the prism of the historical development, but also in the context of the modern realities. The focus of the research is on outlining the specifics of trade and capital exchanges along these two major routes, in symbiosis with analyzing the impact of the established contacts for developing social and intercultural communication. The paper examines the nature and scope of the economic and human interaction between the peoples from the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Sea regions on the one hand, and the vast Asian space on the other.

Keywords: Silk road, Amber road, Asia, Europe, trade, culture

С оглед на актуалните тенденции в развитието на международните икономически и политически отношения, темата за възраждането на Пътя на коприната придоби особена значимост в изследователски и практически план през последните години. Значително по-слабо внимание обаче се обръща на проучването на друг стратегически важен коридор – Пътят на кехлибара, който свързвал бреговете на Северно и Балтийско море със Средиземноморието. Не е напълно изяснено кога е възникнал точният маршрут, който познаваме днес, но основното му направление било използвано още преди времето на Римската империя. Близко до устието на река Морава, Пътят на кехлибара пресичал река Дунав – другият основен коридор, прекосяващ Европа в посока запад-изток. Именно на това място бил изграден лагер на легионери, който по-късно прераснал в Карнунт - главен град на римската провинция Горна Панония, разрушен впоследствие на голямо земетресение. (Fichtner 2009: 54–55) По време на управлението на Тиберий Пътят на кехлибара е подсилен и павиран според урбанистични правилата на империята. Така древният маршрут, наречен по името

на най-скъпо търгуваната по това време стока „*Via dell Ambra*“, е включен в пътната мрежа на Римската империя.

Наричан още „слънчев камък“, „сълзите на морето“ или „златото на Севера“, кехлибарът – древната смола от хвойнови дървета, вкаменена преди 50-140 милиона години, е описан в античните текстове. Още Талес открил необикновените свойства на скъпоценния камък, превърнал се в първия познат предмет в света, който може да привлича статично електричество. И докато по-късният термин „*amber*“ произлязъл от арабското „*anbar*“, гръцкото му наименование „*ēlektron*“ и латинското „*electrum*“ се превърнало в основа на днешната дума за електричество (Tozer 2014:164). Кехлибарените зърна били високо ценени още в Древен Египет. Златният нагръдник на фараона Тутанкамон бил инкрустиран именно с балтийски кехлибар. Подобни предмети са открити и в Делфи, Микена, Троя и Сирия, което потвърждава активното взаимодействие между народите по Пътя на кехлибара. (Hood 1990: 230-35) По време на Римската империя търсенето на тази рядка стока се увеличило многократно. Кехлибарът бил ценен не само като красив скъпоценен камък и предпочитан амулет, предпазващ от беди, но и като съставка на много лекарства. Затова една кехлибарена статуетка струвала дори повече от здрав роб. Народите, които обитавали по това време Северна Европа, разменяли кехлибарените зърна за желязо, мед и други ценни за тях стоки. Засиленият търговски обмен способствал за възникването на големите богати градове по Пътя на кехлибара – Скарбантия и Савария (днешна Унгария), Поетовиум, Келея и Емона (днешна Словения). Прекосявайки Черно море, кехлибарът се включвал в другата голяма световна търговска мрежа, а именно – Пътя на коприната.

Подобно на кехлибара, коприната била една от първите стоки в света, търгувана на дълги разстояния. Именно по тази причина немският изследовател Фердинанд Паул Вилхелм фон Рихтхофен наименува сложната мрежата от търговски пътища, простиращи се от източна Азия до Средиземно море, с термина „*Seidenstraße*“. Пресичайки планини, гори, пустинни и степни области, керваните пренасяли порцелан, чай, барут, перли, плодове, зеленчуци и коприна от богатите източни региони, които заменяли за злато, скъпоценни камъни (лапис лазули и рубини), парфюми, подправки и коне (Xingu 2010: 108). Сред търсените стоки коприната бързо се превърнала в предпочитана разплащателна единица, измествайки дори медните монети и останалите видове валута. Подобно на

кехлибара, ценният плат намерил своя път до Египет, където днес при археологически разкопки е открит в гробници от 1000 г. пр. н.е. През I в. пр. н.е. коприната достига и Римската империя, придобивайки изключителна популярност. Появили се много страхове, че търговията „*злато срещу коприна*“, би могла да доведе Римската империя до банкрут. Дори известният философ и сенатор Сенека споделил своето възмущение, че модерните по това време копринени дрехи не покриват по благоприличен начин тялото и критикувал жените с подобно облекло (Brand 2012: 143). Въпреки последвалите забрани за носене на копринени дрехи на публични места, търсенето в империята не намаляло.

Паралелите между Пътят на коприната и този на кехлибара са видими не само в исторически план, но и в своята географско-логистична насоченост по оста Север – Юг. Подобно на Римската империя, Китай също граничи на север с войнствено настроени племена. Взаимодействието между двата конгломерата от народи преминава както под знака на големите войни за влияние на континента, така и под тяхната икономическа обвързаност. Главната пречка пред Китай за желаната експанзионистична политика била липсата на конна армия. Дори радикалните промени и изгонването на много хора от домовете им (с цел осигуряването на достатъчно място за пасища на императорските коне) не довело до желаните резултати (Ellis 2004: 19-20). Единствената възможност продължила да бъде интензивен внос от техния най-голям политически враг. Много изследователи дори считат, че именно търговията „*коне срещу коприна*“ поставило началото на Пътя на коприната. Номадските племена от своя страна нямали полза от самата коприна, а препродавали ценния текстил на запад. Политическата ситуация в региона се изменила, когато конфедерацията на централно-азиатските народи Сюнну разгромила Хан и наложила на страната тежък данък. Недоволството нараснало през II в. пр.н.е., когато император Уди предприел поредица от военни походи на север. Успехът на кампанията бил резултат от преструктурирането на икономиката и внедряването на достатъчно количество коне в армията. Сложните отношения между двете държавни образувания не се изчерпвали единствено с обмяната на коне срещу коприна. Северните региони страдали от недостиг на хранителни стоки и особено жито, които били набавяни чрез търговия с Южна Азия. Именно липсата на хранителен ресурс довел до прекратяването на военната кампания на север. Скоро след преминаването на

Хуанхъ, китайските войски се изправили пред глада в студения и неблагоприятния климат на Севера. Във войната загинали 80 000 души, а Хан изгубили и 100 000 от своите коне, откупени с тонове коприна (Ying-shih 2008: 377-462).

Несъмнено подсигурияването на номадските племена по северната граница на Китай с продоволствени и луксозни стоки подпомогнало до голяма степен икономическото им развитие. Подобно явление се наблюдава и по търговската ос Север-Юг на европейския континент. Пътят на кехлибара се превърнал в решаващ фактор за развитието на Севера и дал тласък на бронзовата ера в Скандинавия. Всички важни ресурси – злато, сребро, бронз и калай били внасяни от Централна Европа. През VI до V в. пр.н.е. търговията в Европа все още била в своя апогей, но разрастващият се конфликт между централноевропейските келтски племена и средиземноморските култури дестабилизирали търговската пътна мрежа. Това довело до западане на северните държавни образувания, които трябвало да се превърнат в самозадоволяващи се икономики, увеличавайки интензивността на селскостопанското си производство. Промяна настъпила едва през 200-100 г. пр.н.е., когато келтските племена се групирани в по-големи селищни общности, вследствие на което политическата ситуация в Европа отново позволила нов икономически подем въз основа на възобновената търговска дейност (Markel 2008: 39). Така в историята последвали предримската и римската желязна епоха на Севера, които положили основите на по-късната Викингска ера.

Друг сходен елемент се явява и използването на външната помощ на войнствените северни племена за разрешаване на вътрешни конфликти. Така например, спасявайки Китай от местни бунтове, племената на уйгурите извоювали правото си на монополни доставчици на коне за китайската армия (Beckwith 1991: 183-198). Римската империя също разчитала прекалено често на варвари-моряци и местни воители, които да действат като нейни наемници, но те често дезертирали и грабели доскоро защитаваните от тях региони (Клемънтс 2013: 16). След залеза на династия Хан през ранния III в. започнал и упадъкът на Пътя на коприната. По същото време се срива и стокообмена по Пътя на кехлибара. През III в. река Дунав се превръща в основен търговски коридор, засенчвайки не само „*Великия кехлибарен път*“, но и всички останали римски пътища. Новите градове и речни фортове преустановили развитието на старите търговски центрове, които западнали напълно в следствие изострянето на конфликта между Рим и новодошлите варварските племена. И докато Пътят на коприната възстановява

своето значение с възкачването на династия Тан през VII в. и преживява своя най-голям разцвет през VIII в., Пътят на кехлибара никога не успява да възвърне своето отминало величие. Изчезването на Западната Римска империя и изместването на основния център на европейската цивилизация в източна посока към Византия довежда до логистично преструктуриране на старата търговска мрежа.

Пътят на коприната е в косвена зависимост и от религиозните вярвания на хората, чиито земи пресича. Причината е в това, че пътната система и в двата разглеждани региона не била експлоатирана единствено от търговци и воители. Много монаси намерили своето призвание в разпространяването на вярванията си, тъй като народите по Пътя на коприната не били единни в религиозната си идентификация. Близкият Изток и старите гръцки колонии в Централна Азия, изоставени след колапса на империята на Александър Велики, все още притежавали своя езически пантеон. В Персия и останалата част от Централна Азия бил разпространен зороастризмът, а властващият в Индия брахманизъм отстъпвал място на хиндуизма и будизма. По пътя се срещали и търговци от Египет, където все още бил жив култа към Озирис и Изида, както и много евреи (изповядващи юдаизъм) и японци, ползващи религиозна система на ранен шинтоизъм. След появата на даоизма, християнството и исляма религиозната картина в азиатския регион станала още по-дисперсирана. По време на първия голям разцвет на Пътя на коприната обаче и трите религии били далеч в бъдещето. Все още не съществувал и официалният държавен култ на конфуцианството. Народите на Китай почитали своите предци в големи потомствени храмове, както и земните божества, четирите посоки на света, големите планини и реки (Overmyer 1986: 27). Измежду огромния калейдоскоп от религиозни вярвания будизмът се превърнал в първата голяма мисионерска вяра и взел предимство пред останалите. В науката съществуват множество теории, посочващи различни причини за масовостта на неговото разпространение. На първо място се подчертава характера на вярата като „отворена“. За разлика от хиндуизма, юдаизма и шинтоизма, които представляват затворени в етноса религиозни системи, учението на Буда не дискриминира своите вярващи спрямо народност, цвят на кожата или език, нито се счита за „рождено право“. Монасите, които пътували с керваните, винаги били отворени към намирането на нови членове и спечелването на възможно повече хора за своята вяра. Универсализмът в посланията за временния земен живот, пълен със страдания, и обещанието за прекратяване на болезнения цикъл на раждане, смърт

и прераждане чрез истинна вяра лесно достигали до обикновения човек. От друга страна, търговците-будисти в необходимостта си да изпълняват своите молитвени ритуали далеч от дома, започнали да изграждат малки храмове и олтари в често посещаваните от тях пазарни градове. (Elverskog 2010: 53)

Масовото разпространение на будизма в Китай допринесло за строежа на големи храмове. Нуждата от преводни книги и споровете по основни догматични въпроси породили обратна вълна от пътуващи монаси. Новите служители предприемали все по-чести пътувания към старите центрове на вярата. Повишило се и търсенето на религиозни предмети като ръкописи, малки статуи, реликви и миниатюрни ступи. Луксозните стоки, пренасяни по Пътя на коприната, се превърнали в ценни предмети, оставяни като дарения в храмовете. Така стокообменът и религията се превърнали във взаимно зависими явления. Коприната намерила своето приложение не само в погребалните ритуали, но и в интериора на храмовите комплекси. Дори самите статуи на поклонение били обличани в ценния текстил, а миряните окачвали цветни знамена край молитвените места. Подобно на продажбата на индулгенции в християнска Европа, коприната се превърнала в задължителна такса за достигане на желаното прераждане. Будизмът обаче преживял своя апогей в Китай до IX век и залеза на династия Тан. По това време по Пътя на коприната започнали своето пътуване новите религии - даоизмът, християнството (в ранната си форма на несторианство и манихейство), както и ислямът, който бързо се превърнал във водеща религия за държавите по търговската мрежа. С нарастващото значение на чая в износа на Китай се нарушила и първоначалната обменна система „коприна – коне“, изменяйки се през XI век в „чай – коне“ (Millward 2013: 112-113).

С изместването на търговската дейност по река Дунав в източна посока, римската пътна система изгубила своето значение на водеща стокообмена мрежа на Европа. Тя останала адекватен избор единствено за пътуващите на север войници, туристи, актьори и гладиатори. Пътят на кехлибара обаче намерил своето ново възраждане, разпространявайки не ценни ресурси, а различни философски и религиозни доктрини, сред които християнството бързо добило своята популярност. След превземането на Йерусалим от арабите през 640 г. християнският свят останал лишен от своя естествен религиозен център. Нуждата от конструирането на един „нов Йерусалим“ в географските граници на Европа – достъпен за всички вярващи, реабилитирал старата „столица“ на Европа.

Римоцентризмът на Средновековието възвърнал и значението на древната имперска пътна система. Утвърждаването на града като предпочитан поклоннически център привличало векове наред големи маси от вярващи, архитекти, художници и скулптори, строители, болни в търсене на изцеление, монаси, крале и просяци.

Засилена активност по Пътя на кехлибара се забелязва и по време на кръстоносните походи, които увлекли много представители на северните страни в служба на Църквата. Старите викинги, които някога кръстосвали континента в търсене на богатства, но били изпратени обратно в неплодородните си ферми, веднага се възползвали от възможността да избягат от своите нови господари и да опитат късмета си на бойното поле. Победата на Саладин и поредната загуба на Йерусалим през 1187 година, довело до завръщането на войнствено настроените рицари от Светите земи. Църквата била нетърпелива да изпрати „армията на Бога“ на поредния поход, възможно по-далеч от сърцето на Европа. Така през XII в. рицарите се отправили по Пътя на кехлибара към земите на Прибалтика, стартирайки т.нар. Северни кръстоносни походи.

Военните действия довели не само до установяването на Тевтонският Орденстат, но и до неговата масивна експанзионистична политика към всички свои съседи – езичници или християни. Създадените от рицарите държавни образувания нарушили политически баланс в региона, но същевременно дали нов тласък на търговията по Пътя на кехлибара и превърнали Данциг (дн. Гданск - Полша) в едно от водещите пристанища на Балтийско море. Кръстоносците сложили ръка на търговията с кехлибар, напълно монополизирайки пазара на ценната стока, а незаконното му добиване се наказвало със смърт.

Изнасянето на информация за производството на коприна извън китайския императорски двор също подлежало на смъртно наказание. Въпреки строгите мерки тайната намерила своя път до Европа, като легендите разказват за двама персийски монаси, които успели да пренесат ценните буби в своите монашески тояжки. Така през VI век Византийската империя започва масово производство на коприна, което измества важността на тази стока в отношенията между Изтока и Запада. Въпреки това коприната остава високо ценена и екзотична стока, особено в западните и северните райони на континента. Пример за това е известното знаме на скандинавския владетел Харалд Хардрада – „*Опустошителното*“. Легендарният воин донесъл мистичния флаг от византийска коприна след странстванията си в

Южна Европа и Близкия Изток. Враговете на Харалд се страхували от знамето, като смятали, че то било изтъкано с магия и помагало на владетеля в битка. Много след смъртта му копиреният флаг продължавал да всява страх сред народите на Севера, ставайки знаме на известния клан Маклауд и участвайки в битки чак до късния XVI век. Днес то се съхранява в замъка Дънвеган на остров Скай (Клемънтс 2013: 254).

Древните пътни системи не свързвали европейските и азиатските народи единствено чрез икономически и културен обмен, но също така се превърнали в мост между две многопластови цивилизации, пренасяйки най-новите в света изобретения и иновации, допринесли за развитието на науката. Знанието за производство на коприна било приложено и в създаването на хартия от дървесни фибри, като усъвършенстването на процеса на производство през I и II в. в Китай дало още по-голям тласък на разпространението на будистки текстове на континента. По този начин, вървейки по Пътя на коприната, учението донесло със себе си една нова литературна традиция. През VI в. страната била обхваната от най-мащабното в историята на човечеството превеждане на книги с религиозен характер. Будизмът внесъл основните доктрини на Южна Азия в китайската литературна традиция чрез мотива за кармата, моралната причинност и отговорност по време на земния живот, както и идеята за илюзорността на емпиричния свят (Cohen 2017: 319). Традицията на литературните похвати на новелата и „разказ в разказа“ могат да бъдат проследени назад във времето до древна Индия и древноиндийското петокнижие *Панчатантра* (преразкази от будистки текстове), както и до още по-старата *Джатаки* (сборник от „повествования за предишните прераждания на Буда“). Благодарение на търговския обмен, който засилил контакта между народите, будизмът успял да наложи своето влияние чрез силата на литературата дори извън границите на своето религиозно разпространение. Преминавайки през Персия и Близкия Изток, древните азиатски текстове достигнали Северна Африка и Южна Европа. По този начин похватите влезли в европейската литература, намирайки израз в творбите на Бокачо и Сервантес, както и на техните наследници (Cohen 2017: 320).

Логистичното свързване на великите цивилизации на Азия и Европа, както и последвания икономически и културен обмен обаче имали и своите негативни последици. През II и III в. пр.н.е. Хан и Римската империя били завладени от епидемия на едра шарка, морбили и бубонна чума. По това време все още не

съществували подходящи лекарствени средства, вследствие на което населението на двете империи намаляло значително за кратък период от време. Популацията на Римската империя спаднала от около 60 до 40 милиона, а тази на Хан - от 60 на 45 милиона. Обезлюдяването на цели райони намалило търговския обмен в двете империи, което от своя страна довело до затваряне на техните икономики. Събитията повлияли не само върху съдбата на двете държави, но и на Пътя на коприната, който преживял своя първи голям застой. Явлението се повторило и през Средновековието, когато чумната епидемия продължила близо 300 години и убила от 30 до 50 % от населението на Европа. Според съвременните изследвания климатичните промени в Азия по това време способствали за развитието и разпространението на определен тип бактерии, дошли в Европа по големите търговски пътища. Продължавайки своето пътуване, бълхата-преносител на заразата се завърнала в дървените варели, с които се доставяли жизненоважните суровини за далечния Север - пшеница, ръж и вълна. Така тя била пренесена дори в далечна Скандинавия, което довело до 76 % обезлюдяване на региона.

Въпреки съществуването на подобни мрачни периоди в историята на човечеството, взаимодействието между европейския и азиатския континент никога не престанало напълно. След периодите на икономическа стагнация, търговията се завръщала с още по-голям интензитет. Възходът на всяка една голяма цивилизация винаги бил силно обвързан с изграждането на стабилна и прогресивно развиваща се транспортна система. Ефективната инфраструктура обаче не винаги била фактор за нейното реализиране. За разлика от Римските пътища, които разчитали на най-новите инженерните достижения и бивали застигани с 4 до 5 слоя настилка, търговските артерии на Азия преминавали през пустини и труднодостъпни местности, които не позволявали създаването на подобна ефективна пътна мрежа. И докато европейците разчитали на двигателната сила на коня и каруцата, азиатските търговци се ориентирали към алтернативни транспортни методи. Така камилата се превърнала не само в символ на Пътя на коприната, но и ценна стока, без която търговията в региона би била невъзможна. Тя била предпочитана не само поради всеизвестната ѝ издръжливост в безводни региони, но и поради възможността ѝ сама да пренася големи товари, при това без необходимостта на стабилен обработен път. И двата транспортни способа, на които се базирала търговията векове наред, постепенно изгубили своето значение. Възходът на речния и морски транспорт, който позволява пренос

на огромно количество стоки на големи разстояния, довел до залаза на древните пътни системи. Пристанищните градове бързо се превърнали в нови търговски центрове, оставяйки в миналото малките кервани и тайните пътеки през пустини на Азия.

Геополитическата картина в региона се променила още повече с появата на нов играч на евразийската сцена, чийто икономически възход премахнал напълно статуквото на старите империи. Древният занаят на отделяне и обработка на кехлибар постепенно замира, след като на пазара надделели нови видове редки скъпоценни камъни. Днес единственото предприятие, което добива кехлибар чрез промишлен метод, е Калининградският кехлибарен комбинат с годишен добив от около 300 тона. Произведените количества обаче не поемат по „*Великия кехлибарен път от Балтика към Европа*“, а биват транспортирани до Китай, като само през 2016 г. е сключен договор за доставка на над 680 тона необработен кехлибар за близо 10 милиарда рубли.

За разлика от отдавна забравената търговска артерия на „*златото на Севера*“, Пътят на коприната продължава да се радва на все по-нарастващо внимание. Само през последната година Китай, който парадоксално днес внася от своите съседи необходимата му коприна, инвестира 24,8 милиарда долара в инфраструктурни проекти. Новоизградените скоростни магистрала обаче няма да пренасят високоценените някога чай, коприна и подправки, нито отдавна изгубените будистки текстове, а важни за китайската икономика суровини. Благодарение на новия Път на коприната, страната ще продължи да променя и гради световната икономика на бъдещето, докато керваните, камилите и коприната останат единствено далечни символи на една отдавна отминала епоха.

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Уроци по щастие от Йе Шънтао

Лъчезара Николова

Abstract

Ye Shengtao was the first significant Chinese writer to create artistic tales in China in the 1920's. One of his remarkable books is "The Scarecrow". It contains 29 stories. The plot takes us back to the beginning of the 20th century, a time when the common people start walking towards modernization. One of the favourite stories is "The Blind Man and the Deaf Man". It teaches us that life is never easy, that every person comes with his unique problems and flaws, but is also given the opportunity to grow, accept the surrounding reality and live embracing a positive attitude to life itself. The true happiness lies in this.

Keywords: Chinese Modern Fiction, Ye Shengtao, "The Scarecrow", "The Blind Man and the Deaf Man".

Чрез приказките получаваме свобода, допълваме нашата вселена и изграждаме ценностната си система. Приказката представя обществото през определен ъгъл, очертава не само границата между доброто и злото, но обрисова взаимоотношенията между хората и „поставя“ нещата на правилните им места.

Дълбоко познати са ни сюжетите от „Пепеляшка“, „Рапунцел“, „Грозното патенце“ и др. Азиатската литература също не бива да бъде подценявана, особено що се отнася до китайската – създавана в продължение на хилядолетия, с богата интертекстуалност и пищна художественост. Сред творците почетно място заема Йе Шънтао (叶圣陶, 1894-1988) – първият автор на приказки от 1920 г. и създател на Първата асоциация за изследване на литературата⁴ след Движението четвърти май⁵.

Една от най-популярните му книги е „Плашилото“⁶. В нея са поместени 29 приказки. Сюжетът е осъвременен, описани са 20-те години на 20-ти век, когато обикновеният човек прави по-смели стъпки по пътя към модернизацията. Именно това е едно от първите литературни произведения в историята на китайската литература, предназначено за деца. Авторът прокарва идеите си, че младите

⁴ Association for Literary Studies (文學研究會).

⁵ Движението четвърти май 五四运动 е антиимпериалистическо културно и политическо движение, чиято кулминация е в Пекин на 4-ти май 1919 г. Протестът е в отговор на слабостта на китайското правителство и помиряването му с клаузите на Версайския договор.

⁶ 《稻草人》 (1922 г.).

трябва да бъдат възпитавани да мислят повече за обществото. Сюжетите не са сложни, но са изпълнени с дълбок замисъл.

Дейността на Йе Шънтао оказва огромно влияние върху подобряването на съвременното китайско образование. Той въвежда концепцията да се преподава на учениците по нови методи, а не да се използват единствено традиционните. Именно по този начин ще се повиши критичното мислене у индивида и ще се изкорени еднообразието, не само ще се увеличат високите постижения в областта на образованието, но и хората ще могат да растат подготвени за живота.

Според Йе Шънтао реализмът е огледало на живота

Реализмът е една от най-отличителни черти в творчеството на Йе Шънтао, който го възприема като огледало, отразяващо тъмната страна на човешката природа, на цялото общество.

Като действащ преподавател, Йе има поглед върху хора от различни слоеве на обществото. Разказва, че много от интелектуалците са експлоатирани заради политическата нагласа на времето и нямат способността да се противопоставят. В произведенията си винаги отразява истината и реалността. Развива идеите за демокрация, разкрива, че в Нов Китай (т.е. след 1949 г.) много голяма част от населението е станало егоистично, студено, лицемерно и консервативно, отстъпващо се от своите житейски ценности, за да живее спокойно. Именно чрез произведенията си той вярва, че ще събуди съзнанието на хората да се изправят пред социалните проблеми и да имат вяра в щастливото бъдеще.

Език и реторика в произведенията

Езикът в произведенията е ясен и разбираем. Образите са ярки и живи, дълбоко се вниква във вътрешния свят на героите.

Контактите с външната литература

Самият автор казва, че ако е нямал възможност да чете английски и е нямал досег до английската литература, едва ли е щял да се научи да пише художествени произведения. Благодарение на познанията си, той открива един нов свят за съвременната китайска литература.

Какво е щастието

Щастието е основна житейска ценност за човека. Според Епикур единственият живот, който ни е отреден, трябва да бъде изживян възможно най-щастливо. Щастието е тъждествено на инстинкта и може да оправдае страданието (Ницше 1992: 16), но не винаги е лесно достижимо. Същевременно някои желания са отвъд нашите възможности и, преследвайки щастието, можем да се разделим и с малкото, което ни кара да се чувстваме спокойни и благодарни.

В настоящата статия е представена приказка номер 15 от книгата „Плашилото“, озаглавена „Слепият и глухият“. Тя разкрива трогателно и на разбираем език колко уродлив може да бъде светът, в който живеем. Разказът носи поуката, че най-голямата радост, която може да донесем на себе си и другите е, да „излекуваме“ недостатъците на безпощадната действителност, която ни обкръжава.

В приказката „Слепият и глухият“ авторът създава следния сюжет: двама приятели – единият от които сляп, а другият глух, решават че ще бъдат щастливи като се „разменят“ – слепият да стане глух, а глухият – сляп. Надяват се, че ще открият някой, който може да изпълни тяхното най-съкровено желание.⁷

Слепият бил чувал хората да казват, че „най-прекрасното нещо на света е светлината, чрез нея могат да се виждат най-различни красиви неща“. Той тъгувал и завиждал, че другите имат очи, и повече от всичко мразел своя недъг. Мислел си: „Ако можех да видя един-единствен лъч светлина, бих бил много щастлив. Чувал съм да казват, че дори жабите имат очи и могат да видят майките, братята и сестрите си, могат да зърнат облаците в небето и дървесата в планините. Чувал съм хората да казват, че и молците имат очи, могат да намерят пътя в тъмното, да летят към светлината в далечината. Аз съм един от най-големите нещастници, не мога да се сравня дори с жабата и молеца. О, Господи, ще мога ли някога да зърна светлината?“

Глухият виждал другите, които имат уши, и предполагал, че най-прекрасното нещо на света е звукът; чувайки звуците, е сякаш да чуваш чисти и искрени думи. Той много завиждал на хората, които имали способността да чуват, но още повече негодувал заради собствената си неспособност. Той си мислел: „Ако някога чуя дори един звук, ще бъда много, много щастлив! Вярвам, че пеперудите могат да чуят как растенията ги поздравяват, как розите се усмихват ласкаво, как

⁷ Приказката е преведена със съкращения.

рибките слушат песента на рекичката и мелодията на водните растения. Аз съм най-нещастният човек на земята, не мога да се сравня дори с пеперудите и рибите. О, Господи, ще мога ли някога да чуя поне един-единствен звук?“

И понеже глухият никога не можел да говори, затова звуците, които излизали от устата му, не били същите като на обикновените хора, а звучали като „Я, я, я...“

Първоначално двамата намерили един лечител, разказали му за мечтата си, но той отклонил молбата им. Наложило се да потърсят някой друг. На излизане от дома на лечителя попаднали на възрастна жена, която им казала, че „на запад, има една гора, в гората има храм, в който живее стар монах. Той знае много магии и може да ви помогне. Потърсете го.“

Двамата приятели много се зарадвали, благодарили на старицата и се отправили на запад. Стигнали до една гора с буйна растителност. Влезли в нея и намерили храма, а вътре срещнали стария монах. Споделили тревогите си с него и поискали помощ, но той поклатил глава и отказал. Отвърнал им: „Това не е лесна работа. Моите способности не могат да удовлетвори вашите искания.“ Ала много се натъжил от съдбата им, спрял ги и казал: „Аз наистина нищо не мога да направя, но ще ви кажа да отидете на място, където може би желанието ви ще се сбъдне. Продължавайте да вървите на запад, след като минете гората ще стигнете до един малък град, на юг от града има стара вятърна мелница. Тя може би ще ви помогне.“

В края на гората наистина имало град, в чийто край се виждала вятърна мелница. Перките ѝ били целите покрити с прах и счупени на няколко места. Когато вятърът духнел, те лениво се поклащали, като старец, който се движи с усилие.

Двамата с надежда казали на мелницата: „Вярваме, че ти ще ни помогнеш. Ако мечтата ни се сбъдне, от все сърце ще оценим чудотворната ти сила.“

Вятърната мелница се въртяла и шумоляла като стара грамофонна плоча. Тя отвърнала: „Аз мога да сбъдна желанието ви, но искам да знаете, че да се размените не е правилно. Независимо колко проблеми има човек, той винаги си мисли, че е най-нещастният и че всички останали живеят по-щастливо от него. За какво ви е да се размените?“

Но те били убедени, че онова, което желаят, е добро за тях и след като се разменят, някога няма да съжаляват. Мелницата се засмяла и рекла: „Казвам ви го с добро, ала вие не вярвате. Ако толкова силно го желаете, не мога да ви откажа! Но

преди да го направя, трябва да знаете, че мога да ви разменя само веднъж, връщане назад – няма. Ако след размяната, не сте доволни и искате да се върнете в предишното състояние, няма да мога да ви помогна.“

„Фиу, фиу, фиу“ – перките се завъртели три пъти и двамата веднага се разменили. На лицето на слепия се появили две очи. Усетил нещо като светкавица, след която можел да вижда светлината и всичко наоколо. Но не можел да чуе и звук. Глухият изведнъж чул един несравнимо силен звук, и хоп – можел да чува всичко, ала в същото време повече не можел да вижда светлината.

От този момент нататък, за да улесним разказа, ще наричаме онзи, който първоначално бил сляп „новия глух“, а онзи, който първоначално бил глух – „новия сляп“. Сега вече новият глух водел новия сляп, а новият сляп с жестове общувал с новия глух. Двата благодарили на мелницата и си тръгнали.

Странното било, че в града сякаш знаели за тяхната размяна и където и да отидели, предизвиквали объркване.

Новият глух виждал силуетите на хората, това било нещо ново за него и се вглеждал с особено внимание. Минаващите ги сочели с пръст, на лицата им се изписвали презрителни усмивки, устните им се движели и макар че той не можел да ги чуе, благодарение на предишния си опит, знаел, че не говорят с добро. Мислел си: „Не съм предполагал, че на света може да има толкова непоносими усмивки! За да се смеят така, значи тези хора заявяват, че са пълноценни, здрави и щастливи и че това им дава правото да са надменни. Нима инвалиди и нещастници като нас трябва да тънат в срам? Да виждам подобни усмивки, ме кара да се разкайвам, особено когато за първи път имам очи – да виждам подобни усмивки!“ Той дръпнал новия сляп и двамата бързо побягнали от мястото.“

В същото време новият сляп вече бил чул какво си говорят хората, това било нещо ново за него и слушал особено внимателно. Минаващите се подигравали на двамата и казвали: „Това е нечувано и невиждано! Слепият да стане глух, а глухият – сляп, те никога не могат да избягат от недъзите си! Вижте ги – сбръчкали вежди и наострили уши! Колко отвратително!“

Новият сляп, въпреки че не можел да види тези хора, благодарение на предишния си опит знаел как изглеждат подигравателните им изражения. Мислел си: „Не съм предполагал, че на света съществуват толкова непоносими слова. За да ги изрекат, значи тези хора заявяват, че са пълноценни, здрави и щастливи и че това им дава правото да са надменни. Нима инвалиди и нещастници като нас,

трябва да тънат в срам? Да чувам подобни неща наистина ме кара да се разкайвам, особено когато за първи път ушите ми могат да различават звуците – да чувам подобни неща!“ Той побутнал новия глух да вървят по-бързо. Крачките им влезли в такт и двамата се понесли в бяг.

Стряскащ звук накарал новия сляп да спре. Новият глух видял много възрастни хора, които пренасяли тухли. Те влачели тежките тухли, и носейки ги на гръб, се огъвали като куки от голямата тежест. Лицата им били изпити, червеникаво-кафяви, телата – целите в пот, сякаш покрити с масло, краката едвам се мърдали, само се привличвали и така се придвижвали напред. Сцената натъжила двамата минувачи. Очите на новия глух се навлажнили и той предположил, че това са сълзи, нещо, за което преди често бе чувал хората да говорят. Прилив на горчивина от сърцето се прехвърлил някъде между очите и носа. Той изпитал такава тъга, че поискал никога повече да не вижда подобно нещо, но вече не бил сляп!

Теглейки се и подбутвайки се взаимно, двамата бягали колкото се може по-бързо далеч от това място.

Новият глух въздъхнал разочаровано: „С очите си видях толкова много неприятни неща!“ Той попитал новия сляп: „Ти извади ли късмет? Успя ли да чуеш някакъв приятен звук или приятна мелодия?“

Новият сляп наострил уши, намръщено поклатил глава, и казал: „Откакто имам слух, чувам само неща, които не радват.“

Новият глух отвърнал: „По-рано ти споделих, че на света няма никакви приятни звуци. Сега вече повярва ли ми?“

Приятелят му направил няколко жеста, с които казал: „И аз по-рано ти казах, че на света няма никакви хубави неща. Сега вече повярва ли ми?“

„Да не се обвиняваме взаимно. Нашето щастие е в надеждата. Да вървим нататък, ти ще можеш да чуеш хубави звуци, а аз ще мога да видя прекрасни неща.“

Като чул думите на новия глух, новият сляп кимнал одобрително. Двамата бързо потеглили напред.

Изведнъж някакво червено петно уплашило новия глух и той се вцепенил. Не разбрал какво точно е, само усетил, че кръвта от сърцето му сякаш ще бликне през устата. Умът му бил размътен, краката като заковани, и не можел да помръдне. Минало време преди да се поосвести. Тогава осъзнал, че вижда прасе, лежащо на мръсна дъска с кръв, течаща от устата му. Касапин разрязвал с нож гърдите му.

Новият глух се почувствал много зле, сякаш десетки ножове го прободели в сърцето. Още веднъж видял прасето, чиято половина вече била окачена на напречната греда, в устата му се белеели зъби, сякаш готови да захаят човек, очите му – наполовина отворени, сякаш тайно наблюдавало хората. Новият глух ужасно се уплашил, умът му отново се замъглил. С ръце закрил очите си и изкрещял: „Никога повече не искам да виждам!“

В това време новият сляп бил чул пронизителен писък, звукът бил остър като нож, усетил как сърцето му става ледено като кама. След малко чул още низ от стенания, от които цялото му тяло започнало да трепери, чул и звука на кръв, която се лее. Стоновете на прасето ставали все по-слаби и накрая чул само последното му издихание. Новият сляп много се уплашил, покрил ушите си с ръце и извикал: „Никога повече не искам да чувам!“

Докато новият глух крещял „Не искам да чувам“, новият сляп с жестове казвал: „Не искам да виждам“.

Новият глух с изненада попитал: „И ти ли вече не искаш да чуваш? Тогава значи за нас повече няма никаква надежда, ние никога няма да сме щастливи!“

Новият глух покрил прогледналите си очи, новият сляп закрил вече чуващите си уши. Двата се страхували да се пуснат и завинаги останали хванати за ръце, защото магическата вятърна мелница повече не можела да им помогне да възвърнат предишното си състояние.

10 април 1922 г.

Всяка приказка съдържа поука. Творбата на Йе Шънтао ни дава възможност да осъзнаем, че човешкият живот не е лек, че всеки от нас има проблеми или дори недъзи, но трябва да се научим да приемаме реалността, да имаме положително отношение към живота, да не се разстройваме от хорските упреци или обиди. Трябва да ценим онова, което притежаваме, с всички усилия да се стремим да постигаме щастие, защото бъдещето е пред нас. Ако залагаме на силните си страни, бързо бихме преодолели собствените си недостатъци. Именно така ще „пречупим рамката“ на мисълта, че сме нещастни, а другите – винаги по-добре от нас, и ще се фокусираме върху промяна на гледната точка.

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Rampant Wrong Uses of Chinese Characters: Not a Worrier-of-Qi for de-orthodoxy of Chinese language, spoken and written

Liu Hanzhen

Abstract

Taking advantage of similarity of pronunciation, a feat easy to do in the Chinese language because of the phonetics, both spoken and written language applications have fallen into a distortion of wrong use for the application that was intended to be used. Currently, the Chinese language is facing enormous challenge because of abuse from borrowing the similarity of pronunciation and dialect for wrong use that has happened only recently, seldom in Chinese history. Undoubtedly, it is becoming a dark age for Chinese culture and language.

The paper will present some representative examples of wrong uses, and explore how this phenomenon came into being in four respects: politically, economically, socially, and culturally in bringing worries to the future generations for the Chinese language and cultural concerns.

Keywords: Chinese language, phonogram, Chinese characters, Net-slang

简介

因特网是自报纸和杂志，电视之后的第四媒体，其触角延伸到世界尽可能的每个角落。1994 因特网落户中国，带来的改变不仅是对传统的交流方式并且是对中国人的生活，精神和社会都是巨大的。特别值得一提的是，近年来智能手机的普及和快速发展的无线网络的方便推动我们每一个手机用户，社交媒体上的互动，发表看法，上传图片。每个人都是一个写手，作家，是自己的编辑，毫无疑问现代移动互联网就是一个自媒体的时代~~自创语言的温床。中国汉字的中多音性，会意性，通假性，形声性而导致的数万个“网络语言”来表示些“你懂得”的言下之意⁸，没人知道是从什么时候开始出现，开始流行的。总的来说，在某年某月的某一天人们突然觉得当用某个形声字或是借用某个近音或是某个会意字甚至某个方言来表达某种意思更有喜感，更具有意想不到的讽刺意味，更能代表某个特定的心声。久而久之广而盖之就形成今天的“网络语言”，是否是一个巧合，亦或是一个某种灵感，没人说得清楚。无论如何，其疯狂地复制与传播，错误曲意中国汉字的用法无可避免地侵蚀了中国汉字文化的正统性。自媒体时代呈几何般快速传播，更加剧这些错误用法使得每个网民自觉不自觉被影响着。

⁸ 政协发言人吕新华回应涉周永康传闻：你懂的 被译为 you know what I mean. 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbDrzz8suSo>, 02 05 2014

本文将努力解释其类别，种类和产生的时代背景，像是“砖家”，“叫兽”，“稀饭”和“河蟹”等等。

网络语言的类别与释义根据使用方法的几种分类：

1, 借用台湾，山东，陕西或是福建等等地方语言的发音。最流行的是“偶”，这个音是陕西的方言，表达的是普通话里“我”的意思，“虾米”舶来于福建的方言 表达普通话里的“什么”的意思。鉴于现代汉字四声发音的限制，地方方言里的发音很难找到对应的汉字来表示这也是为什么让人总是很困惑的原因，“酱紫”就是一例。“酱紫”的发音来自台湾的方言，是“这样子啊”的快速发音，而“这”是轻读，重音在“样子”上，“啊”基本上也是轻轻带过的。台湾的口语深受当地闽南语和客家话的影响，“样子”就被破译成了现代汉语中“酱紫”来表示了；那“表酱紫”呢（见图一），表达的惊讶“不要这样子啊！”，把台语中的快速发音“不要”直接译成成汉字中结结实实的“表”就成了“表酱紫”。类似这样的“酱紫”或是“表酱紫”在日常生活中的运用，完全曲解了中国汉字在实际生活中的真实意思。

图一⁹




2, 正常词汇和术语在被别用。举个例子吧，网络上很多的本该是的“喜欢”被“稀饭”代替（明明是吃的“稀饭”，是名词，怎么就被借走表示“喜欢”当动词用了呢）。明明说的是“同学”却被“童鞋”换取；明明可爱的“小朋友”却要以“小盆友”出现...怎么能开这样的玩笑？如果某位老师看到某学生写“偶稀饭偶的童鞋”（见图二）“简直就像天书，老师看不懂学生写的是什么”¹⁰。

⁹ 资料来源：网络语言酱紫是什么意思，表酱紫是什么意，<https://www.wsm.cn/wenhua/kepu/15322.html>

¹⁰ Xu 2014: 徐磊. 网络语言“入侵”作文试卷 老师回应“简直像猜谜”. http://www.ce.cn/culture/gd/201404/01/t20140401_2583471.shtml. 2014, 09.14.2017

图二11



3, 数字别用。如果有人打出“55555”，那就表示是在“呜呜”地哭；“1314”表示的“一生一世”；“3166”是借日本语 さようなら 意思说“再见”；“7456”，说的是“你气死我了”；“740”反唇相讥“气死你”；“748”是经常挂在年轻人口上的“去死吧”；“886”是网络上（笔者也是其中之一）双方要结束聊天的时候用的，意思是“走了”或是“下线了”。特别意味的“535”，五月三十五号，暗指“六四”，还有 VIIV 也是同样的意思，因为1989年六月四号发生天安门事件一直在网络被屏蔽，老百姓寻求他法绕过屏蔽的结果。

4, 采用形声字的替代。譬如“媒体”被“霉体”代替，“记者”职业成了“妓者”。在这个自媒体的时代，每个人手机使用者都在自我教育，有些媒体的报道不能与时俱进而老百姓称为“霉体”（发了霉的物体）；而有些记者呢，只是为了钱而写而根本无视新闻工作者的道德操守，所以成了“妓”者。再有“悲剧”成了“杯具”，“喜剧”成了“洗具”，“惨剧”成了“餐具”，怎么地某些时候需要真实悲痛或是欢乐感情的时候，却要用“杯具”或是“洗具”表示，难道不荒谬吗？更甚的是，“文化部”被“焚化部”代替；“广电总局”成了“光腚肿菊”；“独裁”有时候用“毒菜”来表示；“民主”与“自由”因为屏蔽的缘故分别被“皿煮”与“兹油”代替在网络的发帖和跟帖中。

5, 最有时代意义的网络语言。超凡使用汉语中的谐音起到比喻的作用和讽刺的效果~ 尤其在政治事件上或是在政治的问题讨论上。譬如“河蟹”取代了“和谐”¹²，表示在中国任何跟主流媒体不一样的意见都被“河蟹”掉（蟹的两只大钳子尤为形象）。当中国当局高调向国际社会表示中国是一个多么“和谐社会”时，而她的老百姓却认为是一个“河蟹”的社会~钳制一切的言论自由的社会。目前的“砖家”一词¹³，是网友对那些胡说八道的专家的讥讽。这是什么时代呢，很多地方需要专家们的独树一帜的观点的时

¹¹ 资料来源：微信朋友圈

¹² 百度百科. 2013: 河蟹. <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B2%B3%E8%9F%B9/10292878>. 2013, 09.14. 2017

¹³ 百度百科. 砖家. <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A0%96%E5%AE%B6> 09. 14.2017

候，却总是让人大跌眼镜，久而久之人们使用“砖家”的频率比“专家”要多得多。另一个跟知识分子有关系的是“教授”居然被“叫兽”代替了，让人匪夷所思的，不是吗？其结果是：在各大网站的论坛上，一些知名的教授，被愤怒的网民改称为叫兽。这是为什么呢？这是因为这些教授丧失了兼爱为民的价值观，形成了以钱多为荣，以钱少为耻的荣辱观，他们的言论，如同求食的叫兽一样，处处为美食而献声，处处为美食而献技。他们看风驶船，献媚贪官，颠倒是非，为己捞钱，所以被网民们改称为叫兽。这些教授人数虽然很少，但是他们头上有很多骗人的光环，又有很大忽悠人的能力，所以他们全部的市场经济和私有化理论，不管是对国家教育还是对社会的发展，都起到了极大极坏的影响¹⁴。

人们不禁会问是什么让曾经人敬仰的教授们变成“叫兽”，让人敬慕的专家成了“砖家”呢？

一个调查显示“专家”为何变成“砖家”？调查中，79.6%的人觉得是因为“部分专家缺乏社会责任感，为利益群体代言”；72.3%的人认为“大量‘伪专家’充斥专家队伍，素质良莠不齐”。同时，有28.5%的人认为媒体难辞其咎，“媒体争相报道专家‘雷人雷语’，放大负面印象”¹⁵。

无论是“教授”变“叫兽”或是“专家”成“砖家”，反映的是现在的所谓的教授和专家们早已不再是令人尊敬的知识分子不再是社会的良心与脊梁，而是成为了中国的“精致利己主义者”的一族¹⁶。当人们在电视上看到那些油头封面的经济学家们侃侃而谈的理论不敌一点逻辑分析的时候，“叫兽”和“砖家”这类网络替代词语就越来越普及，普及到了人们无论什么人都可以冠名的不假思索的地步了。

归纳一下发生的原因，有可能以下方面：

反传统的意识。在中国30年改革之后，中国经济成了世界第二之巅（国内有的媒体称之第一）。在非凡的经济成功的背后，是道德与文化的大幅的退化“跟我一样守住底线”，厦门大学易中天教授的一次演讲中这样呼吁¹⁷。中国人不再崇拜与尊重中国

¹⁴ Liu 2013: 刘联众. 教授变叫兽，看国家教育的倒退. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_71ba8e1b0101bj9x.html. 2013, 09.15. 2017

¹⁵ Huang 2010: 黄冲. 被滥用的专家透支了整个社会的公信力. http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-06/25/content_3293796.htm. 2010, 09.15.2017

¹⁶ Qian 2015: 钱学理. 大学里绝对精致的利己主义者. <http://edu.qq.com/a/20150520/041737.htm>. 2015, 09.16.2017

¹⁷ 易中天厦大演讲. http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rqwl63h5.html. 09.18. 2017

传统和传统文化，传统中的伦理和道德从此让位于在经济大潮中对感官刺激，名与利的追逐。

政治上的集权统治。跟历史上儒教的宣讲一样，在中国的政治，文化，社会和精神等等领域，意识形态绝对是至高无上的地位。在中国共产党一党专政的新时代里，无处不在的“党文化”已经替代了传统文化，为了屏蔽那些带有所谓的“负能量”的言论中国当局一直在管控监督网上的发帖和跟贴，当局雇佣了大量的“网络评论员”和“网络舆情分析师”¹⁸（被老百姓俗称为“五毛党”）成为正式国家职业的正式编制，负责监督，屏蔽，和删除那些不符合官方主流媒体的声音，收集发帖者的个人信息甚至报告给警方。不仅如此，还下发了“网络屏蔽词”的红头文件¹⁹。怎么样绕过“网络屏蔽词”呢，网友们就创造了“河蟹”，“兹油”，和“VIIV”等等词汇来对抗 — 在这个意义上，美轮美奂的中国汉字就这样成了文字游戏中的一个棋子。

官方主导的腐败。另一个例证，“权利倾向腐败，绝对的权利导致绝对的腐败”（Lord Acton 1887: Par. 7）。政府的报告里的充斥很多官话套话对汉字使用背离正常的用途而入歧途，曲解，错误的方向一大肆地利用歧义，无论如何是对中国官员们在经济开放之后的腐败是个绝佳的描述。在那些腐败中，“语言的腐败是最猖獗...制造数万的语言垃圾一方面损害我们的心灵另一方面污染了环境”²⁰，张维迎，北大经济学教授在演讲中所指的是那些在为官方主流媒体写文章，写社评的靠文字吃饭的记者，编辑或是为某个政治大人物写报告的从县到市到省在到中央的大大小的秘书们，“语言的腐败和一般的腐败不同，腐败者不是直接获取真金白银的利益，而是煞有其事地讲一些他们自己也不相信的谎言”（George Orwell 1963: 150）。当语言不能表达其真实的意图的时候，撒谎就成了自然。不是危言耸听，“为了人类的幸福每个人在思想上保持他的忠诚，如果一个人堕落到宣传自己不相信的东西的时候，他已经做好了干一切坏事的准备”（Thomas Paine）佩恩·托马斯早在 200 年前就有了这样的预警。现代中国的官场中的假，大，空，套话“已经到了屡见不鲜成了一种病态”地步了²¹，党报都不得不开展检讨批评的地步了。那么这些假大空的套话又会影响多少受众？多少人被腐败

¹⁸ Meng 2013: 孟光 . 网络舆情分析师成中国官方认可职业 . http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2013/10/131004_china_internet_analyst 2013, 09.20.2017


¹⁹ Wei 2013: 威克 . 日媒：中国当局下令编列 829 个敏感词 . http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2013/08/130810_chinawordban_japan. 2013, 09.20.2017

²⁰ Zhang 2012: 张维迎. 语言腐败最普遍. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbyVoGoQ3qk>. 2012, 09.20.2017

²¹ Chen 2008: 陈叶军 . 空话、大话、套话、假话成为一种衍续成习的病态 . <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/117092/7476691.html> . 2008, 09.20.2017

的语言污染着？他们又在以怎样的速度在接受污染的同时又在传播污染？中国互联网信息中心的一项调查说“2015 中国大陆达到了网民 688 万人之巨，其中 71.5% 是手机上网用户”²²。（见图三）

图三²³



上有好者，下必甚焉。网络语言的泛滥不仅是件让官方头痛的事情，更是让教育工作者，甚至让家长焦心的一件大事。作者在约 8-14 岁的家长朋友中做了一个随机的采访：对“是否你的孩子在用网络语言”的答复是 100% 的，说他们（孩子们）有时候说的话像是在谜语，还取笑他们（家长们）“你们落伍啦”——由此可见网络语言的在现实中的频率和密度了吧。无独有偶，网上一个调研显示“在 2,000 个受访者中，89.6% 经常使用网络语言，62.1% 认为某些特别的网络语言该编写进入字典”²⁴，鉴于网络语言趋向越来越不可控制，新华社出拳予以重击“新一组 57 个网络语言”继 2015 的 45 个网络语言之后再遭到禁止²⁵。亡羊补牢，未为晚也？面对现实吧，在中国数百万的高中小学生早已经被网络语言不可避免地深深地影响着，其势头之猛都逼着有些学校都开始对网络语言打了白旗了——在新人上岗的培训中就有网络语言的解读（图四）。

图四²⁶


²² China Internet Network Information Center 2016:46. *Statistical Report on Internet Development in China*. <https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201604/P020160419390562421055.pdf>. 2016, 09.20.2017

²³ 资料来源：中国互联网信息中心。CNNIC. 2016. <https://cnnic.com.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201604/P020160419390562421055.pdf>.

²⁴ Zhu 2016: 朱昌逵. 网络词汇无需词典来正名. http://guancha.gmw.cn/2016-07/20/content_21051964.htm 2016, 09.20.2017

²⁵ Jin 2017: 靳倩倩. 新华社发布新闻报道禁用词：新增“撕逼、逗比、你妹”等网络用语. <https://www.digitaling.com/articles/38596.html>. 2017, 09.20.2017

²⁶ 资料来源: 00 后网络语言等级测试. 微信朋友圈



其内容是帮助新老老师更好地理解那些在 2000 年之后出生的新生代在课间或是课上使用的“谜语”，如同洪水般充斥学校各个角落的网络语言，势头之猛居然要教育工作者重新理解中国汉字的运用，更有甚者某些还要放弃传统的标准“高考阅卷对网络语言持包容的态度，并没说禁止使用，关键是尺度的把握”²⁷，但是哪些“尺度”，而又怎么“把握”呢，文章没有明确，足以可见是没有可实施的具体标准的。

结束语

世界上的任何语言都是知识的进步的体现和智慧的结晶。重中之重，中国语言之正统凝聚中国先祖们对天，地和自然的认识的体现。近现代的中国掀起了一次又一次自上而下的反传统文化的运动，无论是从新文化运动，到破迷信破四旧，到文化大革命，再到现今的网络用语泛滥，传统文化在中国大陆遭到前所未有破坏，如何抵制汉字的歧义使用和不规范使用，如何维护汉字的正统性是摆在每个国人面前的一道难题。而政治高压，语言腐败让抵制的防线弱不禁风，国人人人上手的一些汉语输入工具里都把“酱紫”“小盆友”“砖家”等等网络用语都作为高频率的词汇快速输入，美其名曰提供更多快捷的服务给消费者，难道消费者真的愿意接受这样的“便捷”的服务吗？是否，这些公司具备起码的职业道德而不让软件自动生成这样的词汇呢？不管怎么说吧，他们难咎其责，因为他们没有阻止错误的传播反而曲意迎合，多多少少他们是背后的推手。汉字的错误表述是一种极其荒谬的使用，它让中国的汉字失去其正常表达的功能；让道德水准下降；让传递的信息变得不真实。

²⁷ Cheng 2014: 成良田. “你造吗”学生用网络语言搞晕语文老师. <http://news.sohu.com/20141010/n404976443.shtml>. 2014, 09.20.2017

因此，中国汉字的正统性作为传统文化的载体继文革之后又一次面临被颠覆被抛弃的局面，而这一次引领潮流的是以学童们为首的新生代。难以想像，不远的未来 20-30 后，当这一代人成了家长，他们拿怎么教育他们的孩子呢？

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中国与阿拉伯国家的贸易关系的回顾和展望

陆芸

Abstract

China has a long history with Arab countries. Many Chinese porcelain products were exported in the 9th century from Tang Dynasty to Abbasid Dynasty. The Chinese papermaking, silk technology, gunpowder and compass spread into Abbasid Caliphate. In the same time, the Arab astronomy calendar, spices and glassware spread into China and had impacts on China.

The Arab countries responded positively to Chinese President Xi Jinping's initiative "One Belt and One Road". China has proposed to Saudi Arabia to strengthen cooperation in the field of infrastructure, investment, aerospace, nuclear energy and renewable energy. The Egyptian government wants to use the Suez Canal Corridor Economic Zone to link to One Belt and One Road project.

Keywords: China, Arab countries, Batu Hitam, papermaking, spices, glassware, One Belt and One Road

一、从“黑石号”、“泉州宋代古船”等沉船出土的物品看古代中国与阿拉伯——伊斯兰国家的贸易往来

中国与伊朗、阿拉伯半岛之间，自古就有往来。在长期的交往过程中，中国的造纸技术、丝织技术、火药、指南针传入阿拉伯——伊斯兰国家，阿拉伯的天文历法知识、医药和玻璃也传入了中国。近几十年来，在中国沿海和东南亚国家的一些海域陆续发现了一些沉船，如“南海一号”、“南海二号”、“华光礁一号”、“黑石号”、“印坦号”、“井里汶号”等，这些沉船出土了陶瓷、金银锭、香料等。下面我着重介绍“黑石号”和“泉州宋代古船”出土的沉船物品。

一般认为“黑石号”是一艘阿拉伯船，因为它采用了绳索缝合捆扎船体的技术。“黑石号”沉船出土了大量的瓷器，包括 56500 件长沙窑产品，300 多件邢窑、200 余件越窑的产品，还有一些金银器和铜器。这艘阿拉伯沉船从哪儿来？最终要驶往哪里？我结合“黑石号”出土的文物和自己的相关研究，认为“黑石号”可能是从中国扬州出发。最终要驶往阿拔斯王朝的重要港口巴士拉（Basra）或西拉福（Siraf）。巴士拉（Basra）是当时阿拔斯王朝最重要的港口，底格里斯河和幼发拉底河在此交汇，船只从巴士拉出发，沿底格里斯河航行，可以直接到达阿拔斯王朝的首都巴格达。西拉福（Siraf）是波斯湾沿岸的一个古老的港口，在其遗址中发现了许多长沙窑的瓷器。

中国瓷器改变了阿拔斯王朝宫廷的饮食文化，早先阿拉伯人用植物叶子作为食器，后来阿拉伯社会上层效仿宫廷用瓷器作为食器。其次，中国瓷器的引入刺激了阿拔斯王朝的陶器生产，促进阿拉伯工匠们提高生产技术水平。根据吉西卡·哈蕾特（Jessica

Hallet) 在《模仿与启示：中国与巴士拉之间的陶瓷贸易》的描述，“当装载着唐朝陶瓷的船只经印度洋驶抵巴士拉时，这些精美绝伦的陶瓷给当地工匠以启发，鼓励他们尝试自己的新创造。虽然当地缺乏基本原料，又没有高温的烧窑技术，但工匠们就地取材，采用伊拉克南部的黄色粘土，模仿中国陶瓷的形状和颜色创造出自己的产品。”(Jessica 1995)“伊拉克陶器深受中国陶瓷的影响，几乎影响了陶器生产的每一道工序，从制坯、上釉、烧坯到最后成形。”(Jessica 1995)

1974 年在泉州后渚港出土了一艘宋代海船，船上出土遗物十分丰富，其中香料占第一位，数量最大。泉州宋代海船出土的香料有降真香、檀香、沉香、乳香、龙涎香等。

宋代进口的香料，以乳香之用最广。所以宋政府进口了大量的乳香。乳香与没药是西方历史上最重要、最名贵的两种香料。有资料记载，早在 2000 年前阿拉伯人就开始使用乳香了。在犹太教和基督教中，乳香享有很高的地位，我们可以在《圣经》中发现对乳香的描写。在《马太福音》中记载，来自东方的三贤士带了黄金、乳香和没药去伯利恒朝圣，将上述三样东西献给降生于人间的耶稣。赵汝适在《诸蕃志》卷下《志物》中对乳香产地、品种和品质都做了介绍：“乳香，一名薰陆香，出大食之麻啰拔、施曷、奴发三国深山穷谷中。其树大槩类榕。以斧斫株，脂溢于外，结而成香，聚而成块。以象辇之至于大食，大食以舟载易他货于三佛齐，故香常聚于三佛齐。蕃番商贸易至，舶司视香之多少为殿最……”麻啰拔、施曷、奴发自古以盛产乳香而闻名，麻啰拔即米尔巴特 (Mirbat, 阿拉伯语为مرباط)، 在今天阿曼苏丹共和国南部;施曷是席赫尔 (Shihr), 在今天也门境内;奴发是佐法尔 (Dhofor), 在阿曼苏丹共和国南部。乳香产于乳香木，采集方法是在树皮上割开伤口，流出乳状汁液，接触空气后变硬，成为黄色微红的半透明凝块。乳香的阿拉伯名字为لبان，这词的词根是لبن，意思是乳、奶、乳状的，乳白色的，所以中文翻译很好地体现了乳香的特点。

二、怛罗斯战役对中国造纸技术丝织技术传入阿拉伯半岛的影响

天宝十年 (751 年) 唐朝与大食爆发了怛罗斯战役，有一些中国人被大食军队俘虏，其中有造纸匠、纺织匠、画匠等。杜环当时是中国高仙芝部队的随军书记官，他也成了大食的俘虏。杜环在大食居住了十年，他写的《经行记》中曾记载道亚俱罗 (库法) 有：“绫绢机杼。金银匠、画匠、汉匠起作、画者京兆人樊淑、刘泚、织络者河东人乐平 震、吕礼。”这些俘虏中的造纸匠将中国的造纸法传入了大食，大食首先在

撒马尔罕建立了纸厂，这是中亚的第一个纸厂。公元 794 年阿拔斯王朝的首都巴格达开设了新的造纸厂。以后、开罗、大马士革、非斯等地都设立了纸厂，阿拉伯人、波斯人用纸张代替了原先使用的羊皮、莎草纸。现今保存下来最早用阿拉伯文字书写的纸张书是公元 866 年或 867 年由阿布·乌贝塔（Abu Ubayd）抄写的《圣训》章节。上述这些纸厂生产的纸张除满足阿拔斯王朝、法蒂玛王朝的需求外，有一部分纸张输往了欧洲。

12 世纪造纸术从北非传入西班牙。西班牙是最早造纸的欧洲国家。12—13 世纪造纸术传入意大利的西西里岛、热那亚等地区，13—14 世纪意大利成为供应欧洲纸张的主要来源。到 14 世纪末，西班牙、法国、意大利、法国、德国都在生产纸张。15 世纪末，造纸术传入英国。16 世纪以后，造纸术传入俄国，17 世纪造纸术美洲。

恒罗斯战役中被俘的中国织匠还将中国先进的丝织技术传到了阿拉伯半岛。当时统治阿拉伯半岛的是阿拔斯王朝，即我国史书上的“黑衣大食”，鼎盛时期，阿拔斯王朝的疆域西起摩洛哥、东接印度、北抵高加索、南至撒哈拉沙漠。波斯锦的技术和中国的丝织技术为阿拉伯工匠们掌握，他们生产出了具有鲜明阿拉伯——伊斯兰特色的丝织品。今天叙利亚、伊拉克、伊朗的一些城市在古代都有专门生产锦缎、壁毯的作坊，如大马士克（damask, 金线刺绣的绸缎）来自大马士革，阿塔比（Attabi, 条纹绢）因来自巴格达城的阿塔卜区（Attab）而闻名，它们曾在欧洲市场上独领风骚。

中国的丝织技术经阿拉伯人的中介传入西班牙，西班牙的丝织技术后来传入西西里岛，12 世纪下半期，西西里岛的丝织业排挤了伯罗奔尼撒地区的丝织业，西西里岛的丝织业成为欧洲丝织业的代表。

13 世纪，蒙古人西征时，中国的织匠再次进入伊斯兰世界，当蒙古人统治伊朗和中亚时期，中国的凤凰、龙、麒麟等被引入了穆斯林的丝织纹样中。这一点可以在绣有马穆鲁克苏丹穆罕默德·纳赛尔（Muhammad Nasir）名字的出土织物中得到证明。

三、“一带一路”战略下，中国与阿拉伯国家的新机遇、新挑战

2013 年习近平主席提出“一带一路”倡议后，阿拉伯国家积极响应。中国政府鼓励中国企业赴阿拉伯国家开展在能源、资源、石化等领域的投资合作，以经贸合作区建设为抓手，打造中阿产业集聚平台，重点落实沙特集散产业园、阿曼杜库姆产业园、埃及苏伊士经贸合作区、阿联酋江苏产业园等项目，推动交通、电力、通讯、有色金属、建材等领域的合作，带动商贸、物流、金融等配套服务和中小企业发展。下面我

以沙特阿拉伯、埃及为例子，详细说明“一带一路”给双方带来的新机遇、新挑战。

1、沙特阿拉伯

沙特阿拉伯位于亚洲西南部的阿拉伯半岛，它是重要的石油输出国，在欧佩克组织（OPEC）享有及其重要的地位。沙特阿拉伯是海湾阿拉伯国家委员会的成员国，海湾阿拉伯国家委员会的总秘书处设在沙特阿拉伯的首都利雅得。2016年1月，习近平主席访问沙特阿拉伯，将中沙关系提升到全面战略伙伴关系，两国愿在共同推进丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路建设的框架内深入展开合作，中沙共签署了14项合作文件，其中的亮点在于核能和新能源。2017年3月沙特国王萨勒曼率领庞大的访问团访问中国，签署了650亿美元合作项目，涉及石化、核电、通讯、基础设施、航天等领域；双方讨论了“一带一路”与沙特“愿景2030”进行对接。

“愿景2030”是一项雄心勃勃的计划，构成了沙特经济改革的一揽子方案，力图在未来15年到25年的时间内实现沙特国民经济多元化。毫无疑问的是，“愿景2030”作为今后沙特长期的发展计划，会给中沙带来许多合作机会。在《中华共和国政府与沙特阿拉伯王国政府关于共同推进丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路以及开展产能合作的谅解备忘录》中提出以产能合作为突破口，两国加强在基础设施、投资、航天、核能、可再生能源领域的合作。沙特阿拉伯是能源大国，除石油、石化工业外，其他产业基础薄弱。中国企业如何参与沙特的经济多元化战略，我认为可以从“愿景2030”着手，如沙特提出设立2万亿美元的主权基金，这只主权基金将参与大型国际公司和新兴技术公司。近年来，优秀的中国企业在电子商务、铁路建设、核电等方面迅速崛起，它们如果能通过吸引沙特主权基金的投资，会更容易进入沙特市场。其次，沙特提出降低失业率，提高妇女就业率，中国教育机构或中国企业如果能在沙特设立相关的教育或培训机构，可以为当地人提供就业岗位和培训机会。最后，我想说，中国和沙特产业结构互补性较强，如果能通过合作培育新的增长点，对双方而言是双赢的。

2、埃及

埃及是非洲第三大经济体，在中东和非洲具有强大的影响力。它是阿拉伯国家联盟（简称阿盟）的发起成立国，阿盟的总部就设在埃及开罗。2014年12月，中国与埃及签署了《中埃关于建立全面战略伙伴关系的联合声明》，将两国关系提升到一个新的高度。2016年1月，习近平主席对埃及进行国事访问，受到了热烈欢迎。目前，中埃两国政府已经同意进行“一带一路”的合作。

埃及政府想借助苏伊士新运河的区位优势建设“苏伊士运河走廊经济带”，带动汽车组

装、高新电子、石油炼化、水产养殖、船舶制造、轻纺织品等产业的发展，将埃及打造成世界级的经贸和物流中心。早在 1998 年，埃及政府设立的苏伊士湾西北经济区，中国方面就积极参与了共建，成立的“苏伊士经贸合作区”是目前中国在境外最好的经贸合作区之一。投资埃及的中国企业，有一半左右进入了“苏伊士经贸合作区”。“苏伊士经贸合作区”成为中埃落实“一带一路”战略构想的有效工具之一。

鉴于埃及的人口众多，市场消费潜力巨大。埃及与欧盟、阿拉伯国家以及东南部非洲国家签署了自由贸易协定，还与其他多个国家签署了自由贸易协定，这意味着在埃及运作的公司可以以免税或仅支付有限的关税，从上述这些国家获得原材料、商品；同样埃及境内的公司如果符合规定，也能够免税进入上述市场。所以，中国公司进入埃及后的市场前景比较广阔，产品不仅可以在埃及消费，还可以销往埃及以外的国家。

但我们应该清醒地意识到埃及政局的不稳定可能对中埃企业合作带来的负面影响。自 2011 年以来，埃及发生了多起大规模反政府示威游行，2014 年 6 月，具有军方背景的塞西当选埃及总统后，国家秩序得以恢复，埃及的局势才算平稳下来。但埃及周围国家的局势仍处在动荡中，埃及穆斯林兄弟会依旧虎视眈眈，“伊斯兰国”等恐怖主义的威胁没有消除，埃及的政局仍存在一定的变数。

相比而言，我认为旅游业可以作为中埃共建“一带一路”的突破口。埃及有着悠久的历史，灿然的文化，众多的名胜古迹，而且经过 70 多年的发展，埃及的旅游业已经比较成熟，古迹旅游、疗养旅游、会议和展览旅游等在埃及都很发达。以古迹旅游为例，卢克索神庙、卡尔纳克神庙等是古埃及文化的代表；亚历山大城的萨瓦里石柱、露天剧场体现了罗马文化的影响；阿慕尔清真寺、伊本·突伦清真寺、萨拉丁城堡等体现了伊斯兰文化的影响。此外，众多的博物馆是了解埃及历史、文化的捷径，从希腊罗马博物馆可以看到希腊罗马时期的历史、社会生活和文化艺术的影响；努比亚博物馆反映了努比亚文明的不同发展阶段；埃及航海博物馆则反映了从古代到近代埃及的航海历史。

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Функцията на мо'е (萌え) персонажите в трансмедийната КОМУНИКАЦИЯ

Мария Момчилова

Abstract

The development of manga, anime and game industry (MAGI) and their influence on consumers worldwide has been the subject of various multidisciplinary studies. The aim of the present paper is to present one of the invariables in MAGI, namely mo'e imagery. Originating in otaku culture, mo'e characters are a multifunctional element of MAGI. The unique characteristics of mo'e, their ability to trigger powerful emotional response and induce a strong sense of co-experience are being successfully used in transmedia storytelling to produce the sought-after effect.

Keywords: manga, anime, mo'e, otaku, transmedia storytelling

1. Трансмедийна комуникация

Процесите по оптимизиране на комуникацията с потребителите посредством създаване на мрежа от платформи, чрез която се разпространяват сходни по съдържание медийни продукти започват още през 90-те години на 20. век. Безспорен фактор за развитието им са дигиталните технологии, системите за управление на съдържанието (CMS) и техническите платформи, чрез които се предават данни от главните компютри по различни мрежи до периодично нарастващото многообразие от крайни устройства, които са все по-мощни и по-достъпни. Създаването на интегрирано интерактивно съдържание, чийто сюжет предоставя възможности на потребителите да преминават от една медия в друга, т.е. от едномерна (един комуникатор към много реципиенти) към многомерна (много комуникатори към много реципиенти) комуникация е основна характеристика на кросмедийната комуникация.

Промяната в медийното производство и потребление стимулира появата на нова форма за разгръщане на медийното съдържание, а именно трансмедийният разказ. Хенри Дженкинс (Jenkins 2007) дефинира трансмедийния разказ като „процес, при който съставните елементи на произведението са разпръснати систематично в множество комуникационни канали с цел създаване на единно и координирано забавление. В идеалния случай, всеки медиен канал дава своя уникален принос за разгръщането на историята“. Трансмедия-та предполага

създаване на едно съдържание, което чрез различни платформи (традиционни и е-книги, комикси, манга, филми, видео, игри, музика, анимация) е достъпно не само за глобално потребление, но предполага създаване на ново съдържание от потребителите (блогове, подкаст, твит). Трансмедийните разкази са истории с интерактивно и увлекателно съдържание, разположени върху множество платформи, свързани с общ измислен свят и митология, към които е осигурен различен достъп. Следователно може да се твърди, че трансмедията трансформира всяко съдържание в развлечение, конвертируемо във всички налични формати, поставящо и развиващо определен сюжет извън първоначално зададените параметри в пространството и времето.

2. Мо'е персонажи – характеристики и функция

Като сбор от крос платформи, в които систематично се разполагат елементи от една история, или множество истории, случващи се в един и същи свят или с едни и същи герои, трансмедийното разказване стимулира активното участие на потребителите като съавтори. Развитието на смарт технологиите допълнително ускорява процеса на конвергенция на платформите, което вероятно ще доведе до създаване на омниплатформа, в която комуникацията ще се фокусира не върху трансмисията на съобщението, а върху пресъздаването на емоциите и съпреживяването.

Един от методите за катализиране на емоциите и съпреживяването в МАГИ е използването на принципа на непрекъснато усъвършенстване (kaizen) за създаване на мо'е персонажи. Мо'е персонажите са герои с „тяло без органи“ (Deleuze, Guattari, 1987: 149-166). С мо'е се означава предизвиканата от героите емоционална реакция, ответното чувство, въздействието и влиянието, усещането за интензивност и насищане на преживяното, а не принадлежността към някакъв вид жанр или под-категория. Произходът на термина се свързва с началото на отаку дискусиите на миловидните и невинни аниме героини на сайта 2channel през 90-те години на 20. век. Появил се като част от дискурса на отаку, терминът е утвърден като устойчива лексема в МАГИ чрез трансмедийните разкази. Със своята впечатляваща комбинация от елегантност, изтънченост и лекота, невинност и детско очарование, миловидност и привидна беззащитност мо'е персонажите изграждат силна емоционална връзка с почитателите на МАГИ продуктите не само в Япония.

От гледна точка на лексикологията изписването на мо'е с канджи 萌え (номинализация от глагола moeru „напълвам“, „пониквам“) помага за изграждане на предварителна представа за характерите на героите – неопитни, но жизнени, спонтанни, изпълнени с ентузиазъм и желание. За интензивността на емоционалното въздействие на героите върху почитателите може да се съди по омофона на мо'е, който означава „горя“, „изгарям от желание“. Омофонът адекватно изразява изпепеляващата емоция и изгарящото увлечение, еуфоричното състояние, в което почитателите следят и изживяват приключенията на любимите си герои. От друга страна мо'е аурата на неподправено очарование се свързва с kanso (簡素) като подчертава естетиката на простота и непринуденост, съчетани със свежест и чистота. Етимологично многоликият термин се допълва и от конкретен образ на героиня - Notaru Томое от манга поредицата Sailor Moon, чието име се изписва със същото канджи.

Мо'е персонажите имат характерна черта, нещо необичайно, допълнително умиляващо почитателите им, което може да се използва като критерий за категоризация. Най-използваните и въздействащи изображения на мо'е герои са: meganekko-moe (с очила), meido-moe (девојка домашна помощница), shitsuji-moe (симпатичен иконом), tsundere-moe (възхитително издържлив и грижовен), imouto-moe (по-малката сестра). Често наблюдавана е употребата на мо'е антропоморфизъм (мо'е характеристики на живи същества, предмети, понятия, явления), например kemonomimi – герой/иня с уши и/ли опашка, които могат да бъдат няколко под вида според животното, с което се свързват (котка, куче, лисица, вълк и други).

Според Лиотар (Lyotard 1979) създаването на структура от елементи и на елементи от структурата е същността на постмодерното общество. Създаването на мо'е персонажи е от първостепенна важност за изграждането на трансмедийните разкази, тъй като вселените, които тези герои обитават в максимална степен удовлетворяват емоционалните и естетически потребности на почитателите им, създава приятно и ангажиращо преживяване, поражда удоволствие и удовлетворение от принадлежността и споделянето, стимулират съпреживяването и създаването на съавторски продукти. „Мо'е ми дава усещането за живот“, споделя Юн Маеда (Maeda 2014), сценарист за Visual Arts. Мо'е персонажите могат да се разглеждат като олицетворение на същността на

постмодерното общество. От една страна те са мултифункционален елемент в трансмедийното разказване, обединяват МАГИ феновете по света, създават структура. От друга, употребата на мо'е изображения при създаване на колекции от модни дрехи и аксесоари е един от начините за декомпозиране на постмодерното общество.

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Understanding the Interrelationship between Chinese Language and Buddhism

Prachi Aggarwal

Abstract

Chinese language has been known for its pictographic script and tonal patterns. However, the tenacity of a language is reflected in its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Chinese language has survived the onslaught of various languages, cultures and religions yet has managed to retain the flavour of its 'special characteristics' (中国特色). One of the major reasons touted for this is that despite the rigidity of the language and limitations of its script, Chinese language has been extremely versatile in its vocabulary, incorporating various words from various languages and eventually 'sinifying' them to suit the conditions of the language. Buddhism has had a deep influence on China not only because of its philosophy but also because of its ability to gel with the Chinese psyche. This ability is reflected in the vocabulary of Chinese language, which has adopted not only Buddhist thoughts and concepts, but also its various words to suit the Chinese understanding of the world at large. While Chinese have sinified Buddhism to the extent that a new branch called Chinese Buddhism has emerged, the Chinese language could not remain untouched by Buddhist concepts and ideas and many of the words used today were derived from Buddhism. This paper shall dig into the age-old contact between Chinese and Sanskrit, deriving the interrelationships between the two languages and examining the development of Chinese language in the ensuing process.

Keywords: Buddhism, Chinese language, Sanskrit, Buddhist Hybrid Chinese, loanwords from Sanskrit.

Introduction

Drawing the relationship between Chinese language and Buddhism is not merely a refurbishment of the past but an attempt to show how the cultures of the two countries impacted each other. In ancient times the intellectuals of both nations, who were pioneer in their fields, did not resist themselves in humbling down to the neighbour for the sheer want of expansion of knowledge. This explains the travels of Xuan Zang, Fa Xian from China and Kumarajiva and Ashavaghosha from India (to illustrate a few) who wholeheartedly accepted the knowledge from beyond the borders and did not hesitate to incorporate it in their culture.

The impact of Buddhism on the development of Chinese language was strongly felt, some through direct translation, some through transliteration and some through concoction of meaning and sound, producing a completely different word. Shi Xiangdong

also points out that the contribution of Sanskrit to Chinese has been immense in terms of loanwords, new linguistic structures, development of Chinese grammar and Chinese phonology (Chinese tones, initials, finals, etc.). Chinese scholars have found that the areas of impact of Buddhism are all-pervading (e.g. Chinese language and literature, etc.). Wang Li too supports this view citing that the Chinese have become so comfortable with these words that they do not even know that the ancient Chinese used a different word for the same meaning (Xing, undated). Buddhism developed along the lines of ancient silk route through trade and business between Ancient India and China (Smitha 2015). The monasteries and temples worked beyond serving as places of 'prayer and salvation' and became warehouses and banks for Indian traders who came to China. This simple act of economic convenience for the trade gradually blossomed into a tree of Buddhist understanding and concepts which eventually bore fruit of influence into the psyche, the way of living and the language of the Chinese people (Ibid.). The first Chinese attracted to Buddhism were the local people living around the monasteries and temples. They were generally the poorest of the lot, abandoned by their king, exploited by their nobles and marginalised by their clan (Ibid.). Confucianism specifically required 'filial piety' from these three groups. Buddhism, on the other hand, spoke of pity and salvation to all citizens. Nobody was the chosen successor of divine providence as there was no God in Buddhism. Soon Buddhist ideas of drinking tea, wearing cotton, building complex architecture and expansion of literature became a fashion statement of the then China (Ibid.). Buddhist teachings were translated and for those concepts that lacked pre-existing Chinese term, a word was either borrowed from Taoists texts or a new word was created to explain the phenomenon (Ibid.). That is why Chinese language has subtle influences from Sanskrit grammar. In fact, Zhu Qingzhi (2003) points out that since the Chinese did not learn Buddhism in its native language but through translated versions, many concepts and words were introduced that were foreign to original Buddhism. He calls the Chinese language of the time "Buddhist Hybrid Chinese" which was very different from both original Buddhism and the prevailing native Chinese. However, it soon became a part of native Chinese because of the widespread acceptance by the common people.

Contribution of Buddhism to Chinese language

Buddhism gave many loan words to Chinese language which enhanced its vocabulary, e.g. *fo* 佛 (for Buddhist); *mouni* 牟尼 (for muni); *shijia* 释迦 (for shakya), etc. The meaning of these words was directly related to the essence of Buddhism and contributed to both the vocabulary and the conceptual system of the Chinese language. It

is said that Buddhism spread in China through its translated versions which continued for a long period of time. Zhu Qingzhi (2003) writes that this lasted from Eastern Han dynasty to Northern Song dynasty during which period nearly 2,411 scriptures of Buddhist teachings were translated. This involved many translators, and clearly both Chinese language and Buddhist teachings had gone through various cycles of evolution and interpretations which marked the development of Chinese language as very different from the original one. First, as Jerry Norman points out, the translated versions of Buddhist teachings are marked with vernacular flavour (Zhu 2003). Clearly the scholars who came, stayed and translated, wanted themselves to be understood and they interspersed their works with local colloquial language depending on the area and the era they were in. Also since a lot of commoners were attracted to Buddhism and Classical Chinese was a court language generally spoken and written by the elite, the translations reflected the influence of the local dialect rather than the Standard language. Hence the process can be compared to the Modern Chinese, which through the attempts of Hu Shi, reflects a strong bearing of the Western world (Ibid.). Classical Chinese has a heavy tone of influence from Indian culture and language. Since that evolved depending on the dynasty from which the scholar came and the language he spoke, Classical Chinese also had a strong reflection of not just local Chinese colloquial language but also Indian language.

Zhu Qingzhi (2003) explains a unique kind of translation in Buddhist translations, called 'loan translation'. Here the word translated retains the inner structure of the original language. For example, the '*anu*' in Sanskrit corresponds to '*su*' in Chinese, e.g. the term *anugantavya* is equivalent to *suixing*. It is said that these loan translations offered a lot of changes in semantic and grammatical structure of Chinese language. For example, the *gatha* (verse) style of the rhythmic singing of scriptures was retained in Chinese by the formation of four-word compounds or couplets (Ibid.). A few examples are given in the table below to serve as an illustration:

Table 1 Illustrative list of four-word compounds, derived from Buddhist Sutras

Chinese Characters	English meaning of the Words in the Buddhist Sutras
轻重工业	Heavy and light industry
中西药品	Western and Chinese medicines
清信士女	Male and female Buddhist worshippers

水火风种	Water, fire and air element
身口意业	Body, language and mind action
老少中年	Yong, middle and old age
比丘及尼	Bhikshu and bhikshuni

Source: (Zhu 2003: 16)

Apart from these four-word compounds there were many new words which got added on as Buddhism did not introduce only new vocabulary but also new concepts to Chinese literature. It is established that though some words had traces of religious inclinations like *pusa* 菩萨 (bodhisattva), others neutralised their religious tones and led to emergence of new words:

Table 2 Illustrative list of words, derived from Buddhist Sutras

Chinese Character	Actual word from Buddhist Sutra	English meaning
方便	उपाय	Convenience
究竟	अत्यंत	Outcome
不可思议	अचिंत्य	Inconceivable
烦恼	क्लेश	Be worried
危脆	दुर्बल	Weak
金莲	स्वर्णकमल	Golden lotus

Source (Zhu 2003: 20)

Another contribution of the Buddhist translations to the Chinese language was the formation of coordinate compound words in which a word with simple meaning is combined with another to form a word which bore the essence of meaning of both the words (Ibid.). Buddhist vocabulary was used not only in Buddhist scriptures but also in non-Buddhist Chinese literature starting from Jin dynasty. Words like 幻化 *huanhua* (माया magic) or 梦幻 *menghuan* (स्वप्न dream) were used even by poets and scholars of the time who did not practise or believe in Buddhism. The process of de-syllabication in Chinese began with the four-word गार्था style of Buddhism.

Buddhist scriptures led to the development of Chinese vocabulary, to the introduction of the technique of de-syllabication and the advancement of phonology, elevating the status of colloquial vernacular Chinese (Guang, undated). Buddhist scriptures did not only give new words to Chinese language, they also gave new meanings

to existing Chinese words: like *fa* which means both law and *dharma* धर्म or *xing* 性 which means both nature and gender, etc. In addition, many words developed through transliteration of Buddhist words into Chinese. In fact, a lot of Buddhist concepts had no corresponding words in Chinese, so new words were created through transliteration and translation primarily by Kumarajiva. The table below gives a list of Chinese idioms, which emerged from Buddhist stories.

Table 3 Illustrative list of Chinese Idioms, derived from Buddhist Sutras

Chinese characters	English meaning
借花献佛	To borrow things from another person to entertain one's own guests
大慈大悲	Great compassion and loving kindness
六根清淨	The purification of six sense organs
不二法门	The only way
四大皆空	All four elements (solidity, fluidity, temperature and mobility) are illusory
水月镜花	Illusions like the moon in water or flower in the mirror
心猿意马	Mind is like a monkey
求人一命胜造七级浮屠	To save a person is better than building a seven-storey stupa
放下屠刀立地成佛	An evil person can become a good person if he realises his bad deeds

Source: Guang Xing

Liang (1994) points at the stupendous increase in polysyllabic and disyllabic words in the Chinese language and attributes it to the rise in translation of Buddhist scriptures. She notes that most Buddhist translations done by Gunasara or Kumarajiva had more polysyllabic words compared to the non-Buddhist literature. Guang indicates a few taken from Buddhist studies like *putixin* 菩提心 (the mind of enlightenment), *zheng siwei* 正思维 (right thought), *boluomiduo* 波罗蜜多 (*paramita/perfection*), *fei xiang fei feixiang* 非想非非想 (neither thought nor non-thought), etc.

Another important contribution has been the expansion of Chinese language from a logogram language to a phonogram language. The Chinese were used to predominantly *xiangxing wenzi* 象形文字, which meant that symbols had meanings attached to them, but

the development of Buddhism accelerated the phonetic trend of *xingshengzi* 形声字 by lending sound to a character through the concept of *qieyun* 切韵. In fact, it is said that the concept of four tones in Chinese language has been invariably linked to Buddhist translations. Guang Xing cites Chen Yinke (2001: 367-381) who was the first Chinese scholar who attributed the development of Chinese tones to recitation of Buddhist sutras. Chen pronounces that the four tones of Chinese were created by imitating the three tones of Buddhist recitations which were derived from the recitation of Vedic mantras. While Chen's arguments have been questioned by many other Chinese scholars who do not attribute development of Chinese tones to Vedic chanting, they do, by and large acknowledge that the Chinese tones system was influenced by Buddhist sutras. Professor Jao Tsung-I (1993) opines that the four tones in Chinese were created from the fourteen phonetic sounds of the Mahaparinirvana Sutra. Guang Xing argues that whether or not the four tonal patterns developed from Vedic Sanskrit, the latter was introduced to China through Buddhism and in a way Chinese tonal patterns developed because of it. The Buddhist translations were done by monks who were not only of Indian origin but also of Chinese origin. Noted among them is Xuanyin 玄应 who compiled *Yiqiejing yinyi* 《一切经音义》 and explained various Chinese characters in Buddhist texts (Ibid.). Another noted scholar was Huilin 慧琳 who studied under Amoghvajra and was a learned scholar in both Indian and Confucian texts and was also the most well-read author during the Tang dynasty (Ibid.). Similarly, Fayun's 法云 *Fanyi mingyi ji* 《翻译名义集》 with more than 2000 transliterations from Sanskrit from Song dynasty or Yijing's 义净 *Fanyu Qianzi Wen* 《梵语千字文》, which was a bilingual dictionary of that time and promoted the linguistic studies between Chinese and Sanskrit (Ibid.). The table given below shows the presence of vernacular language in many translated Buddhist texts.

Table 4 Illustrative list of Chinese texts, derived from Buddhist Sutras

Chinese texts	English meaning
变文	Transformation texts
讲经文	Sutra lecture texts
押座文	Prologue for the sutra lecture texts
因原	Stories showing karmic consequences

原起	Stories showing the effects of karma
语录	Record of sayings
灯录	Record of the lamp

Source: Zhu Qingzhi (2003: 237)

Chinese Philosophy and Buddhism

It is evident that Chinese language has been heavily influenced by Buddhist translations, words, idioms, syntax and grammar. Ma Tianxiang (2013: 89) agrees in his writings that Buddhism had a greater impact on Chinese literature because both had a similar objective of writing for 'conveyance of truth'. Chinese literature for him has actively absorbed the philosophies and ideals of Buddhism in all its manifestations like sentences, poetry, novels, dramas, paintings, etc. Buddhism got absorbed in the native 'characteristics' of people as reflected in their various works, e.g. Xie Lingyun, Tao Yuanming, Liu Xie, Zhaoming, etc.

After Tang and Song dynasties, Buddhism had grown so strong that it began to be viewed as a religion/school of thought parallel to Confucianism and Taoism. Most poets of the Tang dynasty, e.g. Bai Juyi, Wang Wei, Su Shi, Huang Tingjian belonged to the period between Confucianism and Buddhism and hence their poems reflect the essence of both. Many poets of that time like Han Yu, who were strongly opposed to the, practice of Buddhism, could not help but admire the Buddhist thought and it invariably found reflection in their works (Ma 2013: 91). Another example is the case of Lin Qingxuan whose poetry is a strong reflection of Buddhist thought (Ji 2005). A Taiwanese writer, in his works like '*chen zhong mu gu, zhu qing sha bai*', a connection is drawn between Buddhism and humanism and they have been well received by many (Ji 2005). In his poem he elevates the concept of Buddhism as a route to salvage from difficulties '欲为诸佛龙家，先做众生牛马'. In the Eastern Jin dynasty, Buddhism pervaded into almost all manifestations of culture like poetry, painting, sculpture (Ji 2005). It is said that the concept of water painting emerged in Chinese culture because of Buddhist inspiration. Some renowned writers have shown deep influence from Buddhism in their poetry, e.g. Xie Lingyun, Liu Xie, Wang Wei, Meng Haoran, Su Shi, Yan Yu, Cao Xueqin, etc. The author also points out that most of the modern writers of China like Lu Xun and Hu Shi were aficionados of Buddhism over Western thought (Ji 2005). Similarly authors like Su Manshu and Xu Dishan evoked religious fervour in a communist nation (Ji 2005).

Similarly, Taiwan's traditional mindset has been nourished by Buddhist philosophy after the wave of modernization of Taiwanese literature (read 'influence of Western thought') in the 1960's, the 1970's saw a revival of local literature where the writers intended to discover their cultural route and found solace in Buddhism (Ibid.). Lin Qingxuan's representative work in prose writing is a ten-volume book on *Bodhi Series Puti xilie* 《菩提系列》 where the implied meaning of *Bodhi* is consciousness (Ibid.). This book is an attempt to disseminate Buddhist knowledge, Buddhist thought and Buddhist philosophy. In other words, it attempts to convey to the world 'godly wisdom' (*shensi zhihui* 神思智慧), and dispel people's sorrow (Ji 2005).

Going beyond the philosophical aspect Wang Jihong (2006: 91) argues that it was the impact of Buddhist Chinese, which lasted for 1000 years, that initiated a 'language contact' of Chinese with not only Sanskrit but also with other languages. He quotes Lu Cheng's 'New Chinese version of Tripitaka dictionary' where it is written that although the exact number of translations of Buddhist text is unknown, yet it is anticipated that 5,702 volumes and 46 million words of Buddhist literature have come into Chinese language (Ibid.). Buddhist Chinese refers to the language of the ancient Chinese Buddhist literature, including all the Chinese Buddhist scriptures, the Buddhist writings of the Middle Ages, and the literary works aimed at propagating Buddhist teachings and the Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures. Wang (2006: 92) observes that while Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures has been given enough weightage, the utility of Buddhist Chinese as a language product has been overlooked. It is no hidden fact that Buddhism has enhanced the vocabulary in Chinese language, e.g. 和尚 monk; 尼姑 nun; 塔 tower; 过去 past; 现在 present; 未来 future; 刹那 moment; 世界 world, etc. But Buddhism also gave the concept of combining numbers with objects, for example *si hai* 四海, etc. (Ibid.: 93). Sanskrit is a typical inflected language, which uses inflexions rather than words to express grammatical relations, so that affixes become part of the word; inflexions tend to represent one or more of the meaning of category. The Chinese is a typical isolating language, relying on function words and word order rather than the inflection of the tail to express the grammatical relationship. The translations that happened in the Middle Ages were done by Buddhists whose original working language was Sanskrit and this had a profound impact on their Chinese translations. Similarly, Buddhism is often considered as being instrumental in bringing about renaissance in Chinese literature by giving concepts like Bodhisattva, karma theory, etc. Moreover, it appreciated the aesthetic value

of Chinese literature by lending various stories and fables, especially during the Tang dynasty. Another aspect is that it led to the evolution of genre *bianwen*, some of the most famous being *Weimojiejing bianwen* 《维摩诘经变文》, *Damuqianlian mingjian jiumu* 《大目乾连冥间救母变文》, *Jiangmo bianwen* 《降魔变文》, etc. (Ibid.).

Conclusion

The evidence of the influence of Buddhism over Chinese language is too strong to deny. Moreover, it can also be noted that Buddhism not only impacted the vocabulary but also the tonal patterns and grammar of Chinese language. Yet this is not to say that Buddhism managed to stay away from the influence of Chinese language. In fact, Buddhism, in order to be accepted by the local population, had to undergo radical changes and sinified itself to a great extent. Perhaps this is why Buddhism evolved a completely different language referred to as the Buddhist Hybrid Chinese which accommodated a lot of vernacular words and patterns to explain its contents. Vice versa it also lent a lot of words and concepts and enriched the legacy of Chinese language. To sum up, one can say that while Buddhism bore a profound impact on the psyche of the Chinese people, without a doubt it did a great service to the Chinese language as well.

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The Belt and Road Initiative: A Challenge to Liberal International Order?

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Abstract

The West and its allies dominate the contemporary international order. The Western dominance is an extension of US liberal hegemony to which nation-states has shown disdain to US imposition of its values with impunity. The present world system is reek of American Exceptionalism. The rise of China has made available a countervailing force to the US dictate. China has rejected US model of development, and it is attempting to project its model of development. Especially, in the case of economic liberalism, China has shown that it is not necessary to resort to Western economic liberalism to succeed. The economic success of China has provided confidence to take head-on against the US. Consequently, Xi Jinping, the president of China in 2013, crafted the Belt and Road Initiative to expand its model of economic development. The Belt and Road Initiative is a challenge to the US hegemony and has the potential to dismantle the Liberal International Order. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund are some of the international institutions that will counter Western led international institutions. Therefore, this paper examines the prospect of the Liberal International Order with the rise of China and analyse how China will fit in into the present international system. Will China dislodge US preponderance or cooperate with the US?

Keywords: Liberal International Order, hegemony, belt and road initiative, US-China, liberalism.

Introduction

In the international relations discourse, the rise of China has fascinated the world and the decline of America is considered imminent. Deng Xiaoping, a pioneer of China's economic liberalism in 1978 was a beacon of China rise to eminent. Deng's policy of 'opening and reformation' opens the floodgate of controlled and closed economy of China. With the opened economy, China was able to achieve double-digit growth rate while keeping its political system intact. This ensured that China inch closer in achieving economic parity with United States (US). Currently, China as the second largest economy of the world, only next to US, has stood up to US hegemony. US is determined to retain its supremacy in the international politics but the rise of China has posed a challenge to US's unipolar world.

The debates projecting US as an established power and at the same time declining power is hounded by the rapid rise of China. China aim to achieve great power status and regain its past glory. The conflict of interests between China and US, especially, in the case of political ideology, development model, human rights, international jurisprudence are some areas that has resulted into squabble. Deng's 24-character strategy to "observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership" has taken a backseat in Xi Jinping era. Xi has been outspoken in term of what China wants. Xi is promoting 'China Dream' to energise and rejuvenate China and President Trump triumph US election with a catchphrase "Make America Great Again" could result into tussle.

Therefore, this paper attempts to dissect China quest to expanse its economic clout in the contemporary international liberal order. The present US led Western liberal order could witness a gradual decline as China pursue incremental economic model of development to entice the developing countries. The developing nations are aggrieved by the US's led financial institutions conditionality impose on them for loans. The rise of China provides an alternative to US's liberal hegemony. Currently, the China is eager to spread its economic pie around the world with the re-launching of the Silk Road. It is pertinent to views China's Silk Road Project as reinvigorating the world economic globalisation. The project is called Belt and Road Initiative.

The Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the brainchild of President Xi Jinping. The BRI is a bold initiative that has an aim to encompass more than sixty-five countries. Such confidence is the result of China's economic boom for which Deng Xiaoping can be credited for his vision to opened up China's economy. Xi's assertiveness to expanse China's model of development through the BRI demonstrates the re-emergence of China as a major power of international politics. Basically, the BRI has two aspects, first, a multi-prong land route connecting various countries with China, and second, a maritime silk road that reaches Africa's western coast and Mediterranean Sea from China's eastern coast. According to China, the concept of the BRI is "embracing the trend towards a multipolar world, economic globalisation, cultural diversity and greater IT application, is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and open world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation" (National Developemnt and Reform Commission, 2015).

The extensive networks of connectivity have been chalk out in the following belt and road:

1. New Eurasian Land Bridge
2. China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor
3. China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor
4. China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor
5. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
6. Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) (China-Britain Business Council n.d.: 9).

In addition to the land route, Maritime Silk Road (MSR) has been mapped out. The MSR starts from Fujian province and touches Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan provinces. Then it moves towards Malacca strait touching Kuala Lumpur and advance in the direction of Kolkata and Colombo. The MSR cruises through Indian Ocean and reaches Nairobi and then moves onward to Horn of Africa and Athens, Mediterranean Sea. From here, the MSR move towards Venice to connect with the land based Silk Road (Chaturvedy, 2017).

The MSR envisage to interconnects China Sea, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea forming a Blue Economic Passage. It is proposed that the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the BCIM-EC and the CPEC will be link through the MSR. There are also efforts to expanse the MSR tentacles toward Oceania-South Pacific and toward Europe through the Arctic Ocean. The magnitudes of such expansive and extensive idea of the MSR has been drafted to sustain marine biodiversity, poverty mitigation of the nations along the road, cooperation in utilising marine resources and marine industries, to enhance maritime connectivity, to secure ocean route to ensure development of blue economy, and then cooperation through multilateralism such as China-Africa Cooperation Forum, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Indian Ocean Rim Association (Xinhua, 2017).

The land and ocean components of the BRI elicit China's desire to enthrone itself as a global power that seek equal respect and equal standing in the international political milieu. However, China has been cautious in spreading the BRI and avoided bulldozing its initiative on the smaller nations. China has propagated the message of economic dividend that is associated with the BRI and China has resorted to convincing the countries to come on-board rather than enforcing it. Thus, the BRI enunciated the Silk Road Spirit, which embody "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit" (Beijing Review, 2017). In conformity to the Silk Road Spirit, Xi Jinping gave a

clarion call for “a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation; and we should forge partnerships of dialogue with no confrontation and of friendship rather than alliance. All countries should respect each other’s sovereignty, dignity and territorial integrity, each other’s development paths and social systems, and each other’s core interests and major concerns” (Yan, 2017).

China acknowledges the fact that the different political and economic systems should not stymied the path of development. The countries along the Belt and Road have different system to which China has not question or impose any condition to receive China’s investment. China has outlay an investment of \$900 billion along the road to enhance physical connectivity, promote economy and built closer cultural ties (He Y. , 2015). As of 2016, 77 projects have been initiated in 36 countries along the Belt and Road, which receive an investment of \$24.19 billion. The Export-Import Bank of China too chips in to support 1,279 projects, which exceed the loan balance of 671.4 billion yuan. And so far, the Silk Road Fund has invested \$80 billion in the Belt and Road project (China Daily, 2017). China aggressive funding and expediting the BRI signal China desire to sustain its economic progress without dismantling political system. As well as the success of the BRI will exhibit China’s model of development and provide an alternative to US’s model.

The Liberal International Order

The present international order is based on liberal intuitionism led by America. The US has imbued liberal international order after the WWII as it gains the status of superpower. The liberal international order is characterised by multilateralism where free trade is the crux of such institutions, the Bretton Woods institutions was adopted, security alliances were form to defend the weaker states, U.S. aid was disburse to counter Soviet expansion, U.S. military were station abroad, the Marshall Plan of 1948 and formation of NATO in 1949 were created to isolate Soviet and protect American interests. Within this system, global economy flourish and globalisation took shape (Nye 2017: 11). Categorically, the American led liberal international order constitutes open market, multilateral institutions, security alliances and partnership, democratic solidarity. The Order is based in the larger international institutions such as United Nations, World Trade Organisation, Bretton Woods system, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) wherein the America provides hegemonic stability to the international order. The US succeeded in creating political order and hierarchical order within its liberal hegemonic order (Ikenberry 2010: 512).

The US's hegemony has prevailed and succeeded in maintaining world stability. The hegemonic stability theory reinforces the importance of hegemon power to maintain order and stability. Charles P. Kindleberger (1973), a pioneer proponent of hegemonic stability theory argues that hegemon power is necessary in order to regulate liberal international economy. The hegemon power has certain obligations to fulfil, which would make the world feasible for international trade. The functions that the hegemon should perform are taking initiatives to keep the market open in times of recession, leading in organising trade liberalisation policies, managing international financial institutions and monetary system, providing international currency, supplying liquidity to the liberal system, maintain the international exchange rates, invest capital and propagate development in the peripheral areas of the liberal system (Webb and Krasner 1989: 185). Thus so far, the US has acted as stabiliser making the world conducive of open market and free trade.

However, Trump, the present President of US took decision that seems to abdicate its superpower status. In January 2017, Trump decided against US participation in Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade conglomerates of twelve countries that is founded on the principle of free trade. Then, in June 2017, US withdrew their participations to Paris Agreement of 2015 on climate change. The US abandonment of multilateral agreements and decision not to lead could create space for China to fill in. The liberal order is dependent on the leadership of US but the recent Trump tantrum to withdraw US from multilateral agreement could expedite the downfall of the hegemonic power. The call for 'Make America Great Again' resonates well in election campaign but the American greatness could only be achieve and maintain by leading the world and standing with its allies. Trump has also announced that the NATO members must contribute more for the security fiscal and the current crisis in the European Union (EU) brings the spotlight on the longevity of US led liberal order.

Furthermore, Trump has threatened to take protective measure against China with respect to trade and also hinted that US would renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) so that Mexican products can be tax more (Rood 2017: 2). Trumpism or Trump invocation of his legitimacy is drawn from populism. Putting forward the idea of America First, zealot nationalism has been arouse. Xenophobia is created among the American peoples. To illustrate, Trump sign a decree in January 2017 to built a physical wall along the US-Mexico border. An alibi to prevent terrorist entry into America, Trump bans the citizen from Libya, Iran, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria, an entry into US.

Trumpism is construed as a threat to democracy, a risk to inter racial harmony, and a hazard to multilateralism and international institutions (Dimitrova 2017: 2-3). Amitav Acharya, Distinguished Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, Washington University, pointed out that “Brexit and Donald Trump, and the rising tide of nationalism and protectionism they represent, along with the erosion of liberal democracy in the West, signals the decline not only of liberal ideology but more surely of the liberal international order” (Kuo, 2016).

Apart from the current Trumpism, the weakening of liberal order finds its Achilles heel in the non-existence of common rallying point. In the past, the existence of USSR was considered a threat to like-minded nations of liberal democracy, which provided common cause for solidarity. The other factors of discontentment in liberal order lie in the overarching effect of multilateral institutions. The autonomy of the nations is curtailed and the national interests have to be compromised in order to facilitate institutions such as UN and the World Bank to solve impending issues (Colgan and Keohane 2017). In addition, the global crisis of climate change could stymie the world development and slow down world’s economy. The global financial crisis that affects the whole system resulting from the structural imbalances imperils the existing system. And the third crisis emanating from the global terrorism, the instability in the Middle East and the conflict in different regions pose challenges to the contemporary world order (Peters 2016: 863-864).

The weakening of US dominance is compounded by the rise of China. Currently, the re-emergence of China as a major power has posed a challenge to US hegemony. The rise of China propelled by its economic boom has re-energised China to establish itself as a power to reckon with. The BRI has been equated with US’s Marshall Plan of post WWII reconstruction of Europe but China has denied it on the basis that the BRI is no containment policy, no alliance seeking, no political condition is imposed, consultation is sought with the participants, and does not attempt to dismantle the existing system but dwell on it (Yamei, 2017). Despite the assurance from China to abide by the present liberal system, the US concern is palpable. It is interesting to note that the development pace of China has created ruffle within the Western allies. Although, US still holds sway over the global politics, the rise of China cannot be ignored and poses a challenge to the liberal international order of US. Not necessarily would China replace the liberal system but China would expect to have greater say in the present system and would steer the system to maximise its national interests.

The Role of China in the Liberal International Order

The unipolar world of US hegemony is veering towards a multipolar world where China is playing a major role. The launch of BRI is an indication of China's leading role and attempt to untangle itself from US hegemony but remaining in the system playing by the rules-based international intuitions. The BRI has been formally institutionalised as the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) and the first meeting was held in Beijing on May 14-15, 2017. The BRF is a platform for China "to build a more open and efficient international cooperation platform and a closer, stronger partnership network as well to push for a more just, reasonable and balanced international governance system" (Tian, 2017). But the Western media painted a pessimistic view of BRI. The CNN projected the BRF as "China's New World Order" and an alternative to "Davos or G20" and "It is China's push to put it in a position of world leadership as the US under President Donald Trump takes a more protectionist approach and gives up the mantle of globalisation" (Griffiths, 2017).

He Yafei, former Vice Minister, Foreign Affairs, Government of China, finds fault in economic neo-liberalism of American Order, which prioritised capital, market, and privatisation that has damaged economies of many countries. He argued that China is a responsible power that promotes free trade and supports the Paris Agreement on Climate Change despite US wavering. China's BRI, multilateralism with UN, and global connectivity projects are initiatives to build a robust international community, which is based on the foundation of common prosperity and common development. In global security, China proposed for a global partnership – a partnership based on equal footing that would handle collective security effectively cooperating on all fronts (He Y., 2017). China's assertive posture that is critical of liberal order is because the lead actors of Western Order are looking inward and the stature of China has risen remarkably in global affairs. The BRI projects to integrate regional countries through infrastructure development and connectivity constitute great ambition (Goodman and Hillman 2017). Therefore, it is necessary to look at the BRI objectively to understand China's aspiration.

The salience of the BRI is physical connectivity bolstered by the financial institutions. The physical connectivity interlinks countries along the route that would enable free trade among the participating nations. The financial institutions will sponsor the infrastructure development of the BRI. The Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are financial institutions that have sanctioned grants to fund the BRI. The SRF was established on December 29, 2014 and has a corpus amount

of US\$ 40 billion. The stated objectives of SRF is, “In collaboration with domestic and international enterprises and financial institutions, the Fund (SRF) is designed to promote common development and prosperity of China and other countries and regions involved in the Belt and Road Initiative” (Silk Road Fund, 2017). The first investment of the SRF was invested in CPEC to developed Karot Hydropower Project in Pakistan with an investment of US\$ 1.65 billion (Xinhua, 2015).

The AIIB is another financial institutions, an initiative of China, which was founded in January 2016, with an aim to “bring countries together to address the daunting infrastructure needs across Asia. By furthering interconnectivity and economic development in the region through advancements in infrastructure and other productive sectors, we can help stimulate growth and improve access to basic services” (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2016). At present, the bank has 56 founding member states with a capital of US\$ 100 billion. China funding of new multilateral financial institution is due to slow pace of international financial economic governance reform and above all its is dominated by US and Japan (The Economist, 2014). Moreover, the AIIB runs parallel with the BRI. The AIIB is expected to fund Silk Road Projects such as building highways, investing in energy sectors, speeding up pan-Asian railway connectivity. Furthermore, the AIIB as multilateral financial institutions diminish the prospect of politicising the funded projects. For instance, the projects funded by China in Myanmar, a vital part of Southern Silk Road was interpreted as an advancement of China’s strategic gambit. Thus, the projects funded through AIIB will spearhead China’s BRI without politicising it (Callaghan and Hubbard 2016: 122-123).

China interest in setting up multilateral financial institutions conveys a message of confidence China that has the potent to face US liberal hegemony. In addition to SRF and AIIB, New Development Bank (NDB) an offshoot of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has been established in 2014 with an initial capital of US\$ 100 billion and the headquarter is based in Shanghai, China. The NDB is another multilateral financial institution of emerging economies to which China has given its commitment. The NDB support and lend any development projects to sustain economic growth and foster development in the developing countries. China has desired to fund Silk Road Project through NDB. The opposition may come from India as it is opposed to BRI, especially with the case of CPEC and will try to scuttle any project associated with the Silk Road.

The China Model of Liberal Order

The linking of China initiative financial institutions with BRI is an indication of China's overhaul of liberal international order. The BRI has the potential to transform international political economy with its transnational investment. It is believed that the BRI could take over Washington Consensus and Bretton Woods System. Through the BRI, China is keeping the economic globalisation in flow provided it is in its order (Habib and Faulkner 2017). The order that China postulates is based on the Five Principles of Coexistence. The BRI "upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence" (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015).

The China's expert Rolland comments that the BRI is a strategy to protect its physical security and meet its energy requirement and counter US in the Asia. Moreover, the Chinese investments in infrastructure development within its neighbours and far beyond are projection of its soft power to create a comity of common destiny. The investment is a step towards building "a new Chinese order for the 21st century" by offering an alternative development model to Western model (Grady, 2017). Countering such argument, Xi Jinping in his 9th BRICS Summit address held in Xiamen, explain China reason for BRI as " need to advocate an open world economy, firmly support the multilateral trading regime, oppose protectionism, and rebalance economic globalization to make it more inclusive and equitable. And the need for a more just and equitable international order". Xi statement endorse liberal economic globalisation base on equity where there is no dominant power. Thus, President Xi suggests new type of major power relations between China and US based on equal footing. Even in European Headquarters, Xi alluded to commonality and equal partners to major powers and markets while denouncing the existence of hegemonic power (Brown 2017: 9).

The US dominant is palpable in international financial institutions such as IMF and WB, which is hallmark of western-led liberal order. These institutions operate on the basis of weighed voting system. Every member of the institutions is allowed to cast their vote but it heavily favours the countries that have more shares. For instance, as of 2003, IMF and WB have 184 members and out of these members US has the highest voting weight. It has 371,743 voting weight, which is 17.11 percent (16.41 percent in WB). The closest country to US in voting weight is Japan with 6.14 percent (7.87 percent in WB), followed by Germany with 6.00 percent (4.49 in WB), then France and UK with 4.95 percent (4.31 percent in WB). The decision-making requires supermajority in some matters. Inherently,

by virtue of its voting weight, US is the only country with veto power in these financial institutions (Leech 2003: 1-28). Even, Japan and U.S dominate the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As of 2014, Japan has subscribed capital of 15.677 percent and voting power of 12.840 percent and US has subscribed capital of 15.567 percent and voting power of 12.752 percent in ADB (Asian Development Bank, 2014).

Unlike the western dominated financial institutions, China led financial institutions operate on the principle of one country one vote. The amount of contributions and the size of country is immaterial in AIIB, NDB, SRF and BRI. What matters is consensus, cooperation and equality in the multilateral institutions. However, the fact that there are few hiccup like India, opposing the BRI especially the CPEC that allegedly transgress India's sovereignty. India has refused to attend the First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) held in Beijing. Despite India absence, it is reported that 29 head of states, 130 countries representatives and 70 international organisations have attended the forum (The State Council The People's Republic of China, 2017). India and US were conspicuously absent from the forum. The absence of India is a concern for China as India is a powerful neighbour and power politics between India and China could scuttle BRI in the region. On the positive aspect, India and China has move ahead despite differences. The latest case beings the Doklam issue where both resolve to amicably settle the issue. The BRICS, a multilateralism forum could be credited for dousing the tension between India and China on Doklam issue.

China understands the importance of multilateralism. Therefore, the BRI Forum Communiqué states that, "We reaffirm our shared commitment to build open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade, oppose all forms of protectionism including in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. We endeavour to promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system with WTO at its core". The BRI also enshrine cooperation principles, which are 1) Consultation on an equal footing: respecting others sovereignty and abiding by the international law, 2) Mutual Benefit: Finding common ground of interests for cooperation by accommodating others nations perspectives, 3) Harmony and Inclusiveness: respecting and acknowledging different culture and diversity that all are potential contributor to sustainable development, 4) Market-based operation: respecting the role of market while government perform its duty to keep the market open, transparent, and non-discriminatory procurement procedures, 5) Balance and Sustainability: the importance to

strike a balance among economic development, social progress and environment sustainability (Xinhua, 2017).

Conclusion

The emergence of China in the current international politics as an eminent power is the result of its economic growth. The present policy of BRI is to spread its economic pie around the globe that will ensure the sustenance of liberal international order of economic liberalisation but challenge the hegemonic liberal order of Western allies. As Trump steer US away from Paris Agreement, TPP, resort to trade protectionism, the possibility of China playing a leadership role increases in the contemporary politics. Above all, the BRI call for liberalisation of economy and sharing the benefits of economic benefits based on multilateralism and cooperation. The possibility of China creating liberal order in its own mirror image is a reality. The US needs to have a strategy to counter China's BRI move if it want to prolong its dominance. The current kneejerk reaction of Trump against China does not bode well for US led liberal order.

The China is not, in a true sense, challenging US dominance but demanding for parity in the international politics. The US has resorted to non-peaceful means and interfere in others nations internal affairs to which China has observed with disdain. China is seeking global position that would ensure its economy to flourish and keeps its political system. The BRI strategy is to expanse its influence and showcase its development model that western model is not necessary to achieve progress and modernisation. At the same time, it also provides an alternative to US that impose its condition to the country availing its economic aid. China's BRI does not impose any condition but seek cooperation by finding common convergence interests to make transnational trade feasible. Thus, any countries that are wary of US could expect to be part of China's BRI project and share the economic dividend. China has dole out attractive proposition in the BRI to countries that are in need of economic investment as the BRI dwell on mutual cooperation and mutual benefits. The US looking inward and bypassing international institutions could push the smaller countries closer to China. Although, it is too early to reach a verdict on BRI, it could possibly transform the international trade, connectivity and China stature in the international standing.

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The Role of Russian Researchers of the 19th Century in the Study of the Ancient Chinese Canon “Shangshu”²⁸

L.V. Stezhenskaya, M.A. Egorova

Abstract

In the West the 19th century is the key period in the study and translation of the Confucian “Book of Documents” or “Classic of History” (Chinese: “Shujing” or “Shangshu”). The achievements of English and French Sinology in this area are universally recognized, and the translations of James Legge into English (1865) and Séraphin Couvreur into French (1897) are rightfully considered to be classical all over the world. Only recently it became possible to better understand the contribution of Russian Sinology of the 19th century to the translation of “Shujing”. This article introduces the work of the Russian Sinologist of the first half of the 19th century – Archimandrite Daniil, who was engaged in the translation and study of “Shangshu”. Dmitry Petrovich Sivillov (1798-1871) was born in the Russian outback, in the Penza province. As part of the 10th Spiritual Mission he stayed in Beijing for 10 years, studied Chinese there, read Chinese classics, translated Russian church literature into Chinese. Daniil remained connected with the Russian Orthodox Church all through the period of his activity. He considered church ministry his vocation. The creation of a foundation for the emergence and development of university Sinology in Russia is related to the 10th mission. Archimandrite Daniil (Sivillov) became the first professor and Head of Russia’s first Department of Chinese Language, which was established at the Kazan Imperial University in 1837.

Keywords: Canon “Shangshu”, “Shujing”, “Book of Documents”, “Classic of History”, Chinese canonical books, Russian Sinology.

The 19th century is the key period in the study and translation of the Confucian “Canon of Tradition” (“Shujing”) in the West. The achievements of English and French sinology in this area are universally recognized, and the translations of James Legge into English (1865) and Séraphin Couvreur into French (1897) are rightfully considered classical all over the world. Only recently with the publication of the incomplete handwritten translation of 1822 by N. Y. Bichurin (1777-1853) (Ancient Chinese History 2014) for a wider audience, it became possible to better understand the contribution of Russian Sinology of the 19th century to the translation of “Shujing”. Another remarkable Russian Sinologist in the first half of the 19th century was Archimandrite Daniil. A younger contemporary of N. Y. Bichurin, Father Daniil [Dmitry Petrovich Sivillov (1798-

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1871)] in many respects repeated the path of his famous colleague. He, too, was born in the Russian outback, in the Penza province, in the family of a parishioner. As part of the 10th Spiritual Mission, he stayed in Beijing for 10 years, studied Chinese there, read Chinese classics, translated Russian church literature into Chinese. Unlike Bichurin, not only by life, but by all his activities Daniel remained connected with the Russian Orthodox Church. Having begun his journey in monasticism at the age of 20, Father Daniil reached the rank of dean of the Uglich monasteries in the Yaroslavl province. He apparently considered church ministry his vocation. After the completion of the 10th mission, the grateful Albazinians who wrote to Russia addressed their two “most exemplary fathers” – the head of the mission to Archimandrite Peter [Pavel Ivanovich Kamensky (1765-1845)] and the hieromonk, and from 1832 to the archimandrite, Daniil (Datsyshen & Chegodaev 2013: 297), who at one time was a member of the council and treasurer of the mission.

The 10th mission created the foundation for the emergence and development of university Sinology in Russia (Datsyshen & Chegodaev 2013: 299). Archimandrite Daniil (Sivillov) became the first professor and Head of the first Russian Department of Chinese language, established at the Kazan Imperial University in 1837. Scientific and teaching activities of Sivillov have already received some coverage in number of works (Skachkov 1977: 192-195, 417-419; “The history...” 1990: 123-124; Valeev 1998: 146-148). Unfortunately, literally just a few of the Sinological studies of Father Daniil were published during his lifetime and after his death. Apparently, not all his manuscripts survived. We are convinced of this statement by our own archival searches on the available bibliographic descriptions. Still a significant number of works and translations are available in various archives in Russia. These include the manuscript “Shujing, or Chronicle: One of the Canonical Books” in the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Empire. At one time the description of the manuscript was made by P. Y. Skachkov (Skachkov 1977: 418).

According to the date on the manuscript, the writing of the “Preface” for the translation of “Shujing” was completed on September 23th, 1855. In the same year Father Daniil sent his translations to the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire (Skachkov 1977: 195), from the library of which the manuscript was later submitted to the fund of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). It’s a thick book in a pockmarked dark brown cover with a sticker on it. The text is written by hand on plain paper, yellowed with age, about 20x30 cm wide. The ink is black, faded

over time, but the recordings are good. The manuscript has the form of a clean, rewritten version, the fields of which are then revised.

The date of the “Preface” suggests that the translation itself was performed earlier than the preface. In the “Preface” the translator says that this translation is included in the number of books he has already translated (*Shujing* or *Annals*: 12). At the same time, these “translations” and books sent to the Asian Department include those the translations done by Father Daniil in Kazan, i.e. until 1844 (Skachkov 1977: 418, numbers 9-12; Skachkov, cases 84, 85, 89, 90 of the AVPRI). In this case, we are dealing with a rather early European translation of “Shujing”. The first complete translation of Antoine Gaubil into French was published in 1770 (Le Chou-King 1770), and the second European full translation of Walter Henry Medhurst into English was published in Shanghai only in 1846 (Ancient China 1846). In 1855, Father Daniil could have already known about the English translation of W. H. Medhurst, but the message of the Russian translator about the existence of translations “into many of the most important languages of Europe” (*Shujing* or *Annals*: 12) still applies to all Chinese canonical books, and not only to “Shujing”. He could also have known about some partial translations of this book into European languages that appeared before and after the translation of A. Gaubil (Ancient Chinese texts 2014: 999-1013). In any case, this does not detract from the importance of the Russian translation of Father Daniil, it only allows to expand the field of comparative studies of various translations.

Teaching in Kazan could have played a role in the choice of Father Daniil as the commented original of the Canon of Records with explanations and comments for daily studies (Rì jiǎng Shūjīng jiěyì 日講書經解義), in fact popular, was intended for the education of young emperors and grand dukes of 1680 under the leadership of the Manchu dignitary Kulena.

A noteworthy estimate of Father Daniil of modern Confucianism as the “dominant religion in China”, while in his opinion, the ancient Confucian canons contain “pre-religious concepts” (*Shujing* or *Annals*: 2). This corresponds to the attitude of the Catholic Church of that time to “Chinese rites” (including the cult of Confucius), but differs somewhat from the assessments of Confucius and the ideology of the ancient Chinese classics by Jesuit (and later by other Catholic) missionaries in China of the 17th-18th centuries.

Like N. Y. Bichurin, Father Daniil pointed out the great importance of “Shujing” in the development of Chinese civilization, but apparently was more inclined to historicism

in his approach to the phenomena of life in Modern China, emphasizing the principles of canonization of Confucian classics in the national psychology of the Chinese and the presence of many other “discoveries and legitimations” in the historical life of China.

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Chinese Learners in Italian Secondary School Exploring Error Analysis and Methodological Perspectives

Tommaso Rossi

Abstract

Over the past fifteen years, Chinese language curricula have become very popular in Italian higher education. Despite the extensive research that has been conducted to assess linguistic levels and errors across national and European universities, data on Chinese language outcomes and error analysis in secondary education system are still extremely poor.

The aim of our study was to determine the occurrence and typology of errors committed by Chinese learners in Italian high school, along their transitional competence phase. The analysis might help identify the didactic and methodological factors which could have significantly induced inter-intralinguistic errors. The experiment was conducted on nearly 120 students from an Italian foreign language secondary school.

Results indicate that most of interlinguistic errors are found in the first two years, although some interferences from L1 persist until the end of the learning process; characters memorization and handwriting can be affected by morphological and didactic reasons; phonetics is still too disregarded in students' preparation and finally, contextual factors may strongly impact on Chinese learners' beliefs and performances. This evidence may provide the basis for a reflection on Chinese language teaching techniques and materials for secondary students in the Italian context.

Keywords: Chinese learning outcome, error analysis, interlanguage, beliefs, learning technology

In Italy, Chinese language teaching and research have registered great advancement over the last two decades. Although the situation on a national scale seems well-spread and rather heterogeneous, we can classify some excellent academic realities with long-lasting and productive research teams, as those of Ca' Foscari University Venice, Orientale University of Naples, and, afterwards, La Sapienza in Rome. In the wake of the global trend, the multicultural (sub)urban contexts, and the new job challenges, the interest in Asian languages – especially Modern Chinese – has extraordinarily increased: Confucius Institutes are now spread all over the country in connection with University campuses, private and public centres offering Chinese language courses have multiplied by over 80%, while the number of Chinese teachers and instructors hired in this field has increased by nearly 200%, and, finally, the graduates in Asian studies have seen an unprecedented upsurge over the last 15 years (Bulfoni & Pozzi 2014). Within this fragmented scenario, there is one particular learning environment which deserves special attention firstly

because it is still in the experimental stage, secondly because the target-students differ from all other contexts, thirdly because of the particular learning-acquisition process: this is the Secondary School.

Secondary institutions (public and semi-public) in Italy have been going through the experimental phase of Chinese language curricula for almost 15 years and the standardization of language outcomes is yet to come. According to the M.I.U.R. regulation framework (MIUR 2010), the standard proficiency level expected at the conclusion of a 5-year Chinese course in high school²⁹ is intermediate: at least B1 according to CEFR³⁰. Apparently, the first element standing out is that the indications do not consider the typological distance (D'Annunzio 1969) between students' L1 (normally Italian), the other European languages they study (English, French or other) and Mandarin Chinese (newly introduced). This may lead to think that Chinese language learners should get the same proficiency as French or English learners studying the same amount of hours, for the same number of years and (presumably) in the framework of similar teaching methods and techniques (Lafirenza 1997). To look into this, I found it particularly relevant to examine the reality of Chinese curricula in Italian secondary education from three main perspectives: a) student motivation and beliefs, b) learners' errors, c) learning strategies.

The target school selected for the case study is a Modern Language High School in Northern Italy, whose Chinese curriculum includes five classes. The on-site investigation started in April 2017 and consisted of three phases: in-class observation, paper-based survey, data analysis. The observation was carried out during Chinese speaking classes held by a native teacher and during grammar classes held by the tenured teacher, who is normally Italian. The conversation classes mainly follow a communicative and situational approach. At the first learning stages the method especially relies on picture-word association and sound-word association; in this way over 70% of the contents are taught through digital tools, such as interactive boards. During the intermediate learning stage, the teaching techniques involve reading comprehension, guided debate, topic-presentation and opinion-sharing; the approach sticks to a "global-to-analytic" sequence. Grammar lessons comprise both deductive and inductive methods, the teacher follows both a formalistic approach and a situational approach, leading students to infer the

²⁹ In this case it has to be intended as the Modern Language High School, a specific curriculum where students study three modern languages for 5 years.

³⁰ Common European Framework for Foreign Languages.

grammar structures behind situational dialogues or short essays. Grammar lessons generally stop at the beginning of 4th year, giving way to culture and literature classes.

After one month of observation, I administered the paper survey, which consisted of six components: 1) a background questionnaire, 2) a BALLI-Plus questionnaire, 3) a “think aloud” questionnaire about learning strategies, 4) a Chinese characters handwriting and written production test, 5) a vocabulary comprehension and pinyin recognition test, 6) IT-CH translation test. The target students consisted of 118 students divided in five classes. The research outcomes show an interesting reality to some extent compatible with the European learning scenario.

Considering the motivation for learning Chinese language, the sampled students declared two main motivational orientations. The first orientation is integrative (27%), so it induces to think the students wish to learn more about the Chinese cultural community because they might be interested in it, feel an emotional identification with it or want to become members of it (Gardner & Lambert 1972). This may find its root in the increasing presence of Chinese immigrants in Italian schools who somehow affect Italian students’ emotional sphere. The second orientation declared by over 60% of the sample is instrumental: the students hope to benefit from the language they intend to study, especially for career opportunities and personal advancement. The questionnaire shows this motivation pattern is stable and constant throughout the curriculum, and appears even stronger at the first learning stages.

Through the BALLI Plus questionnaire I could see the beliefs about Chinese learning vary in accordance with the increasing awareness gained along the learning process, so students’ perceptions are likely a subject to the learning stages and the level of confidence with the language. In fact, 1st year students have completely unaware beliefs, especially on the nature of the language itself: 72% of the them believe that studying Chinese is much harder than studying European languages (the percentage decreases to 62% among senior students). Over 75% think that characters are definitely the most difficult component when studying Chinese, while only 15% of them consider the tones as the hardest component. This may lead to the conclusion that probably the teaching method they experienced focused more on the written performance than on the oral one, so they may have perceived the difficulty in terms of study time spent to reach a goal. To look into the educational and cultural environment, intermediate students declared to see a strong connection between the study commitment and the learning environment. In particular, 84% of the sample believe their commitment depends (and will depend) mostly on the

adoption of the right teaching method able to clarify, attract and involve. Unlike this scenario, over 50% of first stage students declare their personal commitment depends on the grade obtained and on the level acquired compared with their classmates', this evidence proves once more how strong the instrumental motivation is during the first stage of the learning process.

Since the late 60', error analysis has acquired a new importance in L2 acquisition: the error, once considered a negative incident to foresee and avoid, has increased its research value and has turned into an inevitable aspect, even necessary for a regular acquisition process (Corder 1967). The error classification phase was quite hard, it was not rare to see sentences apparently acceptable³¹ which contained errors detectable only after an analytic reading (ref. overtly idiosyncratic errors and covertly idiosyncratic errors (Corder 1971)).

Up to the third year, students often commit interlinguistic errors (Selinker 1972), probably because the adherence to L1 heavily affects the acquisition process as long as the L2 code is precarious (or presumably so). Most of the structural errors occurring at this stage of the process (up to 40%) involve adjective+noun (AN), noun+adjective (NA), adverb+verb (Adv.V) and verb+adverb (VAdv.) word order utterances. The research reveals that after studying Chinese for over two years, the learner still has problems with word order. For example, (01) demonstrates word order error involving AN, and (02) proves word order error involving Adv.V:

(01a) * 我不喜欢城市法国的

(01b) 我不喜欢法国的城市

(02a)* 保罗学汉语努力

(02b) 保罗努力学汉语

In case (01), *Faguo de* modifies the noun *chengshi*, so it must precede it in the noun phrase, as in 01b. In (02) *nuli* is an adverb which modifies the verb phrase *xue hanyu*, so the regular order is the one in 02b. Considering the whole range of syntactic errors, the highest occurrence I registered involves order violation of modifiers, especially adverb phrases and Time+Place phrases, such as in examples (03), (04), (05), (06) and (07).

(03a) *我是学生的汉语班

(03b) 我是汉语班的学生

³¹ 'Acceptable' refers to those statements considered by a native speaker well built and appropriate at a first sight.

(04a) *也我会说汉语

(04b) 我也会说汉语

(05a) *我遇到了马可在街上

(05b) 我在街上遇到了马可

(06a) *我们上课八点半

(06b) 我们八点半上课

(07a) *他说日语得很流利

(07b) 他日语说得很流利

In case (03), *Hanyu ban de* modifies the noun phrase *xuesheng*, so it must precede it as in 03b; in (04) the adverb *ye* must occupy the regular position before the verb phrase as in 04b; in (05) the locative phrase *zai jie shang* introduced by the preposition *zai* is a pre-verbal constituent so must appear as in 05b; the same principle is applicable for a time phrase, as in 06b. Different conditions are observed in (07), where the adjective *liuli* standing for a post-verbal complement cannot be separated from the verb phrase by the object *Riyu*, one of the possible solutions is to anticipate *Riyu*, as in 07b. Intermediate and Upper-intermediate students (3rd and 4th year) commit more covertly idiosyncratic errors. Along the third year, learners have to face written production tasks for the first time and, as the learning process does not take place in a language-immersion environment, they still too often rely on a translational approach. The typological erroneous forms are basically: a) “SVO structure” is commonly preferred to the more conventional “topic-comment structure”; b) the erroneous use of dictionary often leads to word misuse, as in (08) or (09).

(08a) *罗马有很多人口

(08b) 罗马人口很多

(09a) *在会上，我认识没有人

(09b) 在会上，我一个人也不认识

In (08), the verb *you* is unnecessary as *renkou hen duo* represents the comment to the topic *Luoma*; while in (09) the student has evidently consulted the dictionary in a wrong way: *meiyou ren* probably means “anybody/nobody” but cannot fit in the position of an object.

A section of the test was completely dedicated to word/character recognition, 78% of the sampled students declared that two factors mostly affect their ability to recognize

and write: a) word occurrence in the didactic materials and pattern drills; b) number of strokes and shape complexity. The test was administered without dictionary, the words in it were all extracted from the textbook in use and the short passages ranged from A1 to C1 level. Senior students demonstrated the ability to recognize over 70% of the characters giving the right translation in Italian and a rough pronunciation (students underestimate the importance of phonetics) but could only write 45% of them. Moreover, 62% of the sample showed evident difficulty to handwrite the components and the overall shape of characters counting over 11-13 strokes.

Considering the role of learning strategies in L2 acquisition process, the most relevant outcome is that 65% of the sample show very passive and conventional learning strategies: around 78% memorise the graphic form only through repetitive writing exercise, 64% memorise the pronunciation of a word reading it aloud several times or consulting the book glossary, less than 60% memorise the meanings trying to remember the components/radicals or the story behind the characters. Just a small number of students (around 18%), those who show higher proficiency in Chinese (according to the grade declared) rely on active and individualised learning strategies, such as a) associating old and new characters to memorise the graphic shape and the meaning, b) creating personal lists of words divided in semantic categories, c) making extensive use of digital Apps to improve character recognition skills.

In conclusion, matching the learning strategies with the learners' errors may help envisage a potential advancement in Chinese teaching methodology within Secondary Institutions. I could observe a connection between a dynamic and pro-active study method (i.e. the use of learning technologies) and the reached learning outcomes. Students who declared to use smartphone apps for characters and stroke sequence memorization, HSK preparation software, and digital dictionaries have shown much higher performances in character recognition and also phonetics (the most disregarded aspect). This may prove that the effective didactics should move in the direction of a globally comprehensive methodology. It may include formalism, situational approach, grammar-translational approach, communicative method, but cannot exclude the constant and extensive adoption of digital devices to be used individually and collectively. In Italian curricula, the insertion of multimedia in classroom environment could potentially contribute to solve some typological issues in Chinese teaching, as tone reproduction, syntax violation and character recognition-writing.

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“一带一路”构想的文化内涵与特点

姚广宜

Abstract

"The Belt and Road Initiative" concept is the contemporary show of Chinese ancient Silk Road cultural value. It is not only a way to promote the economic development of China, but also an important channel to spread Chinese culture, condense cooperation and development with countries along the road, promote the soft power of Chinese culture. In the process of practicing the target of "The Belt and Road Initiative", it regards culture as soul, openness and inclusiveness as connotation while multiplex symbiosis as characteristics, which presents brand new idea and guiding of cultural values.

内容提要“一带一路”构想是中国古丝绸之路文化价值的当代显现,它不仅是推动中国经济发展的途径,更是传播中国文化、凝聚中国与沿线国家的合作与发展、提升中国文化软实力的重要渠道。在践行“一带一路”目标的伟大进程中,“一带一路”以文化为灵魂,以“开放包容”为内涵,以“多元共生”为特点,展现了全新的文化价值理念和导引。

关键词: 一带一路, 文化, 开放包容, 多元共生

一带一路 (One Belt One Road) 又简称“OBOR”, 是“丝绸之路经济带”和“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”两者的简称。2013 年 9 月 7 日, 习近平主席在哈萨克斯坦纳扎尔巴耶夫大学发表演讲, 提出了建设丝绸之路经济带和 21 世纪海上丝绸之路的“一带一路”战略目标。同年 10 月 3 日, 习近平主席在印度尼西亚国会发表重要演讲时明确提出, 中国致力于加强同东盟国家的互联互通建设, 愿同东盟国家发展好海洋合作伙伴关系, 共同建设“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”。

“一带一路”构想是中国古丝绸之路文化价值的当代显现,它不仅是推动中国经济发展的途径,更是传播中国文化、凝聚中国与沿线国家的合作与发展、提升中国文化软实力的重要渠道。在践行“一带一路”目标的伟大进程中,“一带一路”以文化为灵魂,以“开放包容”为内涵,以“多元共生”为特点,展现了全新的文化价值理念和导引。

一、“一带一路”以文化为灵魂

“一带一路”不仅仅是一个空间概念和经济合作战略,它更是一个建立在历史文化概念影响基础之上的文化影响力的具象,是用文化将历史、现实与未来连接在一起的中国面向全球化的战略架构。放眼世界历史,中国文化既坚守优秀传统又与时俱进、展现出强大的生命力和创造力。

中国文化博大精深、源远流长，它以独有的凝聚力和认同感团结整个民族，影响着世界历史的发展。中国的文化，诸如文字、艺术、科技、伦理、民俗、货币、制度等等，曾经以其广泛的亲和力和深刻的感召力，为周边民族所尊崇和仰慕；其影响力北至日本、南及越南的广大地区，进而形成一个具有强大生命力的汉文化圈。古丝绸之路的开辟，使中国文化进一步走向世界，更加绚丽夺目、光彩照人（Shuang 2016）。

文化是活的生命，是价值共识，是延续着一个国家和民族的精神血脉。文化作为“一带一路”的灵魂，它承载着丝绸之路沿线各国发展繁荣的梦想，顺应了合作、共赢、和平、发展的时代潮流。我们倡导“一带一路”要文化先行的战略，这不仅是对古丝绸之路精神的继承与发扬，更重要的是通过文化交流传播可以增强“一带一路”倡议的吸引力，促进各领域的合作共赢，推动中国与沿途各国的全方位、多领域的交流、合作与认同、在弘扬中国文化精神的同时，深入体察沿线国家的社会民生诉求，为中国与沿线国家的经贸合作和科教互动提供了文化价值指引。

需要强调的是，文化作为沟通民心的桥梁和交流感情的纽带，其影响往往潜移默化、润物无声，超越时空，跨越国界。“一带一路”涉及 60 多个国家、数十亿人口，沿线各国经济发展水平不同、政治生态各异、利益诉求多元、国家间关系复杂微妙。然而，国之交在于民相亲，民相亲在于心相通。只有充分挖掘沿线国家深厚的文化底蕴，深入开展文化交流与合作，让沿线国家、人民彼此之间加深理解、增进信任，产生共同语言，形成经济共享、利益交汇，才能有效化解分歧、共同发展、互利共赢。

尽管文化在“一带一路”实施过程中具有重要的潜在作用，但这些作用和价值很难自发产生，需要自下而上的高度重视和有意识地发掘与推进，因此，在实施“一带一路”战略布局中，要发挥文化的先行优势，通过密切高层交往、文化互访，双向交流等方式，推进“一带一路”战略的实施。要努力促进民间的交往与合作，通过举办文化活动、开展文化贸易交流，使文化资源互通共享；要积极促进人员往来和人文交流，扩大沿线各国在教育、科技、文化等领域的合作，维系好沿线各国人民世代友好的情感纽带，进而夯实国家建设和发展的根基。此外，我们还要积极倡导和大力发展文化产业，在经济较发达地区设置文化产业园，以文化产业带动文化领域的合作，推进“一带一路”战略木料的实现。

二、“一带一路”体现了“开放包容”的文化内涵

习近平主席所提出的“和平合作、开放包容、互学互鉴、互利共赢”是“一带一路”不同于以往经济全球化框架的全新理念，体现了丝绸之路“开放包容”的文化内涵。这一倡议，旨在借用丝路精神，与沿线国家和地区在发展理念和价值观上形成共识，推动经济、文化的交流与合作，打造政治互信、经济融合、文化开放包容的共同体。

站在这一高度，一些学者认为，“一带一路”所体现的“开放包容”具有以下几个特征：

其一，合作理念的开放包容。即所谓“和平发展和互利共赢”。围绕这一理念推进“一带一路”合作，我们概括为三个“共”，即共商、共建和共享。

其二，合作空间上的开放包容。“一带一路”合作空间范围是以亚欧大陆作为核心，延伸到非洲、大洋洲，随着这一计划的全方位推进，会有越来越多的国家参与到“一带一路”的合作平台上。

其三，合作领域的开放包容。“一带一路”要实施所谓“五通”，即政策沟通、设施联通、货物畅通、资金融通和民心相通。这“五通”是互为基础，相应关照，既适合“一带一路”国家之间的经济融通与文化交流，也满足了“一带一路”不同国家的发展需要。

其四，合作方式的开放包容。这一方式既包含着机制性的合作方式，即愿景和行动当中提到一系列的机制，诸如上海合作组织、清迈倡议、中国东盟自贸区、亚投行丝路基金等，也包括未来的 RCEP 等其他的机制。这些机制的构建与沟通推进未来“一带一路”建设走向繁荣（Zhang 2015）。

关于包容，这里特别强调的是“文化包容”（cultural tolerance），它是“一带一路”包容性的核心内含。我们必须清醒地看到，“一带一路”沿线国家是四种文明、上百种语言并存之路，其中多数国家并不发达，文化差异巨大，误解和摩擦在所难免，因此，在“走出去”的过程中，我们应照顾和重视沿线各国合理的、正当的、实际的需求和利益，以赢取沿线国家的认同、信任和尊重；我们还要特别注意自己的行为和举止，以释放诚心、展现善意，以平等、友善、互助、合作的姿态与沿线各国民众交往、交流，避免沿线国家对中国产生疑惑、影响“一带一路”的战略部署（Liang 2015）。只有如此，才能“达则兼济天下”，最终和各国实现共赢。

“一带一路”作为知古鉴今、面向未来的合作倡议，它是对古丝绸之路“和平合作、开放包容、互学互鉴、互利共赢”精神的传承和弘扬，也必将为沿线各国经济社会和文化发展带来新机遇。

三、“一带一路”体现文化的多元与共生

“一带一路”是当今中国的一个热点问题，也是古丝绸之路的文化传播在当代的反映，更是多元文化交流的重要表现。众所周知，人类文明因多元才有传播与交流合作的價值，多元产生交流，交流孕育融合，融合促进进步。文化在交流中传播，在多元化中合作，在新模式下创新，在共识下认同，在共生、共享中共进（Wei 2016）。

人类的存在其实质就是文化的共生。文化作为一个民族的灵魂与生命，同承载着这种文化的民族共生共存。这种文化的共生还表现为其与政治、经济、科技等领域的融合并进，显现出综合竞争中的国力与地位。

需要强调的是，文化的共生性是与差异性并存的。共生性是弥合差异性的基础，差异性又成为沟通交流的动力，彼此相互碰撞、借鉴、补充，构成相互理解的基础与纽带。

当然，我们也要充分注意到，“一带一路”沿线国家的经济发展水平不等、社会习俗和文化信仰各异，如何协同好这样一个多元化的主体，一个相互联系的精神文化纽带必不可少。我们必须尊重文化的多样性，坚持文化多元与共生，在维护各自的文化权益中实现共同发展，从而凝聚起“一带一路”建设的强大力量。

具体而言，我们提出以下几点建议：

（一）要不断拓展和强化文化认同和思想共识。

首先，要坚持自主发展，构建主导交流与合作的文化主体。不同的文化源是进行文化交流与合作的基础，古老的丝绸之路沿线各国都有着丰富的文化遗产和各自不同的文化认同，对此，不同的文化主题在保持自主性的基础上不断缩小这种差异性十分必要。这就要求文化交流合作主体，一方面要始终坚守自身的文化传统，另一方面要保持自身的文化特色，要以自身独到的眼光和分辨力兼收并蓄而不失自我。只有这样，才能获得文化交流合作赖以形成的牢固基础。

其次，彼此互尊，平等相待。“一带一路”要遵循各国间平等的原则，以此为基础，相互信任、相互支持、共赢共进，共同发展。要注重集思广益，充分发挥各方的智慧

；协同合作，推进文化的融通、共享与共建；要以文化合作项目建设为着力点，以文化习惯和信仰为尺度，把握文化交流的频度和热度，通过双向的文化建设，使沿线各国、各族人民共同收益、共享彼此的文化成果。

其三，尊重和保持自身的文化差异性，形成文化交流合作的价值认同。古丝绸之路是多元文化传播与交流的价值体现。多元必然产生差异，差异促进交流。“一带一路”沿线是一个文化多元与差异并存的地带，文化的共享与共生需要我们在尊重文化多样性的基础上，形成价值认同，以包容互鉴来不断促进文化差异的兼收并蓄、交流协作、和谐共进。

（二）广泛拓展文化交流合作的领域，提升文化的价值层次和水准。

其一，树立全新的合作理念，探寻正确的合作方法和途径。“一带一路”所倡导的文化交流与合作理念，是新形势下的价值理念导引，我们既要站在高点看世界，也要立足世界看中国，要积极拓展新的合作交流路径，把握文化融通与协作的关键要素，不断提升文化交流与合作的文化价值层次和水准，推动沿线各国文化共同迈上新台阶。

其二，建立和完善文化交流合作机制的新模式。建立和完善交流合作机制的新模式，是推进“一带一路”文化交流与合作的重要手段。首先，机制的建立，离不开相应的政策导向，以此来引导文化交流合作方向和轨迹。其次，要体现系统性，建立各层次、各领域的合作交流机制，并形成不同机制的相互配合和互补。此外，要注意灵活性，避免单一化和模式化，同时随着形势和环境的不断变化，要对已经形成的机制进行相应的调整和完善。

其三，着力打造文化交流合作品牌。品牌的打造要发挥各国艺术家的想象力和创造力，要立足于文化艺术的精品，围绕“一带一路”的建设主题，依托各国自身的文化资源，共建一批文化合作示范项目；此外，还可以协同创建系列跨境文化交流活动，并以此为窗口，展现其文化形象，在不断加深了解的基础上扩大交往、增进感情、促进合作。

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